FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LEE GORDON LAMB, No. 16-35847
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00909-MC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JERI TAYLOR; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 12, 2018**
Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges
Lee Gordon Lamb, an Oregon state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eighth
Amendment and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review de novo, Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013), and
we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lamb’s Eighth
Amendment failure-to-protect claim because Lamb failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether allowing supervised interaction with Lamb’s
assailant posed an objectively substantial risk of harm or whether defendants knew
of and disregarded that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)
(“[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
[failing to protect an inmate] unless the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”).
The district court properly dismissed Lamb’s state law claims against
defendants in their official capacities because these claims for damages are barred
by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Sato v. Orange Cty. Dep’t of Educ., 861
F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 2017) (standard of review); Brown v. Or. Dep’t of Corr.,
751 F.3d 983, 989 (9th Cir. 2014). To the extent that Lamb seeks injunctive relief
for these state law claims, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. See Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law
claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered . . . will
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point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims.”); Brown
v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review).
AFFIRMED.
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