UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4015
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEANTHONY MARCELLE SLIGH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:04-cr-00133-NCT-1)
Submitted: July 6, 2018 Decided: July 25, 2018
Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eugene E. Lester III, SHARPLESS & STAVOLA, P.A., Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Leanthony Marcelle Sligh appeals the district court’s order revoking his supervised
release and sentencing him to 18 months of imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the
sentence is plainly unreasonable. Sligh was advised of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but has not done so. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review a sentence imposed as a result of a supervised release violation to
determine whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d
370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). The first step in this analysis is a determination of whether the
sentence is unreasonable; in making this determination, we follow the procedural and
substantive considerations employed in reviewing original sentences. United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). Although a district court must consider the
policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines along with the statutory
factors, “the court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and
impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Id. at 439 (internal
quotation marks omitted). If a sentence imposed after a revocation is not unreasonable, we
will not proceed to the second prong of the analysis—whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable. Id. at 438-39.
A district court must adequately explain a revocation sentence, “whether the district
court imposes an above, below, or within-Guidelines sentence.” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A court
need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when
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imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, in conducting the
individualized assessment, the district court must consider the defendant’s nonfrivolous
arguments for a sentence outside of the Guidelines range. United States v. Slappy, 872
F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that
the district court sufficiently explained the chosen sentence, rejecting Sligh’s arguments
for a below-Guidelines sentence, and the sentence is not unreasonable. It follows,
therefore, that the sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with the requirements of Anders
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the district court. This court requires that counsel inform Sligh, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Sligh requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Sligh. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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