UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4340
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRELL JAMAR HOUSTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.
(S. Ct. No. 17-6520)
Decided on Remand: July 26, 2018
Before TRAXLER, AGEE * and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ross Richardson, Executive Director, Ann L. Hester, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF
WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill
Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina,
*
Judge Davis participated in the original decision but retired prior to the
Supreme Court’s remand of the case and was replaced by Judge Agee.
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Terrell Jamar Houston entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon , see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), reserving the right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The district court sentenced Houston to 37
months’ imprisonment. On appeal to this court, we held that the district court properly
denied the motion to suppress based on our decision in United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d
117 (4th Cir. 1994). In Wellons, we held that a driver of a rental car who is not listed on
the rental contract as an authorized driver has no expectation of privacy in the car or
containers in the car and that the driver’s Fourth Amendment rights therefore were not
violated by a warrantless search of the rental car and its contents. See id. at 119-20.
In Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018), however, the Supreme Court held
that “the mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is not listed
on the rental agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of
privacy.” Id. at 1531. Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Byrd abrogated our
decision in Wellons, the Court vacated our decision in this case and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Byrd. Having considered the Supreme Court’s decision, we
hereby vacate the decision of the district court and remand for further proceedings. The
district court should consider the matter de novo in light of Byrd, and the parties are free
to raise any newly relevant issues.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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