MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 09 2018, 9:48 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael R. Fisher Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Henry A. Flores, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Christopher Dixon, August 9, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-303
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark D. Stoner,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G06-1706-F1-21166
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-303 | August 9, 2018 Page 1 of 9
[1] Christopher Dixon appeals his convictions for five counts of Level 1 Felony
Child Molesting.1 Dixon argues that there is insufficient evidence supporting
one of the convictions and that the trial court gave an erroneous jury
instruction. Finding sufficient evidence and no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] Between July 2015 and November 2016, then-eleven-year-old A.J. lived with
her great aunt and Dixon, who was her aunt’s husband. During this time,
Dixon molested A.J. multiple times. She testified to the following five
occurrences:
• Dixon asked A.J. to come into his bedroom to help him with a cell
phone issue. He asked her to perform oral sex and she complied.
• Once, late at night, Dixon and A.J. were in the family room when he
demanded that she perform oral sex. She did so, and he then put
Vaseline on his penis, took her clothes off, and—ignoring her saying
“no”—rubbed his penis between her “butt cheeks.” Tr. Vol. III p. 2-3.
• A third incident occurred when A.J. asked Dixon for chocolate cake. He
said she could only have cake if she would perform oral sex. She
complied.
• Once, A.J. was sleeping on the couch in the family room late at night.
Dixon woke her up and rubbed his penis between her “butt cheeks.” Id.
at 6.
• A fifth incident occurred in Dixon’s bedroom when he promised A.J.
that he would talk to her aunt about A.J. having exclusive control of the
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-303 | August 9, 2018 Page 2 of 9
shared household computer if she would perform oral sex. She
complied.
A.J. eventually told other family members about the molestations. They
notified the police.
[3] On June 7, 2017, the State charged Dixon with five counts of Level 1 felony
child molesting, one count of Level 4 felony child molesting, three counts of
Level 5 felony child solicitation, and one count of Level 6 felony dissemination
of matter harmful to minors. On January 23, 2018, after a two-day trial, the
jury found Dixon guilty of five counts of Level 1 felony child molesting, one
count of Level 4 felony child molesting, and one count of Level 5 felony child
solicitation.2 The trial court found that the Level 4 and Level 5 felonies merged
into the Level 1 felonies. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Dixon to
consecutive terms of thirty years for two of the Level 1 felonies and to
concurrent terms of forty years on the other three Level 1 felonies, for an
aggregate sixty-year sentence. Dixon now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency
[4] Dixon first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support one of the Level 1
felony child molesting convictions. When reviewing the sufficiency of the
2
The jury found Dixon not guilty of two of the child solicitation charges and the trial court dismissed the
dissemination of matter harmful to minors charge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-303 | August 9, 2018 Page 3 of 9
evidence to support a conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence
and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction and will neither assess
witness credibility nor reweigh the evidence. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144,
146 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm unless no reasonable factfinder could find the
elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[5] Dixon argues, essentially, that the evidence does not support a conclusion that
the first and fifth incidents set forth above were different incidents. Instead, he
argues that the only possible conclusion is that they were the same incident.
With respect to the first incident, A.J. testified as follows:
Answer: [Dixon] had walked in and he claimed, he said he
needed help with his phone. And I usually helped
him with his phone. So I went to his room to help
him, well, I thought I was going to help him with
his phone.
***
Question: So what happened after you got to his room?
***
Answer: Okay. So we had this computer—And I’m telling it
like what happened. We had this computer and it
was a gray computer and so when we get to his
room to help him with his phone that’s when I was
asked to suck his penis.
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Tr. Vol. II p. 246-47. With respect to the fifth incident, the following discussion
occurred:
Question: You mentioned something about a computer
previously?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Can you tell me what happened with the computer?
Answer: He had went up—Like what happened after—
Question: No. No. Sorry. You said one of the instances
involved a computer?
Answer: Yes. And you want to know what happened
before?
Question: I want to know what did he say about the
computer?
***
Answer: He just told me he was going to [A.J.’s aunt] and
ask if I could have it for myself.
Question: Now did he want you to do anything in exchange
for the computer?
Answer: Yes.
***
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-303 | August 9, 2018 Page 5 of 9
Question: What did he want you to do in exchange for a
computer?
Answer: Suck his penis.
Tr. Vol. III p. 40-41.
[6] Dixon contends that because A.J. referred to a computer in her description of
the first incident, the only possible conclusion is that the first and fifth incidents
are the same. We disagree. It is readily apparent that the first incident revolved
around Dixon’s claim of cell phone issues. At no point in describing the fifth
incident did A.J. refer to a cell phone. Instead, the fifth incident revolved
around bribery for the exclusive use of the household computer. And although
A.J. briefly referred to the presence of a computer when describing the first
incident, at no point did she mention any bribery related to that computer. We
agree with the State that at most, the evidence presented a factual dispute to be
resolved by the jury. Dixon’s argument to the contrary requires us to reweigh
the evidence, which we may not do. We find the evidence sufficient to support
each of these convictions.
II. Jury Instruction
[7] Dixon next argues that the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction. When
evaluating jury instructions on appeal, we look to whether the tendered
instruction correctly stated the law, whether there is evidence in the record to
support giving the instruction, and whether the substance of the proffered
instruction is covered by other instructions. Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-303 | August 9, 2018 Page 6 of 9
636 (Ind. 2010). We will reverse only if the instructional error prejudiced the
defendant’s substantial rights. Id.
[8] To address concerns regarding jury unanimity, the trial court provided the
following instruction:
The Defendant, Christopher Dixon, is accused of being at least
21 years of age and of having performed or submitted to other
sexual conduct against [A.J.], a child under the age of 14 years
old.
The State has presented evidence that the defendant may have
committed more than one act of child molesting against [A.J.]
during an unspecified general time period. Before you may find
the defendant guilty of any count, you must all unanimously find
and agree the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each
element of that count as previously given to you. You may not
combine or mix the events together to reach a single verdict.
Each count must be considered separately, individually, and
must be proven unanimously before you can convict.
Specifically, you must find:
AS TO COUNT 1:
That the defendant committed the act of child molesting against
[A.J.] involving having performed or submitted to other sexual
conduct against [A.J.] for the first time in the defendant’s
bedroom.
AS TO COUNT 2:
That the defendant committed the act of child molesting against
[A.J.] involving having performed or submitted to other sexual
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-303 | August 9, 2018 Page 7 of 9
conduct against [A.J.] in the family room where [A.J.] and the
defendant were the only ones present.
AS TO COUNT 3:
That the defendant committed the act of child molesting against
[A.J.] involving having performed or submitted to other sexual
conduct against [A.J.] at or near the time of a birthday party.
AS TO COUNT 4:
That the defendant committed the act of child molesting against
[A.J.] involving having performed or submitted to other sexual
conduct against [A.J.] involving discussions about a computer.
AS TO COUNT 5:
That the defendant committed the act of child molesting against
[A.J.] involving having performed or submitted to other sexual
conduct against [A.J.] in the family room where Tyshawn and
[A.J.]’s cousin were sleeping.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 149-51. Dixon argues that this instruction confused
the jury because there is no factual basis for both Count 1 and Count 4; the
foundation for this argument is the same contention he raised regarding
sufficiency of the evidence.
[9] Initially, we note that Dixon has waived this argument for two reasons. First,
he failed to tender his own proposed jury instruction on the issue. See, e.g.,
Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169, 1178 (Ind. 2011) (holding that a failure to
tender an instruction results in waiver of the issue for review). Second, while he
objected to the instruction, he offered a different argument to the trial court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-303 | August 9, 2018 Page 8 of 9
than he offers on appeal. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 34 N.E.3d 258, 263 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015) (appellant waives argument if he made one argument to the trial
court and presents a different one on appeal), trans. denied.
[10] Waiver notwithstanding, we do not find Dixon’s argument to be persuasive. As
noted above, we found the evidence sufficient to support Dixon’s convictions
for both incidents, so we disagree that the instruction is confusing because of a
lack of factual basis for both molestations. Nor do we find the instruction as a
whole confusing or misleading in any way. We agree with the State that the
instruction provided the jury with helpful direction and guidance as to what,
specifically, it had to find to render a guilty verdict for each count. The trial
court’s decision to give this jury instruction was not erroneous.
[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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