MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Aug 09 2018, 8:31 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael R. Fisher Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Caleb Bixler, August 9, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
49A04-1712-CR-2847
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kurt Eisgruber,
Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Trial Court No. 49G01-1508-MR-
29145
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Caleb Bixler (Bixler), appeals his conviction for murder,
a felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[3] Bixler presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as the following:
(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence;
and
(2) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
to sustain Bixler’s murder conviction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] In August of 2015, Bixler, Keith Cornwell (Cornwell), Ricky Ogden (Ogden),
John Murphy (Murphy), and Ron Trahan (Trahan) were all residing in a two-
story house located on the east side of Indianapolis, Indiana. Trahan occupied
the downstairs bedroom. One of the two upstairs bedrooms was shared by
Ogden and Murphy, while Cornwell and Bixler shared the other. Cornwell did
not get along with Trahan, and in the past, they had engaged in verbal and
physical altercations over rent, food, and keeping their home clean.
[5] On August 13, 2015, at around 2:00 a.m., Bixler, Cornwell, and Trahan left the
house together. At approximately 5:00 a.m., Bixler and Cornwell returned to
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the house without Trahan. Murphy awoke and went out to speak to Cornwell
and Bixler in the hallway. Cornwell narrated to Murphy a “frightening” event,
inferring Trahan’s murder. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 52). Cornwell, Bixler, and Murphy,
then obtained a “decent sized” lunch box and placed clothing items inside it
which they planned to burn. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 53). Before leaving the house,
Murphy retrieved some gasoline used for the lawn mower, and Bixler held the
spray bottle while Murphy filled the bottle with gasoline. Murphy tried to act
“normal” and like nothing was wrong, but was terrified. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 59).
[6] Shortly thereafter, Bixler, Murphy, and Cornwell left the house, and when
Murphy asked Cornwell where they were headed, Cornwell explained that they
were going to burn the clothes in the lunch box by the train tracks. When the
three arrived at the train tracks, they doused the lunch box and set it on fire. As
they watched the items burn, they sat down and each smoked a “Newport”
brand cigarette offered by Murphy. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 60). When they were done
smoking, they discarded the cigarette butts on the ground, and Cornwell
indicated to Bixler and Murphy that it was time to leave.
[7] The three began walking, and when Murphy asked where they were going,
Cornwell stated that it “was a surprise.” (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 61). Cornwell directed
the men to an abandoned building which had several mulch piles in the parking
lot. At some point, Bixler asked Cornwell and Murphy if they were bleeding,
and after they stated that they were not, Bixler pointed to the “blood” on his
“white socks” and expressed, “[I]t must be [Trahan’s].” (Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 62,
63). After approximately thirty minutes, the men left the abandoned building
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and walked back to their house. Murphy woke up later in the afternoon and
called his father. Murphy’s step-mother answered the phone, and Murphy left a
message for his father.
[8] On August 14, 2015, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Bixler sent a text message to
his friend Morgan Farfan (Farfan) stating, “[A]ye sis as soon as you wake up
tell me I need to come over ASAP no joke!!” (State’s Exh. 184 A). At around
noon, Bixler went to Farfan’s house and he placed a drawstring backpack on a
high shelf. Bixler instructed Farfan to wash the clothes that were inside the
backpack, and to place it back on a distant shelf. Farfan never washed the
clothes.
[9] The next day, on August 15, 2015, Murphy’s father paid Murphy a visit at the
house. Murphy asked his father to take a walk with him, instead, Murphy’s
father instructed Murphy to get into his car. Murphy then directed his father to
drive to the parking lot of an abandoned building. Murphy pointed to a mulch
pile where he thought Trahan’s body had been buried. At that point, Murphy’s
father called the police.
[10] Officer Sally Kirkpatrick (Officer Kirkpatrick) of the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department was first to arrive at the scene. Murphy pointed to a
“pillow” of blood “not far from the mulch pile,” where Trahan’s body might
have been buried. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 107). At that point, Officer Kirkpatrick
radioed for assistance. Detective Daniel Kepler (Detective Kepler) conducted a
recorded interview of Murphy at the scene. During the interview, Murphy
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notified Detective Kepler of Bixler’s remark regarding the blood on his sock,
and then he led the officers to the burn pile on the railroad tracks. Several
cigarette butts were located at the burn site.
[11] The first K-9 officer that searched the mulch pile did not detect a body. Officer
Kilpatrick informed Murphy of the negative result, and Murphy insisted on
another thorough search. A second, more experienced K-9 officer, conducted a
search and successfully detected a body in the mulch pile. Crime scene
technicians carefully cleared the mulch, and Trahan’s decomposing body was
located.
[12] After the discovery of Trahan’s body, several officers were sent to Cornwell’s
and Bixler’s residence to monitor their movements. When Bixler and Cornwell
exited their house, they were detained and taken to the homicide office for a
formal interview at approximately 3:00 p.m. During the interview, just as
Murphy had narrated, Detective Kepler observed that Bixler had “blood on his
right sock.” (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 55). Also, Detective Kepler independently
observed burrs stuck on Bixler’s shirt.
[13] Bixler’s and Cornwell’s interview concluded at approximately 9.00 p.m. At the
close of the interview, and after obtaining consent from both men, Detective
Kepler collected buccal swabs. Also, in order to preserve the evidentiary
“integrity” of the evidence on Bixler’s and Cornwell’s clothes, which Detective
Kepler objectively believed could have been lost during Bixler’s and Cornwell’s
transportation to jail, Detective Kepler collected their clothes, which he then
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placed in separate labeled bags. (Tr. Vol. V, p. 37). Detective Kepler thereafter
placed the bagged clothes in a locked cabinet, and he planned on obtaining a
search warrant the next day to subject Bixler’s and Cornwell’s clothes to DNA
testing.
[14] Several days after Bixler’s and Cornwell’s arrest, Farfan, who was still in
possession of Bixler’s drawstring backpack, turned it over to the police. The
backpack contained a pair of heavily bloodstained blue jeans, a pair of
sweatpants, and several mulch chips. Forensic testing of the bloodstained jeans
revealed Trahan’s DNA in three separate places. Analysis of a Newport
cigarette brand found by the burn cite showed the presence of Bixler’s DNA.
After the police obtained a search warrant for Bixler’s clothes worn at the time
of his arrest, Trahan’s blood was found on one of Bixler’s socks.
[15] An autopsy revealed that Trahan had “stabbing and incised wounds” to the
“front of the neck and side of the neck” and hemorrhaging within the neck.
(Tr. Vol. IV, p. 242). Also, Trahan had multiple sharp stab wounds to his arm,
torso, and back; and he been strangled. In addition, there was a “blunt force
injury” to the back of his head and facial fractures. The cause of death was
determined to be “mixed modality trauma,” with the manner of death being
homicide. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 242).
[16] On August 17, 2015, the State filed an Information, charging Bixler with
murder. On May 22, 2017, the State amended the charging Information,
changing the date of the offense. A two-day jury trial which was conducted
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between May 23-24, 2017, ended up with a hung jury and a mistrial was
declared. On September 7, 2017, Bixler waived his right to a jury trial. On
October 2 and October 3, 2017, a bench trial was conducted. At the close of the
evidence, the trial court found Bixler guilty as charged. On November 17,
2017, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. At the close of the
evidence, the trial court sentenced Bixler to fifty-five years, with five years
suspended to probation.
[17] Bixler now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Admission of the Evidence
[18] Rulings on the admissibility of evidence fall within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Wise v. State, 26 N.E.3d 137, 140-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans.
denied. We review such rulings for an abuse of that discretion, which occurs
when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before it. Id.
[19] Bixler argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of
the results of the DNA testing of the sock he wore on the day of his arrest. He
contends that “[A]lthough the police had probable cause to arrest him, and did
in fact place him under arrest, they did not obtain a warrant to seize and search
the clothes he was wearing until the next day.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 11). Bixler
maintains that the warrantless seizure of his sock was in violation of his rights
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under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
A. Fourth Amendment
[20] The Fourth Amendment provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
[21] “The protections granted by the Fourth Amendment have been extended to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” J.B. v. State, 30 N.E.3d 51, 54
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is
to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their
persons, homes, and belongings.” State v. Parrott, 69 N.E.3d 535, 541 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2017), trans. denied. The touchstone of a Fourth Amendment analysis “is
always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’” Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). A warrantless
seizure is per se unreasonable, and the State bears the burden to show that one
of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. Jacobs v.
State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 850 (Ind. 2017).
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[22] Bixler maintains that the seizure of the clothes that he wore at the time of his
arrest was not part of a valid inventory search. A valid inventory search is a
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Taylor v. State, 842
N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). In determining the propriety of an inventory
search, the threshold question in determining the propriety of an inventory
search is whether the impoundment itself was proper. Jackson v. State, 890
N.E.2d 11, 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). An impoundment is proper when it is
either part of the routine administrative caretaking functions of the police or
when it is authorized by statute. Id.
[23] Detective Kepler testified that he had been interviewing Bixler and Cornwell
“since 3:00 [p.m.] and it was 9:00[p.m.] They hadn’t eaten.” (Tr. Vol. V, p.
41). Based on Detective Kepler’s concern, he released Bixler to the jail officials,
however, prior to Bixler’s transportation to the jail, he seized Bixler’s clothes for
safekeeping, and he testified that he intended to obtain a search warrant the
following day. Furthermore, no evidence was presented that Detective Kepler
did not follow established police procedure by seizing Bixler’s clothes ahead of
Bixler’s booking at the jail. See Jackson, 890 N.E.2d at 19 (“The towing of the
car was authorized by statute and by police policy, and the inventory of the
vehicle was similarly authorized by established police policy. Although this
policy was not thoroughly followed, this alone does not establish that the
inventory was a pretext. Inventory searches are not always unreasonable when
standard procedures are not followed.”). Moreover, the State points to at least
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two applicable exceptions to the warrant requirement under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
[24] The State argues that the seizure of Bixler’s clothes was justified based on
exigent circumstances. We note that the warrant requirement becomes
inapplicable where the “‘exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law
enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978).
Among the well-known circumstances that have justified a warrantless search
or seizure include entries: (1) to prevent bodily harm or death; (2) to aid a
person in need of assistance; (3) to protect private property; and (4) to prevent
actual or imminent destruction or removal of evidence before a search warrant
may be obtained. Willis v. State, 780 N.E.2d 423, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). A
warrantless seizure is per se unreasonable, and the State bears the burden to
show that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement
applies. Jacobs, 76 N.E.3d at 850.
[25] Detective Kepler testified that it was important to seize Bixler’s clothes ahead of
his booking in jail so as to preserve the evidentiary “integrity” of the evidence.
(Tr. Vol. V, p. 37). He was concerned that “inside the wagon[,] [Bixler] could
have taken off his socks and gave them to somebody else. I mean, there’s just
an untold number of bad things that could have happened to the good evidence
that we had.” (Tr. Vol. V, p. 37). Based on Detective Kepler’s testimony, we
find that exigent circumstances existed—i.e., there was a possibility that the
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State would have lost a key piece of evidence relating to Trahan’s murder—and
a warrant was not necessary.
[26] Lastly, the State argues that even if the seizure of Bixler’s clothes was improper,
we should sustain the seizure based on the inevitable discovery rule. Under the
Fourth Amendment, the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule
“permits the introduction of evidence that eventually would have been located
had there been no error, for in that instance ‘there is no nexus sufficient to
provide a taint.’” Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001),
trans. denied. We, however, choose not to apply this doctrine since we have
determined that exigent circumstances existed to justify the seizure of Bixler’s
clothes at the homicide office. Moreover, the inevitable discovery doctrine has
not been adopted in Indiana. See Gyamfi v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1131, 1138 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014); Ammons v. State, 770 N.E.2d 927, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
B. Article 1, Section 11
[27] Although the language of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution
tracks the language of the Fourth Amendment, we use a different method of
analysis. That is, the legality of a search or seizure under the Indiana
Constitution requires an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct
under the totality of the circumstances. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359
(Ind. 2005). In evaluating reasonableness, we consider three factors: (1) the
degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, (2) the
degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s
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ordinary activities, and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Watkins v.
State, 85 N.E.3d 597, 601 (Ind. 2017).
[28] Bixler readily concedes that “the degree of suspicion that an offense [had]
occurred was very high in light of information provided to the police by . . .
Murphy. However, the State . . . failed to show a basis for the seizure under the
second and third” Litchfield factors. We disagree.
[29] With regards to the second Litchfield factor, any intrusion on Bixler’s ordinary
activities when his clothes were taken incident to the murder arrest was slight,
given that his clothes would have been taken shortly after he was booked into
jail. Also, it is apparent that the extent to which law enforcement needs to
investigate a crime was high following Murphy’s statement to the police that
Bixler had stated that he possibly had Trahan’s blood on his sock, and the
subsequent discovery of Trahan’s decomposing body in the mulch pile. Under
the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the seizure of Bixler’s clothes
by the homicide office prior to his transportation to jail was reasonable, and
Bixler’s rights were not violated under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting DNA evidence obtained from Bixler’s sock.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[30] Bixler contends there is insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction.
Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we will
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not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Staton v. State,
853 N.E.2d 470, 474 (Ind. 2006). We must look to the evidence most favorable
to the conviction together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that
evidence. Id. We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of
probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
[31] A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits
murder, a felony. I.C. § 35-42-1-1. Evidence was presented that Bixler,
Cornwell, Murphy, and Trahan all lived in one house in Indianapolis. Also,
evidence was presented that Cornwell did not get along with Trahan, and in the
past, the two had engaged in verbal and physical altercations. On August 14,
2015, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Cornwell, Bixler and Trahan, left the house
together; however, at approximately 5:00 a.m., only Cornwell and Bixler
returned to the house. Shortly after returning to the residence, Cornwell
informed Murphy of a “frightening” event, implying Trahan’s murder. (Tr.
Vol. IV, p. 52). During Cornwell’s narration of the events leading to Trahan’s
murder, Bixler failed to distance himself from any involvement. Moreover,
Bixler was one of the last people to be seen with Trahan, and Bixler was in the
company of Cornwell, who was known to have had issues with Trahan.
[32] Bixler argues that while circumstantial evidence may have established that he
was present at the murder scene, or that he might have even assisted Cornwell
in disposing Trahan’s body, it was not probative to prove that he committed the
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alleged crime. It is well established that a murder conviction may be sustained
on circumstantial evidence alone. Lacey v. State, 755 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ind.
2001).
[33] As Bixler concedes, there was circumstantial evidence placing him at the scene
of the crime, thereby implicating him in Trahan’s murder. Specifically, Bixler
remained by Cornwell’s side and participated in burning evidence relating to
Trahan’s murder by the train tracks. Also, Bixler’s DNA was found on a
cigarette butt collected at the burn site, and when the men went to the
abandoned building, Bixler expressed to Murphy and Cornwell that he might
have had Trahan’s blood on his sock. DNA analysis of Bixler’s sock confirmed
Bixler’s suspicion. In addition, Bixler’s conduct after he and Cornwell revealed
the details of Trahan’s murder to Murphy, further evinced his participation.
Unlike Murphy who was later encouraged by his father to report Trahan’s
murder to the police, Bixler attempted to rid himself of any incriminating
evidence. The day after Trahan was murdered, Bixler called his friend Farfan
and gave her a drawstring backpack that contained bloodied jeans. Bixler then
directed Farfan to clean the clothes and store the bag on an unreachable shelf.
The drawstring bag was later turned over to the police, and DNA testing
revealed Trahan’s blood on the heavily bloodied blue jeans. When Farfan later
visited Bixler in jail, Bixler informed Farfan that his life was in her hands.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt to support Bixler’s murder conviction.
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CONCLUSION
[34] In light of the above, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting DNA evidence obtained from Bixler’s sock, and the State presented
sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Bixler’s murder
conviction.
[35] Affirmed.
[36] May, J. and Mathias, J. concur
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Caleb Bixler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion