United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT June 1, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-30102
Summary Calendar
CHARLES A. TREECE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
O. KENT ANDREWS; MAJOR THOMAS; WAYNE CALABRESE;
RICHARD L. STALDER; WACKENHUT CORP.; MS. VIDRINE,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:03-CV-846
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Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Charles A. Treece, Louisiana prisoner # 349233, appeals the
dismissal with prejudice on summary judgment of his civil rights
complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Treece alleged
that defendants Andrews, Thomas, and Vidrine violated his First
Amendment rights by assigning him duties inconsistent with his
work classification in retaliation for his filing complaints
through the prison administrative remedy procedure (ARP).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-30102
-2-
“This court reviews the grant of [a] summary judgment motion
de novo, using the same criteria used by the district court in
the first instance.” Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268,
1273 (5th Cir. 1992). “To state a valid claim for retaliation
under section 1983, a prisoner must allege (1) a specific
constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate
against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a
retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Jones v. Greninger,
188 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1999).
Treece has not shown a retaliatory adverse act or that the
defendants intended to retaliate against him. See id. The
district court thus did not err in granting the defendants’
motions for summary judgment and denying Treece’s cross motion
for summary judgment.
Treece offers no argument with respect to the district
court’s conclusion that all of his claims, except for his claim
of retaliation based on the change in his classification, were
unexhausted. He also fails to challenge on appeal the district
court’s conclusion that his claims against Stalder, Calabrese,
and unnamed insurance companies in their supervisory capacities
were not cognizable under § 1983. By failing to address the
basis of the district court’s decision, Treece has abandoned
these claims. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th
Cir. 1993).
No. 05-30102
-3-
Treece’s appeal is without arguable merit and is dismissed
as frivolous. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2; Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215,
219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). This court’s dismissal of Treece’s
complaint as frivolous counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th
Cir. 1996). Treece is warned that if he accumulates three
strikes, he may not proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action
or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any
facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical
injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.