United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT June 2, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-30234
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MELVIN LUTCHER, also known as Mel, also known as Big Mel;
MELVIN LUTCHER, JR.,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:03-CR-338-2
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Before KING, DeMOSS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Melvin Lutcher (Lutcher, Sr.) and Melvin Lutcher, Jr.
(Lutcher, Jr.) appeal from their conviction of conspiring to
possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine and using a
communication facility in furtherance of a drug crime.
The Lutchers contend that Special Agent Oliver McGill’s
testimony interpreting recorded telephone calls violated
FED. R. EVID. 701(b). The admission of McGill’s testimony was not
an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-30234
-2-
434, 440-41 (5th Cir. 2001). McGill testified that he was the
case agent in the Lutchers’ case, and that he listened to almost
5,000 telephone calls in the case. McGill became familiar with
the drug organization’s jargon as he listened to the calls and as
he participated in controlled transactions with the organization.
McGill debriefed as many as 50 individuals during the
investigation, and he was involved in physical surveillance of
members of the organization. According to McGill, the drug
evidence seized in the case also helped him to understand the
jargon of the organization, by confirming that there was crack
cocaine in the residences that were mentioned. McGill’s
inferences were rationally based on his own perceptions, and his
inferences were helpful to the jury to determine the meaning of
the jargon used by the drug traffickers in the case. See
FED. R. EVID. 701.
Lutcher, Sr., contends that the district court erred by
denying his motion for a new trial. He argues that the evidence
of weapons seized from Dwayne Kennedy, Sterling Lewis, and
Andrese Villalobos that was put before the jury was irrelevant to
his guilt and was prejudicial to his defense.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Lutcher, Sr.’s motion for a new trial. See United States v.
Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 1997). The Government
provided Lutcher, Sr., with notice that firearms had been seized
from Kennedy, Villalobos, and Lewis. Lutcher, Sr. did not move
No. 05-30234
-3-
before trial to have firearms evidence suppressed. Nor did
Lutcher, Sr., object contemporaneously when the firearms were
first mentioned and shown. The district court excluded the
firearms evidence regarding Kennedy and Villalobos when
objections were made, and the district court instructed the jury
that it must base its verdict on legally admissible evidence and
testimony. Juries are presumed to follow their instructions.
Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993). Lutcher did
not object to the firearm evidence regarding Lewis, and he
evidently sought to rely on that firearm evidence in his opening
statement and closing argument.
AFFIRMED.