In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 17‐1888
DANIEL MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:14‐cv‐00369 — Robert M. Dow, Jr., Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JUNE 1, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 17, 2018
____________________
Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. In 2012, Chicago Police Department
officers arrested Daniel Martinez during a search of his
home. They charged him with resisting arrest and obstruc‐
tion of justice, but a jury acquitted him. He subsequently
brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the
officers had violated the First and Fourth Amendments of
the Constitution of the United States, as made applicable to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, when they entered
2 No. 17‐1888
and searched his home and seized him. He also alleged that
the officers had committed the state tort of malicious prose‐
cution. The jury found for the defendants on all claims. Mr.
Martinez unsuccessfully sought judgment as a matter of law
and a new trial. The district court entered judgment for the
defendants, and Mr. Martinez now appeals. Because we be‐
lieve that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury
verdict and because Mr. Martinez failed to carry his burden
of demonstrating the need for a new trial, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
I
BACKGROUND
A.
On January 17, 2012, two police officers, Reynaldo Nunez
and Joaquin Salazar, observed a white Ford Taurus, driven
by Alberto Martinez (“Alberto”),1 run a stop sign. The offic‐
ers attempted to make a traffic stop, but Alberto abandoned
his vehicle and fled on foot through an alley for two blocks.
On the way, he discarded a .357 revolver. Officer Nunez
pursued him on foot and radioed for backup, noting that the
suspect was headed to “Talman and 55th.”2 He observed Al‐
berto enter a building, and he radioed the address—“2622 in
the building”3—before following him inside. Officer Nunez
1 Because several individuals in this case have the same surname, we
will employ their first names to facilitate identification.
2 R.259‐5 at 56.
3 Id. at 59.
No. 17‐1888 3
also described Alberto as a Hispanic male with a ponytail,
who was wearing a gray shirt and blue jeans. Once Officer
Nunez was inside the home, he saw Vanessa Martinez
(“Vanessa”), Alberto’s sister, seated on a couch. He asked
where the man had run, and Vanessa pointed toward the
back of the residence. Officer Nunez set out in that direction
but did not find Alberto. Officer Nunez stated over the radio
that the suspect likely had fled to the alley. He then began
searching the home cautiously, looking for Alberto.
The building Alberto entered at 55th and Talman is, in
fact, a duplex. It includes two separate residences: 2622 and
2624 West 55th. There is a single door on 55th Street; it is
marked “2622.”4 The number 2624 also appears on the 55th
Street side but in the corner, far from the door. There is a
separate door on Talman, which appears to be marked 2624,
although the photograph is not clear. Both residences were
occupied by members of the Martinez family. The building
has one garage and a single fence around a common back‐
yard, as well as a single architectural style and no obvious
exterior indications that it contains two separate residences.
While Officer Nunez searched for Alberto, Officer Sala‐
zar recovered the weapon, secured the vehicle, and drove
toward 55th and Talman. When Officer Salazar arrived at
the house, he questioned Vanessa and learned that the sus‐
pect might be Alberto. Vanessa indicated that Alberto had
long hair and drove a white Ford Taurus. Officer Salazar
then transmitted the suspect’s name, Alberto Martinez, over
the radio. Because the building is across the street from an
4 See R.289 (photographs).
4 No. 17‐1888
elementary school and it was near dismissal time, the school
was placed on lockdown.
Multiple police units responded to the radio transmis‐
sions. One of the arriving officers, Jeffrey Weber, entered the
building through what he believed was a side door, but was
actually the door to the separate residence, 2624 West 55th,
facing Talman. He observed between ten and fifteen officers
present.
Plaintiff Daniel Martinez (“Mr. Martinez”) returned
home from shopping with a friend, Alex Matias. Matias tes‐
tified that they noticed the police cars and that Mr. Martinez
left the car to investigate. He entered through the back of the
building and went toward his room. Mr. Martinez claimed,
to the contrary, that he was unaware of police officers at the
residence. At some point, another officer announced over the
radio that the suspect was returning, entering the home
through the back door.
Mr. Martinez entered the living room and saw his niece
on the couch with Officer Weber standing next to her. The
curtains in the room were closed, making it somewhat dark,
but the television was on, and Officer Weber was wearing
his police uniform, including a coat with a police emblem.
Mr. Martinez denied that he could tell that Officer Weber
was in uniform, but his niece recognized the man as an of‐
ficer. Officer Weber believed Mr. Martinez matched the de‐
scription of the fleeing suspect, a Hispanic male with long
hair pulled back. Mr. Martinez was, however, wearing a red
shirt, not the gray shirt described in the radio transmissions.
Officer Weber testified that he had not heard the shirt color
over the radio. Mr. Martinez approached Officer Weber. He
screamed expletives at the officer, demanded that he
No. 17‐1888 5
“[g]et … out,” and yelled “[w]e didn’t call you.”5 Officer
Weber asked his name, and Mr. Martinez responded that he
was Daniel Martinez.
Officer Weber repeatedly ordered Mr. Martinez to the
ground or to put his hands behind his back, and Mr. Mar‐
tinez refused. Instead, at one point, Mr. Martinez walked
toward the door and appeared to be attempting to open it.
Officer Weber tried to detain Mr. Martinez so that Officer
Nunez could come and make an identification, but Mr. Mar‐
tinez pulled his arms away. Officer Weber called for assis‐
tance, and Officer Chavez came to the door. Officer Chavez’s
account confirmed that Mr. Martinez was flailing his arms to
avoid Officer Weber. His testimony also confirmed that Mr.
Martinez appeared to match the description of the suspect.
Together, Officers Weber and Chavez took down
Mr. Martinez and put him in handcuffs.
After Mr. Martinez was arrested, he saw Officer Allyson
Bogdalek seated inside a police vehicle. According to
Mr. Martinez’s deposition testimony, he heard Officer Bog‐
dalek say, “That’s not him. That’s Danny.”6 At trial, he add‐
ed that he further heard her say, “Lock him up anyways.”7
Matias, the friend who had been shopping with Mr. Mar‐
tinez, claimed that he heard Officer Bogdalek say, “Take him
anyways. I don’t care.”8 Outside of the house, Officer Nunez
5 R.259‐3 at 242.
6 R.259‐2 at 121.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 76.
6 No. 17‐1888
identified Mr. Martinez as Danny, not Alberto. Offic‐
ers Chavez and Weber nevertheless decided to arrest Danny
for “resisting and obstructing.”9 Officer Chavez learned,
once they were at the station, that Mr. Martinez had a pend‐
ing civil rights action against Officers Weber and Bogdalek.10
Ultimately, Officers Chavez and Weber each filed two
criminal complaints against Mr. Martinez, for resisting arrest
and obstructing justice. With respect to resisting, both offic‐
ers cited his pulling away from the officers when they at‐
tempted to put him in handcuffs. With respect to obstruc‐
tion, both officers claimed that Mr. Martinez had attempted
to block access to a room they wanted to enter to search for a
fleeing suspect. The arrest report for the incident included a
check‐box for resisting that was marked “no.” Officer Weber
testified at Mr. Martinez’s criminal trial on the resulting
charges. In his testimony, he indicated that the language re‐
garding blocking a room was in error, but that Mr. Mar‐
tinez’s conduct hindered the investigation of the original
suspect because the officers were delayed in ascertaining his
identity and in their continued search. Mr. Martinez was ac‐
quitted on all charges.
9 Id. at 259.
10 The other action, stemming from a 2008 incident, apparently ended in
a settlement for the Martinez brothers. The district court in the present
case granted a motion in limine by the defendants to bar any reference to
the action other than the fact of its existence.
No. 17‐1888 7
B.
Mr. Martinez brought this action against Officers Weber,
Chavez, and Bogdalek, and their employer, the City of Chi‐
cago, in 2014. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a
verdict for the defendants on all counts. Mr. Martinez
moved for a judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b) and 59, respec‐
tively.11 The defendants moved for costs.
In a comprehensive order, the district court denied
Mr. Martinez’s motions and awarded $9,902.78 in costs to
the defendants. With respect to his Rule 50 motion, the court
concluded that evidence supported the jury’s verdict on the
unlawful entry and search claim because Alberto’s flight had
created an exigent need to enter the home and because the
officers reasonably believed that the home was a single resi‐
dence. On the unlawful seizure and false arrest claims, the
court concluded that, although Mr. Martinez gave a different
name and was wearing a different color shirt, other objective
factors gave the officers reason to believe he was the fleeing
suspect, including that he came into the house, was a His‐
panic male with long hair pulled back, had the same last
name as the suspect and was found close to the place where
11 Mr. Martinez presented to the jury claims rooted in the constitutionali‐
ty of the search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend‐
ments, as well as state law claims for malicious prosecution. In addition,
he alleged a conspiracy by the officers to violate his constitutional rights
and a claim for retaliation for his prior civil rights lawsuit, in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The conspiracy and retaliation
claims were not part of his Rule 50 or Rule 59 motions and are not before
us in this appeal.
8 No. 17‐1888
Alberto had last been seen. This evidence was sufficient to
permit the jury to conclude that the officers had probable
cause to believe that Mr. Martinez was a fleeing suspect. The
court also determined that there was sufficient evidence to
arrest Mr. Martinez for resisting and obstructing. Finally, on
his claim for malicious prosecution, the court agreed with
the defendants that errors in the charges were negligent but
did not show malice.
The district court then ruled on Mr. Martinez’s Rule 59
motion. The court noted that the jury had to sort out “testi‐
mony that was riddled with inconsistencies” and had
reached a reasonable conclusion in light of the evidence.12
The court also rejected Mr. Martinez’s claim that the defend‐
ants’ closing statement, which referenced a gunman in the
proximity of a school, was unfairly prejudicial. Specifically,
the court rejected the challenge as waived because Mr. Mar‐
tinez had not objected to such a reference at trial. The court
further rejected challenges to several jury instructions as
well as his argument that our cases have allocated wrongly
the burden of proof in warrantless Fourth Amendment cas‐
es. Finally, the court rejected a series of challenges to eviden‐
tiary rulings as lacking in merit.
II
DISCUSSION
In this appeal, Mr. Martinez now asks us to review the
district court’s rulings on his post‐trial motions. In his view,
12 R.279 at 25.
No. 17‐1888 9
the record contains no legitimate justification for the war‐
rantless entry into his home. He also maintains that his sub‐
sequent detention and arrest were not supported by proba‐
ble cause. Finally, he submits that we should revisit our
holding in Bogan v. City of Chicago, 644 F.3d 563 (7th Cir.
2011), and reallocate the burden of proof in warrantless
Fourth Amendment cases.
Under Rule 50, a court may enter judgment as a matter of
law when it “finds that a reasonable jury would not have a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis” to support its verdict.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1); see also id. 50(b). We review the
court’s denial of a Rule 50(b) motion de novo. Venson v. Al‐
tamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2014). “Our task is to
consider whether the evidence, viewed in the light most fa‐
vorable to the defendants, is sufficient to support the verdict
in their favor.” Id. We must “draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party, and [we] may not make
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). “On‐
ly if no rational jury could have found for the defendants
will we reverse.” Venson, 749 F.3d at 646.
Under Rule 59, a district court may order a new trial “for
any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted
in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(a)(1)(A). We have stated that “[a] new trial is appropriate
if the jury’s verdict is against the manifest weight of the evi‐
dence or if the trial was in some way unfair to the moving
party.” Venson, 749 F.3d at 656. “[B]ecause that decision is
committed to the district court’s discretion, we will not dis‐
turb it except under exceptional circumstances showing a
10 No. 17‐1888
clear abuse of discretion.” LaFollette v. Savage, 63 F.3d 540,
544 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A.
We begin with Mr. Martinez’s claim that the district court
erroneously concluded that Officer Weber’s initial decision
to enter and search his home was constitutional.
The Supreme Court has long held that “searches and sei‐
zures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
(2006) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004)).
“Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is
subject to certain exceptions.” Id. One such exception is
when “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law
enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is ob‐
jectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (internal quotation marks
omitted).13 Among the exigencies recognized as justification
for a warrantless entry into a residence is engaging in “hot
pursuit” of a fleeing suspect. United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976). Other relevant exigencies include
“when there is a danger posed to others by the occupant of a
dwelling, as when the occupant is armed and might shoot at
13 See also Bogan v. City of Chicago, 644 F.3d 563, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The
exigent circumstances doctrine recognizes that there may be situations in
which law enforcement officials may be presented with a compelling
need to conduct a search, but have no time to secure a warrant.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
No. 17‐1888 11
the police or other persons,” or when “there is a risk that the
suspect may escape.” Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d
542, 557 (7th Cir. 2014).
Whether exigent circumstances existed is a mixed ques‐
tion of fact and law that we review de novo. United States v.
Schmidt, 700 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2012). In determining
whether an exigency permitted law enforcement to enter
without a warrant, we conduct an “objective review” and
“ask whether a reasonable officer had a reasonable belief
that there was a compelling need to act and no time to obtain
a warrant.” Bogan, 644 F.3d at 572 (internal quotation marks
omitted). We consider “the totality of facts and circumstanc‐
es as they would have appeared to a reasonable person in the
position of the … officer—seeing what he saw, hearing what he
heard.” Id. at 571–72 (alteration in original) (emphasis in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The objective facts known to Officer Weber clearly sup‐
port the existence of exigent circumstances. Officer Weber
testified that he heard at least portions of numerous radio
transmissions about a suspect, who, upon being pulled over
for a traffic violation, had run from officers and discarded a
weapon. The officer heard a transmission that the suspect
had entered the residence on 55th and Talman. When he ar‐
rived on the scene, a search was in progress. Many officers
were present, securing the perimeter and searching the
premises. He entered the building through an open door on
Talman and saw other officers already present. As it turns
out, the door on Talman opened to one‐half of the duplex,
and not the half through which Alberto was believed to have
12 No. 17‐1888
run; its status as a separate residence, however, was not ob‐
vious, as Mr. Martinez now concedes.14 A reasonable person
in the position of Officer Weber, therefore, would not have
known that he was entering a separate home.15 The radio
transmissions indicated a fluid situation where there re‐
mained the possibility that the suspect was in the immediate
area. At no point did any transmission indicate that the sus‐
pect had been apprehended or definitively had left the prop‐
erty. These facts objectively support the exigency created by
Alberto’s flight into the home and suggest that it had not
dissipated.
Mr. Martinez’s assertions essentially amount to attacks
on the credibility of the law enforcement witnesses.16
“[C]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are
within the province of the jury,” Bogan, 644 F.3d at 572 (in‐
ternal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the issue of
Officer Weber’s credibility on what he encountered when he
arrived on the scene and what he knew about the suspect
and the building, were all questions squarely put before the
jury by Mr. Martinez’s counsel.
14 Appellant’s Br. 20.
15 For the same reasons, Mr. Martinez’s claim that the jury should not
have been instructed on mistake is not persuasive. At trial, Mr. Martinez
himself repeatedly drew the jury’s attention to the fact of the separate
residences, arguing in part that it was unreasonable for the officers to
assume Alberto had ever been in 2624; resolving the legal status of a mis‐
take was relevant to the jury’s understanding of the case.
16 See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 19 (asserting that Officer Weber “concocted a
sham”).
No. 17‐1888 13
B.
The district court imposed the burden of persuasion with
respect to all elements of the Fourth Amendment claim on
Mr. Martinez, including that the police were not justified in
their entry by any exigency recognized at law. In doing so,
the district court properly applied the rule of Bogan v. City of
Chicago, 644 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2011). Mr. Martinez acknowl‐
edges that Bogan is the law of this circuit, but urges this court
to revisit its holding, at least in cases such as this one where
the plaintiff alleges police misconduct. We decline that invi‐
tation. We note, as we did in Bogan, that the approach we
chose is consistent with our approach to § 1983 claims alleg‐
ing other types of Fourth Amendment claims. See Valance v.
Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269, 1279 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
burden to establish the lack of consent to search fell on the
plaintiff, once asserted by the defendant); McBride v. Grice,
576 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[A] plaintiff
claiming that he was arrested without probable cause carries
the burden of establishing the absence of probable cause.”).
The district court committed no error in following the law of
this circuit regarding the allocation of burdens of proof.
C.
Mr. Martinez disputes whether Officer Weber had the
authority first to conduct an investigatory stop and then ar‐
rest him. He contends that the district court erroneously
concluded that there was probable cause to believe that he
was the fleeing suspect.
14 No. 17‐1888
As Mr. Martinez’s brief concedes, Officer Weber’s initial
encounter with Mr. Martinez was an investigatory stop, not
an arrest. Officer Weber merely asked Mr. Martinez’s name
and sought to keep him in the home so that other officers
could come in and make a definitive identification. As such,
it was not necessary that Officer Weber’s initial seizure of
Mr. Martinez be supported by probable cause, but only rea‐
sonable suspicion. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 823–24 (7th Cir. 2008).
When reviewing the reasonableness of a Terry stop, we
evaluate the totality of the circumstances. Jewett, 521 F.3d at
824. Officer Weber testified that he knew, from the radio
transmission, that he was looking for a suspect with the last
name “Martinez.” He also knew that the suspect was a His‐
panic male with long hair pulled back into a pony tail,17 who
had headed into the home in which Officer Weber encoun‐
tered Daniel Martinez. Mr. Martinez reacted aggressively to
Officer Weber’s presence, shouting expletives at him, telling
him to leave, and screaming that they had not called the po‐
lice. Although the limited physical description of the suspect
would, without context, be insufficient justification for a stop,
see Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (rejecting a justifi‐
cation that would “describe a very large category of pre‐
sumably innocent” persons), the temporal and geographic
proximity to the last sighting of the suspect is entitled to
some weight in the analysis, see D.Z. v. Buell, 796 F.3d 749,
17 There is a great deal of dispute in the transcript about whether the de‐
scription of long hair pulled back into a pony tail sufficiently matched
the description of Mr. Martinez, who Officer Weber described as wearing
his long hair in a messy bun. The jury’s verdict resolves this question.
No. 17‐1888 15
754 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that reasonable suspicion
supported the stop when the individual “somewhat
matched” the description given over the police radio, when
paired with the “temporal and geographic proximity of the
stop to the reported crime, and the behavior of the suspect”);
see also Pasiewicz v. Lake Cty. Forest Pres. Dist., 270 F.3d 520,
524 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the police had probable
cause, because, although the arrestee “did not match exactly
the characteristics provided by the two women, he bore a
fair resemblance”).18 Considering all the circumstances, Of‐
18 In United States v. McCauley, 659 F.3d 645, 649–51 (7th Cir. 2011), we
considered at some length whether a limited description of a suspect
could support the even higher burden of probable cause applicable to
warrantless arrests, rather than Terry stops. There, the suspect was iden‐
tified only as between “5‐feet and 5‐feet‐4‐inches, with a medium build
of around 125 pounds, and braided, collar‐length hair.” Id. at 647. On
appeal, the criminal defendant asserted that if such a description sup‐
ported probable cause, it would subject all short black males in the vicin‐
ity to arrest. We disagreed. We distinguished between cases involving a
limited description and a public area, such as a bar, from those involving
a more specific or closed location, such as the defendant’s home. We also
noted that the Supreme Court had found probable cause to arrest a man
located in a suspect’s home who provided identification showing he was
not the suspect, but who fit the general description of the suspect. Hill v.
California, 401 U.S. 797, 803 (1971) (“Upon gaining entry to the apart‐
ment, they were confronted with one who fit the description of Hill re‐
ceived from various sources. That person claimed he was Miller, not Hill.
But aliases and false identifications are not uncommon.”); see also id. at
802 (“[W]hen the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and
when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the
arrest of the second party is a valid arrest.” (quoting People v. Hill, 446
P.2d 521, 523 (Cal. 1968)).
16 No. 17‐1888
ficer Weber’s brief investigatory detention of Mr. Martinez
does not offend the Fourth Amendment.
Mr. Martinez objected to his detention vociferously. In‐
deed, he shouted profanities. Encountering this lack of coop‐
eration, and considering the exigency underway, Officer
Weber repeatedly ordered Mr. Martinez to the ground.
Mr. Martinez not only failed to comply with the order, at
one point, Mr. Martinez walked toward the door and ap‐
peared to be attempting to open it. When Officer Weber at‐
tempted to physically restrain Mr. Martinez so that Officer
Nunez could come and make an identification, Mr. Martinez
pulled his arms away. Officer Chavez’s testimony is further
evidence that Officer Weber struggled with Mr. Martinez,
who was flailing his arms to avoid Officer Weber. The offic‐
ers together took down Mr. Martinez, put him in handcuffs,
and placed him under arrest for resisting arrest and obstruc‐
tion.
Mr. Martinez’s actions provided the officers with proba‐
ble cause to arrest him. Under Illinois law, it is an offense to
“resist[] or obstruct[] the performance by one known to the
person to be a peace officer … of any authorized act.” 720
ILCS 5/31‐1(a). The statute prohibits two kinds of interfer‐
ence with police activities, and Mr. Martinez was charged
with both.
The first charge, resistance, has been examined thorough‐
ly in the Illinois cases since People v. Raby, 240 N.E.2d 595 (Ill.
1968). The Illinois courts have held that it does “not pro‐
scribe mere argument with a policeman about the validity of
an arrest or other police action, but proscribe[s] only some
physical act which imposes an obstacle which may impede,
hinder, interrupt, prevent[,] or delay the performance of the
No. 17‐1888 17
officer’s duties, such as going limp, forcefully resisting ar‐
rest[,] or physically aiding a third party to avoid arrest.” Ab‐
bott v. Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 721 (7th Cir. 2013) (al‐
terations in original) (quoting Raby, 240 N.E.2d at 599). We
have stated that the standard “has often proved difficult in
application,” but that “the most straightforward cases … are
those in which a person physically scuffles with a police of‐
ficer performing his or her official duties or attempts to
elude the police,” and “[a]t the other end of the spec‐
trum … are those involving only verbal argument.” Id. at
722.
We have little difficulty in concluding that Mr. Mar‐
tinez’s conduct falls in line with the more straightforward of
the Illinois cases. During his brief confrontation, he refused
to comply with orders, was verbally aggressive, appeared to
walk toward the door, and repeatedly pulled away from the
officers.19 The officers therefore had probable cause to arrest
him for the offense of resisting on the basis of his conduct
during this brief encounter.
19 Mr. Martinez repeats an argument he made to the district court that he
was entitled to resist arrest based on People v. Young, 241 N.E.2d 587 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1968). As the district court pointed out, Young is a case about
resistance to search, not seizure, and the Illinois statutes are clear that
forceful resistance to arrest is not permitted even when the arrestee “be‐
lieves the arrest is unlawful and the arrest in fact is unlawful.” 720 ILCS
5/7‐7.
Mr. Martinez also argues that any probable cause disappeared when
Officer Nunez told the others he was not the fleeing suspect, but this
identification is irrelevant to whether his conduct during the arrest itself
supported the officers’ decision not to release him.
18 No. 17‐1888
In contrast to the offense of resisting as interpreted by Ra‐
by, the other form of official interference prohibited by 720
ILCS 5/31‐1(a), obstruction, does not turn on the perfor‐
mance of a physical act; instead, it is focused on the conse‐
quence of the interference. As the Illinois Supreme Court re‐
cently explained, “‘resist’ implies some type of physical exer‐
tion in relation to the officer’s actions. It would be superflu‐
ous for the legislature to then limit ‘obstruct’ to the same
meaning.” People v. Baskerville, 963 N.E.2d 898, 905–06 (Ill.
2012). Accordingly, “[a]lthough a person may commit ob‐
struction of a peace officer by means of a physical act, this
type of conduct is neither an essential element of nor the ex‐
clusive means of committing an obstruction. The legislative
focus of section 31‐1(a) is on the tendency of the conduct to
interpose an obstacle that impedes or hinders the officer in
the performance of his authorized duties.” Id. at 905. Not on‐
ly did Mr. Martinez disobey the officer’s commands, People
v. Smith, 77 N.E.3d 87, 92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (disobedience of
an officer’s command can be included in the definition of
obstruction); People v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 282, 287–88 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2011) (failure to leave the scene of a traffic stop after
being repeatedly ordered to leave constituted obstruction),
but dealing with Mr. Martinez pulled both officers away
from the most significant task at hand: locating the fleeing
suspect and securing the area, cf. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d at 287–
88 (affirming conviction where defendant refused police or‐
der and yelled profanities and threats at officers while a
companion tried to escape). The police therefore had proba‐
ble cause to arrest Mr. Martinez on the separate offense of
obstructing.
No. 17‐1888 19
D.
Finally, Mr. Martinez argues that the district court should
have granted his post‐trial motions regarding his claim for
malicious prosecution. However, our conclusion that the of‐
ficers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Martinez on charges
of both resisting and obstructing resolves this claim as well.
“To state a claim for malicious prosecution under Illinois
law, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was subjected to judi‐
cial proceedings; (2) for which there was no probable cause;
(3) the defendants instituted or continued the proceedings
maliciously; (4) the proceedings were terminated in the
plaintiff’s favor; and (5) there was an injury.” Sneed v. Ry‐
bicki, 146 F.3d 478, 480–81 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The existence of probable cause for each of‐
fense charged is a complete defense to an action for mali‐
cious prosecution. Howard v. Firmand, 880 N.E.2d 1139, 1142
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007).20
Conclusion
Mr. Martinez tried his claims before the jury, which re‐
solved the significant factual disputes between his account
and that of the officers against him. Mr. Martinez has not
carried the heavy burden to establish entitlement to a new
trial or to judgment as a matter of law, and the district court
20 Because we believe that the arrest and the prosecution were supported
by probable cause, we need not consider Mr. Martinez’s argument that
the evidence demonstrated malice by the officers. In any event, the issue
of officer credibility was aggressively pursued by Mr. Martinez at trial,
and the jury found in the officers’ favor.
20 No. 17‐1888
therefore committed no error in denying his post‐trial mo‐
tions. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED