COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-18-00163-CR
NO. 02-18-00164-CR
EX PARTE TAYMOR TRAVON
MCINTYRE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NOS. 1511547D, 1511574D
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OPINION
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Taymor Travon McIntyre perfected this interlocutory appeal from
the trial court’s order denying his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus
requesting that reasonable bail be set in his pending case for a capital murder
and three counts of aggravated robbery occurring on or about July 26, 2016
(cause number 1511547D, “the capital murder case”) and his pending case for
one count of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon committed in Arlington, Texas, on or about May 25, 2017 (cause
number 1511574D, “the Arlington aggravated robbery case”). For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s order denying bail in the capital murder
case, but we reverse the trial court’s order denying bail in the Arlington
aggravated robbery case and remand that case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL OVERVIEW
Appellant was sixteen years old when he allegedly committed these
offenses. The capital murder case stems from a July 26, 2016 incident in which
multiple suspects entered a house in Mansfield at 10:45 p.m., displayed their
pistols, and demanded the occupants’ cell phones and illegal drugs. During the
robbery, the suspects fired their pistols, killing one of the occupants and
wounding another. Appellant was identified as one of the suspects.
An arrest warrant issued for Appellant, and he was arrested and placed in
the juvenile detention facility. After detention hearings, the juvenile court
released Appellant pretrial to “home arrest” subject to conditions that included
electronic monitoring via an ankle monitor. Despite signing the conditions of
release and being informed that violations could result in the issuance of a
directive to apprehend him and his subsequent arrest and detention, on March
27, 2017, Appellant cut off his monitor and fled.
2
Within a month of fleeing, Appellant became a suspect in—and has now
been indicted for—a second capital murder in Bexar County. According to a
Bexar County arrest warrant affidavit admitted into evidence at the writ hearing,
Appellant and three others picked up a photographer for a photo shoot at a mall
on April 23, 2017. The affidavit alleges that Appellant and one of the others
pulled out guns and took the photographer’s backpack containing his camera
equipment. The other gun-bearing individual pistol-whipped the photographer
and forced him from the car. The photographer attempted to get back into the
car and eventually jumped on the hood. According to the affidavit, Appellant then
leaned out of the window and shot the photographer, who died as a result of the
gunshot.
A month after that incident, Appellant became a suspect in—and has now
been indicted in—the May 25, 2017 Arlington aggravated robbery case. The
details of that offense are not in the record before us.
Thus, Appellant has been indicted for two felony offenses––the Bexar
County capital murder and the Arlington aggravated robbery––that were
committed within two months of the date Appellant cut off his ankle monitor and
fled. Approximately three months after Appellant cut off his ankle monitor and
fled, on June 30, 2017, he was apprehended by the United States Marshals
Service in Union County, New Jersey. He was returned to Tarrant County where
he was incarcerated in the Tarrant County Jail on July 20, 2017. The juvenile
court waived its jurisdiction and transferred Appellant’s cases to the district court.
3
The State filed criminal complaints against Appellant in the capital murder
case (noting bail was set in the amount of $500,000) and in the Arlington
aggravated robbery case (noting “$0 bond”), and a Tarrant County grand jury
returned indictments against Appellant in both cases on September 29, 2017.
On February 7, 2018, the trial court sua sponte held the $500,000 bond
previously set in the capital murder case to be insufficient and ordered that
Appellant be held without bail in that case.
Appellant filed an application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus in both
cases1 arguing that he is being illegally restrained because he has been
incarcerated since July 20, 2017, without the setting of reasonable bail.
Appellant requested in his application that the trial court set reasonable bail in
both the capital murder case and the Arlington aggravated robbery case. The
trial court conducted a hearing.2
At the hearing on Appellant’s application for a pretrial writ of habeas
corpus, evidence presented to the trial court established that after Appellant cut
off his ankle monitor and fled, he wrote a song detailing his escapades. A New
1
To avoid possible confusion on remand, Appellant’s application for a
pretrial writ of habeas corpus was filed in the trial court under the single cause
number CDC2-C009483-00 but encompassed both the capital murder case and
the Arlington aggravated robbery case.
2
The hearing started on March 8, 2018, and concluded on April 3, 2018.
The reporter’s record of the April 3, 2018 conclusion of the hearing is only seven
pages long and reflects that defense counsel simply tendered financial
documents to the trial court that the trial court had ruled on March 8, 2018, that it
would accept.
4
York lawyer represented Appellant in recording contract negotiations, and
Appellant ultimately signed a three-year recording contract with 88 Classic for
$600,000 or $700,000. Appellant also made a music video in which the trial
court described Appellant as “pretty much bragging about the fact that he not
only cut off his monitor . . . but he’s standing around holding a .9 mm pistol . . .
standing next to a poster of himself,” which the trial court believed “came from
the directive to apprehend.”
Appellant’s father and Appellant’s uncle testified at the writ hearing.
Appellant’s father, Kevin Beverly, said that although he lived in McKinney, he had
made arrangements to lease a home in Fort Worth so Appellant could live there
with him if Appellant were released on bond. Beverly explained that Appellant’s
uncle had agreed to live with them if Appellant was released so that together they
could provide continuous supervision of Appellant and make sure Appellant
complied with all of the conditions of any bonds that are set. Beverly said that
Appellant’s recording contract was paying for his lawyers in Tarrant County and
Bexar County and that as Appellant’s legal guardian, he had transferred
Appellant’s assets to a trust.
Appellant’s uncle testified that he lived in Florida and that he had retired
from the Army after suffering injuries during combat. Since retiring from the
Army, Appellant’s uncle had worked in security contracting (protecting embassies
and consulates) and executive protection (providing security for mayors,
senators, artists, and other similar professionals). Appellant’s uncle testified that
5
he was willing to move to Texas and live with Beverly. Appellant’s uncle agreed
that either he or Beverly would be in direct supervision of Appellant at all times
and promised to make sure that Appellant observed every condition of any bonds
that are set.
Defense counsel asked to provide additional information about the assets
in Appellant’s trust fund at a later date. The trial court agreed, and defense
counsel provided that information at a subsequent, brief, on-the-record
conclusion to the writ hearing. Defense counsel also requested that the trial
court take judicial notice of Bexar County’s placement of a juvenile hold on
Appellant for the alleged capital murder of the photographer. According to
defense counsel, even if the trial court set bail in Appellant’s capital murder case
and in his Arlington aggravated robbery case and even if Appellant posted bail,
Appellant would not be released from custody but instead would be transported
to Bexar County for a detention hearing in the juvenile court and possibly a
hearing seeking a waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court and transfer of
Appellant’s case to a Bexar County district court for criminal prosecution. Only at
that point, defense counsel argued, could Appellant seek bail in his Bexar County
case and potentially be released.
The State offered and the trial court admitted the arrest warrant for
Appellant in the capital murder case and the Bexar County capital murder arrest
warrant for Appellant. The State’s sole witness was Luis Montoya. Montoya
testified that the juvenile system does not have bonds and that Appellant has
6
never been placed on a bond or bail. Montoya explained that Appellant’s act of
cutting off his monitor was a violation of his conditions of release and that the
remedy for that violation was to issue a directive to apprehend.
The trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. Applicant’s date of birth is [redacted].
2. Applicant has been a runaway since July 4, 2014.
3. In Cause No. 1511547D, Applicant is accused in a four-
count indictment alleging one count of capital murder and three
counts of aggravated robbery.
4. In Cause No. 151157[4]D, Applicant is accused of one
count of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault.
5. Applicant previously removed his ankle monitor and fled
while under house arrest as ordered by the juvenile court.
6. Applicant is alleged to have committed an additional capital
murder and other felonious conduct after a directive to apprehend
was issued following his absconding from house arrest by removing
his ankle monitor.
7. According to the Noble Static Risk Assessment that was
administered to Applicant, the classification reported for Applicant is
“High Violent.”
8. The nature of the alleged offenses and safety of the victim
and community should be and has been considered on the issue of
bond.
....
For all the reasons stated above and by the Court on the
record during the hearing on March 8, 2018, the relief requested by
Applicant should be denied[,] and no bail amount should be set.
7
The trial court denied Appellant’s application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus
ruling that “Applicant’s requests for relief are DENIED[,] and no bail amount shall
be set.”
III. THE TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF HABEAS RELIEF
In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying the relief requested in his application for a pretrial writ of habeas
corpus and by holding him without bail in the two underlying felony cases in
Tarrant County.
A. Standard of Review
Generally, a ruling on a pretrial writ of habeas corpus is reviewed for abuse
of discretion, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the ruling. Ex parte
Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). But when there are no
disputed facts and the resolution of the ultimate issue turns on an application of
purely legal standards, as here, our review is de novo. See Ex parte Martin, 6
S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); cf. Ex parte Jones, 410 S.W.3d 349,
350 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013), aff’d, 440 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014). We will uphold the trial court’s judgment if it is correct on any theory
of law applicable to the case. Ex parte Walsh, 530 S.W.3d 774, 778 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.).
B. Applicable Law
The Texas constitution provides, “All prisoners shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, when the proof is evident; but this
8
provision shall not be so construed as to prevent bail after indictment found upon
examination of the evidence, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” Tex.
Const. art. I, § 11; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.07 (West 2005)
(setting forth provision similar to that in article I, section 11 of the Texas
constitution). The Texas constitution also provides, however, that bail may be
denied in certain circumstances. See Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 11a, 11b, 11c. One
of the circumstances in which the Texas constitution authorizes denial of bail is
when an accused has violated a condition of his pretrial release related to the
safety of the community. Id. art. I, § 11b (titled “Violation of condition of release
pending trial; denial of bail”). Article I, section 11b provides,
Any person who is accused in this state of a felony or an offense
involving family violence, who is released on bail pending trial, and
whose bail is subsequently revoked or forfeited for a violation of a
condition of release may be denied bail pending trial if a judge or
magistrate in this state determines by a preponderance of the
evidence at a subsequent hearing that the person violated a
condition of release related to the safety of a victim of the alleged
offense or to the safety of the community.
Id.
The United States and Texas constitutional right-to-bail provisions do not
automatically apply to juveniles, as they do to adults. See Ex parte D.W.C., 1
S.W.3d 896, 897 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, pet. denied). This is because
juvenile law is based on the doctrine of parens patriae––that is, the ideology that
minors are subject to the control of their parents and when parental control
falters, the State will take on the role of promoting and protecting the juvenile
9
child’s welfare so that the minor’s liberty interest is subject to the State’s parens
patriae interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.02(b) (West 2014). See
generally Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0229 (2000).3 A juvenile may be released
from juvenile detention prior to a delinquency hearing, however, and such
release may be conditioned upon requirements reasonably necessary to insure
the juvenile’s appearance at later proceedings. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§§ 53.02(a), 54.01(f) (West 2014). The conditions of the juvenile’s release must
be in writing and filed with the office or official designated by the court, and a
copy must be furnished to the juvenile. Id. §§ 53.02(a), 54.01(f).
3
The opinion explains,
[A]s the United States Supreme Court has recognized,
unemancipated seventeen-year-olds’ constitutional liberty rights are
not as great as adults’ and are subject to the control of their parents
or guardians: “Traditionally at common law, and still today,
unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of
self-determination -- including even the right of liberty in its narrow
sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will. They are subject, even
as to their physical freedom, to the control of their parents or
guardians.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654
(1995). Furthermore, a child’s liberty interest may, in appropriate
circumstances, be subordinated to the state’s interest in preserving
and promoting the welfare of the child. See Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (“[J]uveniles, unlike adults, are always in some
form of custody. Children, by definition, are not assumed to have
the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed to be
subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters,
the State must play its part as parens patriae. In this respect,
the juvenile’s liberty interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be
subordinated to the State’s ‘parens patriae’ interest in preserving
and promoting the welfare of the child.”) (citations omitted).
Id. at 6.
10
C. Analysis
1. The Capital Murder Case
In the capital murder case, Appellant is charged with one count of capital
murder and three counts of aggravated robbery for the events that occurred in
Mansfield in July 2016. Appellant was placed in juvenile detention as a result of
these offenses, was subsequently released on “house arrest,” and was subject to
conditions of release that included electronic monitoring via an ankle monitor.
The State argues that Appellant’s release from juvenile detention on the
condition that he be electronically monitored twenty-four hours a day is
equivalent to being “released on bail pending trial” for purposes of Texas
constitution article I, section 11b’s authorization of the denial of bail.
In support of this argument, the State’s brief includes a helpful chart
comparing juvenile predelinquency adjudication hearing release to adult pretrial
bond release, which we have reformatted as follows:
Juvenile Predelinquency Adult Pretrial Bond Release
Adjudication Hearing Release
Does not include money. See Tex. May or may not include money. See
Fam. Code Ann. §§ 53.02, 54.01. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
17.03(a) (West Supp. 2017).
May include conditions. See Tex. Fam. May include conditions. See Tex.
Code Ann. §§ 53.02(a), 54.01(f). Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 17.43–.47
(West 2015).
Conditions are used “to insure the Bail is the security given by the
child’s appearance at later accused “that he will appear and
proceedings.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. answer before the proper court.” Tex.
§§ 53.02(a), 54.01(f). Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.01 (West
2015).
May include house arrest and May include house arrest and
11
electronic monitoring as a condition. electronic monitoring as a condition.
See generally Tex. Fam. Code Ann. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
§§ 53.02(a), 54.01(f). 17.43.
Violating conditions of house arrest and Violating conditions of house arrest and
electronic monitoring could result in electronic monitoring could result in
apprehension. See Tex. Fam. Code arrest. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. § 52.015(a) (West 2014). Ann. art. 17.44(c)(1).
May require an adult to agree to Does not require an adult to agree to
produce the child at later proceedings produce the accused at later
under penalty of an order of contempt. proceedings under penalty of an order
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.02(d). of contempt.
The above comparison shows that juvenile predelinquency adjudication hearing
release and adult pretrial bond release differ only in that (a) adult pretrial bond
release typically includes security or money and (b) juvenile predelinquency
adjudication hearing release may require an adult to agree to produce the child at
later proceedings under penalty of an order of contempt. Compare Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.01, with Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.02(d).
The State points out that the same major underlying purpose––assuring
appearance at trial––is served by juvenile predelinquency adjudication hearing
release and its conditions and adult pretrial bond release and its conditions. See,
e.g., Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 53.02(a), 54.01(f); Ex parte Rodriguez, 595
S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (stating that “[t]he primary
purpose or object of an appearance bond is to secure the presence of a
defendant in court for the trial of the offense charged”). Conditions of juvenile
predelinquency adjudication hearing release serve the same purpose, apply
similar requirements, and use similar punishments for violations as adult bail
12
conditions. The State argues that the above-charted procedural consistencies
and the identical purposes underlying juvenile predelinquency adjudication
hearing release and adult pretrial bond release render violations of conditions of
juvenile predelinquency adjudication hearing release congruent with and
interchangeable with violations of adult pretrial bond release for purposes of
triggering possible denial of bail under section 11b of the Texas constitution. We
agree. No distinction exists between juvenile predelinquency adjudication
hearing release and adult pretrial bond release for purposes of article I, section
11b of the Texas constitution; indeed, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
declined to draw such a distinction between adults and juveniles certified to stand
trial as adults in a similar situation. See, e.g., Ex parte Green, 688 S.W.2d 555,
556–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (rejecting applying section 42.03 of the code of
criminal procedure’s credit-for-time-served provision differently to juvenile
subsequently certified as an adult who had served time pretrial—even though
juvenile was detained in juvenile detention facility, not jail—when juvenile was
confined as a result of behavior which, if committed by an adult, would constitute
a penal offense).4
4
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained,
Once a juvenile is “certified” as an adult . . ., it makes no difference
that “said cause” began as a civil proceeding, [citation omitted],
since “[o]n transfer of the child for criminal proceedings, he shall be
dealt with as an adult and in accordance with the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure[.] [Citation omitted.] We do not think that in
enacting [the credit-for-time-served provision of article 42.03 of the
13
A trial court may deny bail under Texas constitution article I, section 11b if
a person (1) who is accused in Texas of a felony, (2) is released on bail pending
trial, (3) has his bail subsequently revoked for a violation of a condition of
release, and (4) is found to have violated conditions that relate to the safety of a
victim or the safety of the community. Tex. Const. art. I, § 11b. In the capital
murder case, Appellant is a person (1) who was accused in Tarrant County,
Texas, of the felonies of capital murder and aggravated robbery; (2) was
“released on bail pending trial” via his juvenile predelinquency adjudication
hearing release; (3) had his “bail”/juvenile predelinquency adjudication hearing
release subsequently revoked, as reflected by Appellant’s continuous
confinement since July 20, 2017, for violating a condition of his release—
including cutting off his ankle monitor and fleeing;5 and (4) was specifically found
by the trial court in finding of fact 8 to have violated a condition that relates to the
safety of the victims and of the community.6 For purposes of article I, section 11b
code of criminal procedure] the [l]egislature intended that an
individual initially detained as a juvenile and later certified an adult,
then prosecuted and sentenced accordingly, should be treated any
differently than one who is initially detained as an adult.
Green, 688 S.W.2d at 557.
5
Appellant violated many other conditions of his release as well.
6
Appellant allegedly committed a second capital murder and an aggravated
robbery during the approximately three-month time period he was fleeing before
he was apprehended; the trial court made a finding that the nature of Appellant’s
alleged offenses mandated consideration of the safety of the victim and the
community in determining bail and that the trial court had considered this factor.
14
of the Texas constitution, Appellant has effectively been “released on bail
pending trial” in the capital murder case; Appellant violated the conditions of his
release, fled, and allegedly committed multiple additional felonies demonstrating
his danger to the community. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Appellant’s application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus
and by denying bail under article I, section 11b in the capital murder case. See
id. See generally Ex parte Shires, 508 S.W.3d 856, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2016, no pet.) (looking at the legislative history of section 11b and stating that
“the legislature recognized that when an accused has demonstrated a reluctance
to abide by reasonable conditions of bond, considerations of the safety of victims
. . . and the safety of the community as a whole should be considered before
releasing the defendant into the community again”).
We overrule the portion of Appellant’s sole issue challenging the denial of
his application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus seeking bail in the capital
murder case.
2. The Arlington Aggravated Robbery Case
Because Appellant’s juvenile predelinquency adjudication hearing release
was based on the capital murder case, not the Arlington aggravated robbery
case, Texas constitution article I, section 11b does not support the trial court’s
decision to deny bail in the Arlington aggravated robbery case. That is, Appellant
was never granted juvenile predelinquency adjudication hearing release in the
15
Arlington aggravated robbery case, so he cannot be denied bail based on a
violation of conditions of release that were never imposed.
The State argues that “extraordinary circumstances” exist authorizing the
trial court to deny bail in the Arlington aggravated robbery case. The State
candidly acknowledges, however, that this bail exception has been very rarely
utilized––only in one case.7 We decline to apply the “extraordinary
circumstances” exception here, if in fact such an exception still exists. We hold
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s application for a
pretrial writ of habeas corpus seeking reasonable bail in the Arlington aggravated
robbery case. See, e.g., Tex. Const. art. I, § 11 (“All prisoners shall be
bailable . . . .”); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.07 (using similar language); Ex
parte Davis, 574 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (“The
general rule favors the allowance of bail.”); Gutierrez v. State, 927 S.W.2d 783,
784 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (holding that appellant was
entitled to pretrial bail under the Texas constitution because none of the
constitutional exceptions to bail applied).
We sustain the portion of Appellant’s sole issue challenging the denial of
his application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus seeking reasonable bail in the
Arlington aggravated robbery case.
7
The State cites Mills v. State, 626 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
1981, pet. ref’d).
16
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled the portion of Appellant’s sole issue challenging the trial
court’s denial of bail in the capital murder case, we affirm the trial court’s order
denying Appellant’s application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus in that case.
Having sustained the portion of Appellant’s sole issue challenging the trial court’s
denial of bail in the Arlington aggravated robbery case, we reverse the trial court
denial of Appellant’s application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus in that case
and remand that case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d); Gutierrez, 927 S.W.2d at 784 (remanding
case to trial court to set bail when appellate court held appellant was entitled to
have bail set).8
PER CURIAM9
PUBLISH
DELIVERED: August 16, 2018
8
Appellant urges this court to set his bail, contending that if these cases
are remanded for the trial court to set bail, the amount set by the trial court will be
unreasonably high. We will not so presume. We give the trial court the first
opportunity to set reasonable bail.
9
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2, the court on its own
initiative, for good cause, has suspended the operation of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 47.2(a) in this particular appeal.
17