NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 20 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN DANIEL CASTILLO, No. 16-72239
Petitioner, Agency No. A077-992-454
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 15, 2018**
Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Juan Daniel Castillo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order overturning an immigration
judge’s (“IJ”) decision granting his application for a waiver under 8 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1182(h), and the BIA’s order dismissing his appeal from an IJ’s decision denying
his request for administrative closure. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We review de novo constitutional claims and questions of law. Mohammed
v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We dismiss in part and deny in
part the petition for review.
The record does not support Castillo’s contentions that the BIA failed to
apply the correct standard of review or failed to consider or properly analyze
relevant evidence in denying his request for a waiver of inadmissibility under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (“The Board may review
questions of law, discretion, and judgment and all other issues in appeals from
decisions of immigration judges de novo.”). In the absence of a colorable legal or
constitutional claim, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary
denial of relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i);
Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To be colorable
in this context, . . . the claim must have some possible validity.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Monroy v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 1175, 1177-78 (9th
Cir. 2016) (holding that petitioner did not raise a reviewable issue because “he
simply disagrees with the agency’s weighing of his positive equities and the
negative factors”). Accordingly, Castillo’s due process claim also fails. See Lata v.
2 16-72239
INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (an alien must show error and substantial
prejudice to prevail on a due process claim).
To the extent Castillo contends that the BIA’s limitation on the scope of
remand to the IJ was improper, we reject this contention. See Fernandes v. Holder,
619 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing the BIA’s authority to qualify or
limit remand for a specific purpose).
We do not reach Castillo’s contention that the IJ had authority within the
scope of remand to grant his request for administrative closure, where that request
is now moot, because this court dismissed his earlier petition for review in 2015.
See Castillo v. Lynch, 618 F.App’x 337 (9th Cir. 2015) (unpublished).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.
3 16-72239