[J-11-2018] [MO: Dougherty, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, : No. 61 MAP 2017
BUREAU OF LIQUOR CONTROL :
ENFORCEMENT, : Appeal from the Order of the
: Commonwealth Court dated April 13,
Appellant : 2017 at No. 575 CD 2016 Affirming
: the Order of the Berks County Court of
: Common Pleas, Civil Division, dated
v. : March 15, 2016, docketed March 16,
: 2016, at No. 15-17486.
:
JET-SET RESTAURANT, LLC, : ARGUED: May 17, 2018
:
Appellee :
DISSENTING OPINION
JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: August 21, 2018
I join Justice Baer’s dissenting opinion in full. As Justice Baer notes, the 2003
amendments added four additional instances of the word “frequent” to 47 P.S. § 4-
493(14). Utilizing the definition of “frequent” set forth in Appeal of Speranza, 206 A.2d
292 (Pa. 1965) results in a nonsensical construction of the statute as fully discussed by
Justice Baer. See Dissenting Op. of Baer, J. at 5-7. I write separately to emphasize that
a reading contrary to that outlined by the dissent results in a law that allows violations to
occur on two occasions without penalty, before a citation is issued on the third occasion.
Section 4-493(14) clearly intends to penalize licensed establishments for allowing
the admission of minors unless one of the enumerated exceptions applies. To interpret
the Act otherwise is to ignore the directive that it be construed to accomplish its purpose:
“protection of the welfare, health, peace and morals of the people of the Commonwealth.”
47 P.S. § 1-104.
Further, the Speranza definition is impractical to implement as it requires a system
for tallying and tracking infractions prior to issuing a citation. Instantly, the
Commonwealth Court noted that “Jet-Set was cited for permitting a minor to be present
in a licensed premises on two occasions in 2014.” Cmwlth Ct. Op. at 5. Because it was
not Jet-Set’s third known instance of allowing minors to be present, the Commonwealth
Court determined no violation of Section 4-493(13) had occurred and the citation was
improper. In my view, it is unlikely that the General Assembly intended to condone
allowing licensed premises to knowingly admit minors into their establishments unless
one of the Section 4-493(13) exceptions was met. For the foregoing reasons, I
respectfully dissent.
Justice Baer joins this dissenting opinion.
[J-11-2018, 61 MAP 2017] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 2
Pa. St. Police, Aplt. v. Jet-Set Restaurant, LLC
Combined Opinion