1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
2
3 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2018
4 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
5 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
6
JANEECE FIELDS, No. 17-17537
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00272-JST
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
7
8 Appeal from the United States District Court
9 for the Northern District of California
10 Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding
11
12 Submitted August 15, 2018**
13
14 Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
15 Janeece Fields appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
16 her action alleging federal and state law claims related to a loan on her real
17 property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
18 dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1 Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011).
2 We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside
3 Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
4 In her opening brief, Fields fails to address the grounds for dismissal of her
5 claims related to the 2007 deed of trust, the dismissal of defendant Bank of
6 America, the striking of her claims based on a violation of the state court’s
7 temporary restraining order, and the denial of her motion to name doe defendants.
8 Therefore, Fields has waived her challenge to the district court’s disposition of
9 these claims and these issues. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350
10 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e will not consider any claims that were not
11 actually argued in appellant’s opening brief.”); Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d
12 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993) (issues not supported by argument in pro se appellant’s
13 opening brief are waived); see also Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir.
14 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion
15 does not preserve a claim . . . .”).
16 The district court properly dismissed Fields’s claims related to the 2016
17 notice of default and notice of trustee’s sale because Fields failed to allege facts
18 sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th
2 17-17537
1 Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must
2 present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
3 The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fields’s motion for
4 leave to amend to add new defendants and claims based on a violation of the state
5 court’s temporary restraining order. See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th
6 Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and factors for permitting leave to
7 amend).
8 AFFIRMED.
3 17-17537
Janeece Fields v. Bank of New York Mellon
Combined Opinion