NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANTE LAMON TAPLIN, No. 17-35842
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-01937-AA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MULTNOMAH COUNTY HEALTH
SERVICES; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2018**
Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Dante Lamon Taplin appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs during his pretrial detention at Multnomah County Inverness
Jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Ersson
because, under any potentially applicable standard, Taplin failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Ersson knew of and disregarded an excessive
risk to Taplin’s ankle fracture. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (in
considering the conditions of pretrial detention, courts consider whether the
conditions amount to punishment); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-58 (neither a
difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment nor mere negligence in
treating a medical condition amounts to deliberate indifference); see also Gordon
v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (elements of
Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim by pretrial detainee).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office and Multnomah County Health Services
because Taplin failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a
policy or custom caused him to suffer constitutional injuries. See Castro v. County
of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (discussing
requirements to establish municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Taplin’s motions
for appointment of counsel because Taplin failed to demonstrate exceptional
2 17-35842
circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting
forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
We reject as unsupported by the record Taplin’s contention that the district
court improperly granted summary judgment without allowing an opportunity for
discovery.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 17-35842