NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHAD JAMES ROMINE, No. 17-17142
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02012-TLN-EFB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GEOFF DUPPMAN; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2018**
Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Chad James Romine appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from a dispute
regarding car repair services. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Romine’s request for oral
argument, set forth in his reply brief, is denied.
review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d
956, 963 (9th Cir. 2018). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record,
Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
Dismissal of Romine’s federal claims was proper because Romine failed to
allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally
construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief); Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 2010)
(setting forth elements of a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act); Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1144-45 (9th Cir.
2006) (setting forth elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C § 1981); Sever v. Alaska
Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth elements of a
conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418,
1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting forth elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend
because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and
2 17-17142
stating that “[a]lthough leave to amend should be given freely, a district court may
dismiss without leave where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure
the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be futile”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 17-17142