NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY BERNARD SMITH, Jr., No. 17-17452
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:14-cv-04791-LHK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JIMMY CRUZEN; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2018**
Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Anthony Bernard Smith, Jr., a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from
the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
federal claims related to the interruption of congregational prayer. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. See Jones v. Williams,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
791 F.3d 1023, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Smith’s Free
Exercise Clause claim because Smith failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
facts as to whether defendants’ conduct constituted a substantial burden. See id. at
1031-32 (“A person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the government
action in question substantially burdens the person’s practice of her religion.”); see
also Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1211-14 (9th Cir. 1998) (no substantial
interference where intrusions on plaintiff-prisoner’s prayers were “relatively short-
term and sporadic” and did not constitute a substantial interference).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Smith’s
Establishment Clause claim because Smith failed to raise a triable dispute as to
whether defendants’ actions constituted government sponsorship of religion. See
Canell, 143 F.3d at 1214 (where there was no indication that other prison staff
were aware of or condoned defendant’s conduct, it was not “sufficiently imbued
with the state’s authority” to constitute government sponsorship of religion).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Smith’s retaliation
claim because Smith failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether defendants
interrupted the congregational prayer because of Smith’s protected conduct. See
2 17-17452
Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To prevail on a retaliation
claim, a plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was the substantial or
motivating factor behind the defendant’s conduct.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Smith’s equal
protection claim because Smith failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether
defendants had discriminatory intent. See Mendiola–Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d
1239, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose
is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Smith’s Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claim for monetary
damages against defendants in their official capacities as barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.
2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars [the plaintiff’s] suit for official-capacity
damages under RLUIPA.”).
We reject as without merit Smith’s contention that the district court failed to
give him an opportunity to cure a defective pleading.
AFFIRMED.
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