FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 23, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SHERWIN V. KOYLE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 18-4041
(D.C. No. 2:15-CV-00239-DBP)
SAND CANYON CORPORATION; (D. Utah)
WELLS FARGO BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Sherwin Koyle appeals the district court’s denial of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
motion. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I
Koyle filed suit in Utah state court against Sand Canyon Corporation and
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., asserting various claims related to a foreclosure.
Defendants removed the case to federal court. The district court granted summary
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
judgment in favor of defendants on March 8, 2016. We affirmed. Koyle v. Sand
Canyon Corp., 683 F. App’x 715, 716 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished).
On March 5, 2018, Koyle filed a motion for relief from judgment based on
newly discovered evidence and fraud under Rule 60(b)(2) and (3). He also submitted
an affidavit requesting a temporary restraining order to halt a scheduled foreclosure
sale. The district court denied both requests for relief. This appeal followed.
II
We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Switzer
v. Coan, 261 F.3d 985, 988 (10th Cir. 2001). Rule 60(b) allows for relief from a final
judgment based on, inter alia, “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b)” or “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2), (3). A motion under
either of these subsections “must be made . . . no more than a year after the entry of
the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
Koyle’s motion was filed nearly two years after the district court’s summary
judgment order, well beyond this deadline.
On appeal, Koyle asserts that the deadline to file a Rule 60(b) motion should
be calculated from the date this court’s mandate issued. But we have previously held
that “the one-year time limit in Rule 60(b) runs from the date the judgment was
‘entered’ in the district court; it does not run from the date of an appellate decision
reviewing that judgment, nor does the pendency of an appeal toll the one-year
2
period.” The Tool Box, Inc. v. Ogden City Corp., 419 F.3d 1084, 1088-89 (10th Cir.
2005). The rule is the same in our sibling circuits. See id. at 1089 (collecting cases).
Koyle argues that such a rule is unfair in light of a district court order denying for
lack of jurisdiction Koyle’s motions filed during the pendency of the appeal. We
need not decide whether a litigant filing an untimely but meritorious Rule 60(b)
motion might be entitled to some form of relief under these circumstances in light of
the plainly frivolous nature of Koyle’s filings.
III
Defendants request attorneys’ fees for litigating this appeal. In the prior
appeal, we concluded that defendants were entitled to reasonable fees incurred on
appeal pursuant to an adjustable rate note signed by Koyle. Koyle, 683 F. App’x at
725. We explained that by defending Koyle’s suit intended to stop the foreclosure,
“defendants have, in essence, incurred ‘costs and expenses in enforcing th[e] Note,’
and thus are entitled to an award of ‘reasonable attorneys’ fees’ as authorized by
Paragraph 7(E) of the Note.” Id. The same is true in this appeal. We therefore direct
submission of a statement of reasonable attorneys’ fees as described below.
IV
AFFIRMED. Defendants shall submit, within thirty days of the date of this
Order and Judgment, a statement of appellate attorneys’ fees and costs for which they
seek reimbursement. Koyle shall then have thirty days from the date defendants
3
submit their statement to file any objections to defendants’ requested fees and costs.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
4