Case: 17-14924 Date Filed: 08/24/2018 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-14924
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:16-cr-80089-KAM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ESTIL GEDEON,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(August 24, 2018)
Before TJOFLAT, NEWSOM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 17-14924 Date Filed: 08/24/2018 Page: 2 of 5
Estil Gedeon appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Gedeon
contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his renewed motion to
withdraw his guilty plea without providing an evidentiary hearing. After review, 1
we affirm.
At Gedeon’s change-of-plea hearing, the district court conducted a thorough
inquiry under Rule 11. In response to the district court’s questions, Gedeon
testified: (1) he read the indictment; (2) he fully and completely discussed the
indictment with his attorney; (3) he fully and completely understood the charges
against him; (4) he discussed with his attorney the evidence against him; (5) he
discussed with his attorney any defenses he might have to the charges; (6) there
was nothing else he believed his attorney should have done to defend him; (7) he
was satisfied he received competent representation from his attorney; (8) he read
the plea agreement; (9) he discussed the plea agreement fully and completely with
his attorney; (10) he fully and completely understood all of the plea agreement’s
terms and provisions; (11) he signed the plea agreement after having read,
understood, and discussed it with his attorney; (12) he signed the plea agreement
1
We review a district court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty
plea for abuse of discretion and will reverse only if the denial was “arbitrary or unreasonable.”
United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006). We also review a district court’s
refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of
discretion. Id.
2
Case: 17-14924 Date Filed: 08/24/2018 Page: 3 of 5
freely and voluntarily; (13) he was changing his plea freely and voluntarily; (14) he
understood there was a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment;
(15) no one made any promises or representations to him outside of the plea
agreement; (16) he read the factual proffer detailing the facts alleged against him;
(17) he discussed the factual proffer fully and completely with his attorney; (18) he
understood all of the facts set forth in the factual proffer; (19) the facts set forth in
the factual proffer were true and correct; and (20) the facts in the factual proffer
met all elements of the offense to which he was pleading guilty. Based on
Gedeon’s testimony, the district court accepted his guilty plea as knowing and
voluntary.
Two months later, Gedeon changed his mind and informed the district court
he intended to withdraw his guilty plea. After the motion to withdraw the plea was
filed, despite Gedeon’s clear and unequivocal testimony at the Rule 11 hearing, the
district court held an evidentiary hearing and allowed Gedeon to supplement his
testimony in support of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. At that hearing,
Gedeon contradicted his previous sworn testimony, asserting that his guilty plea
was not knowing and voluntary because it was based solely on his belief that he
had little chance of succeeding at trial. Gedeon further suggested his counsel was
deficient because he should have filed more motions on Gedeon’s behalf. When
pressed to identify what motions should have been filed, Gedeon could not recall
3
Case: 17-14924 Date Filed: 08/24/2018 Page: 4 of 5
any. But he testified, “I know that [my attorney] could have filed more motions
than what he did.”
The district court was unconvinced. It denied Gedeon’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea and reaffirmed its conclusion that Gedeon’s guilty plea was made
knowingly and voluntarily. Gedeon, however, was undeterred. He sought and
received new counsel, who then filed a renewed motion to withdraw the guilty
plea, this time contending that Gedeon never received close assistance of counsel.
The district court denied the renewed motion—without granting an
additional evidentiary hearing—on the basis that the new issues Gedeon raised
could, and should, have been raised in connection with his original motion to
withdraw the guilty plea. Moreover, the district court noted that at least a portion
of the new facts proffered by Gedeon were inconsistent with his prior
representations to the court.
Under our precedent, the district court was well within its discretion to rely
on Gedeon’s sworn testimony at the change-of-plea hearing and reject his later
attempts to contradict that testimony. See United States v. Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506,
1514 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[I]f the Rule 11 plea taking procedure is careful and
detailed, the defendant will not later be heard to contend that he swore falsely.”
(citing United States v. Barrett, 514 F.2d 1241, 1243 (5th Cir. 1975) 2). Moreover,
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
4
Case: 17-14924 Date Filed: 08/24/2018 Page: 5 of 5
the district court provided Gedeon an evidentiary hearing at which he could present
any evidence he wished in support of withdrawing his guilty plea. Gedeon’s
testimony at that hearing suggested he simply changed his mind about pleading
guilty, and he felt his attorney should have filed more unspecified motions on his
behalf.
Based on Gedeon’s testimony, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by concluding both that Gedeon was provided the close assistance of counsel and
that he pleaded guilty knowingly and voluntarily. The district court also did not
abuse its discretion by denying Gedeon an additional evidentiary hearing, which
would provide Gedeon a second chance to contradict the clear and unequivocal
testimony he gave at his change-of-plea hearing. See id. at 1514 (“In light of the
extensive Rule 11 inquiries which the trial court made before accepting appellant’s
plea, we do not believe that its refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing amounts
to an abuse of discretion.”).
AFFIRMED.
Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior
to close of business on September 30, 1981.
5