NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 28 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-50013
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:13-cr-02297-JLS-1
v.
TONY LEE MCLEOD, AKA Tony, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 11, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: BEA and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,** District Judge.
Tony Lee McLeod was convicted by a jury of nine counts of persuading or
attempting to persuade a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the
purpose of producing an image of that conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e), one count
of traveling with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. §2423(b),
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for
the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
and one count of transportation of a minor with the purpose of engaging in illicit
sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). McLeod appeals his conviction, alleging the
district court abused its discretion by: (1) failing to make a reliability finding on
purported expert testimony concerning information obtained from a cell phone
through a Cellebrite device, which he claims is required by Federal Rule of
Evidence 702; (2) admitting testimony from one of the victims about physical
contact between McLeod and the victim, over McLeod’s objection based on Rule
403; and (3) failing to sever the § 2251 production counts from the § 2423 travel
and transport counts. McLeod also asserts that § 2251 is unconstitutional as applied
to him.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district
court’s evidentiary rulings and denial of McLeod’s motion to sever for abuse of
discretion. See Estate of Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457, 460 (9th Cir.
2014) (en banc); United States v. Beck, 418 F.3d 1008, 1013 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Leon-Reyes, 177 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Mayfield, 189 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 1999). We review de novo his constitutional
challenge to § 2251. See United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809, 811 (9th Cir. 2001).
We affirm.
1. McLeod argues the district court abused its discretion when it
admitted Detective Damian Jackson’s testimony at trial without making a
2
reliability finding under Rule 702. Rule 702 governs the admission of expert
testimony and requires that proposed expert testimony be reliable. Further, under
Rule 702, where the testimony’s “factual basis, data, principles, methods, or [its]
application” is called into question, a trial judge must make a reliability
determination. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999)
(quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
It appears that the district court overruled McLeod’s objections to Detective
Jackson’s testimony because the district court found that Detective Jackson had the
experience and knowledge to present the contested documents, and nothing in his
testimony required the district court to make additional findings about the
testimony’s reliability. See id. At trial, Detective Jackson testified about how he
used a Cellebrite device during the course of his investigation to download
information from one of the victim’s cell phones onto a thumb drive and then
testified about the contents of that information. He testified about what Cellebrite
does and how he used it in the course of his investigation to extract information
from the victim’s cell phone. His investigation and Cellebrite use yielded readable
text of the downloaded data, a link to images downloaded from the victim’s cell
phone, and “extraction reports.” Detective Jackson also testified that he could
select what data to extract from the phone through Cellebrite. In short, Detective
Jackson testified about his use and interaction with Cellebrite—and how he
3
extracted data from one of the victim’s phones in this case. We have previously
allowed testimony similar to Detective Jackson’s testimony without requiring that
the testimony meet Rule 702’s expert testimony requirements. See United States v.
Seugasala, 702 F. App’x 572, 575 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The officers who followed the
software prompts from Cellebrite and XRY to obtain data from electronic devices
did not present testimony that was based on technical or specialized knowledge
that would require expert testimony.”).1
Nevertheless, the dissent asserts that Detective Jackson provided expert
testimony subject to Rule 702. The dissent believes the district court erred by not
making a reliability finding regarding Detective Jackson’s testimony and accepting
the information obtained through Cellebrite. However, even assuming that the
district court erred in admitting Detective Jackson’s testimony, the error was
harmless. See United States v. Spangler, 810 F.3d 702, 708 (9th Cir. 2016)
(holding that even assuming that the district court’s decision to bar expert
testimony was error, such error was harmless); Estate of Barabin, 740 F.3d at 464
(citing United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1415 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that
this court reviews improperly admitted expert testimony for harmless error). The
record reflects that testimony from one of the victims and from one of the victim’s
1
That the Seugasala court reviewed for plain error is a distinction that does not
change the fact that our court has previously allowed testimony similar to
Detective Jackson’s testimony.
4
aunts independently supports McLeod’s conviction without Detective Jackson’s
testimony. Therefore, assuming Detective Jackson’s testimony was admitted in
error, any error was harmless because sufficient evidence in the record supports
McLeod’s conviction.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Detective
Jackson’s testimony. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1030 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“We afford broad discretion to a district court’s evidentiary rulings.”);
see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149. And even if the district court erred, such
error was harmless. See Estate of Barabin, 740 F.3d at 464.
2. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in admitting
testimony from one of the victims concerning touching between the victim and
McLeod in the car on the way to the Los Angeles International Airport and on the
flight to Florida. The parties agree that the disputed testimony was probative of the
transport and travel counts, but the testimony had low probative value as to the
production counts. See United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th
Cir. 2005) (explaining that the trial court should weigh the prejudicial effect of
certain evidence against its probative value). McLeod points to no authority
holding that evidence must be probative as to all charges against a defendant to be
admissible under Rule 403, which permits a district court to “exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by,” among other things,
5
unfair prejudice. See United States v. Jayavarman, 871 F.3d 1050, 1063 (9th Cir.
2017) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403).
McLeod argues that the district court erred by admitting the victim’s
testimony regarding the touching because it was not probative of the production
counts, irrelevant to the production count related to the other victim, and its
graphic nature was highly prejudicial. However, McLeod points to no authority
holding that testimony must be probative of all charges.2
Moreover, the contested testimony was not unduly prejudicial. Given all the
charges against McLeod, and the sexually explicit and graphic nature of the other
evidence presented at trial that was probative of the production charges, the district
court permissibly concluded that in this context, admitting the victim’s testimony
was not extraordinarily inflammatory. Jayavarman, 871 F.3d at 1063–64 (holding
that the district court did not err under Rule 403 where it admitted audio recordings
of the defendant’s statements that he had sex with the victim when she was thirteen
or fourteen years old because the probative value of the evidence was very high
and that “value was not substantially outweighed by any risk of unfair prejudice
that might have arisen from the evidence, especially in the context of other
evidence adduced at trial”); United States v. Higuera-Llamos, 574 F.3d 1206, 1209
(9th Cir. 2009) (“The district court is to be given ‘wide latitude’ when it balances
2
The dissent makes similar arguments as McLeod on this issue.
6
the prejudicial effect of proffered evidence against its probative value.”) (citation
omitted). Although courts must take care to prevent emotionally charged evidence
that may lead to a decision on an improper basis, see Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d at
1098, we review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence with great
deference, see United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1267 (9th Cir. 2009). The
dissent reweighs the testimony’s prejudicial value without considering the
deference we afford district courts. On this record, it was not an abuse of discretion
for the district court to admit the contested testimony.
3. Assuming McLeod did not waive his motion to sever the transport and
travel counts from the production counts by failing to renew the motion at the close
of evidence, McLeod bears the burden of proving the undue prejudice he suffered
from the joint trial. See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 845 (9th
Cir. 1994). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 “sets a high standard for a
showing of prejudice.” Id. McLeod argues that because the contested victim
testimony had no bearing on the production charges, only on the travel and
transportation count, its admission prevented him from receiving a fair trial. The
dissent argues substantially the same thing as McLeod. However, as discussed
above, the district court did not err in admitting the victim’s testimony regarding
touching between the victim and McLeod.
Moreover, we have previously held that district courts do not abuse their
7
discretion by denying motions to sever in cases that involve potentially
inflammatory evidence. See Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 846–47 (holding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to sever
where the defendant did not “present[] any reasons, other than the emotionally-
charged nature of [one of the] murder[s], as to why the jury would be unable to
consider separately the evidence that applies to the two pairs of murders.”); United
States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 850–51 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever a felon in possession of a
firearm charge from child pornography counts under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 14 where defendant argued evidence of the gun would “inflame[] an
already emotionally charged trial and invited the jury to infer that Smith would
have used the gun to threaten or kill the children if they had refused to allow him to
take their pictures”).
Here, McLeod’s charges all arose from related conduct concerning his
communication with the victims and the subsequent enticement of one of the
victims to leave with McLeod for Florida with the intention of engaging in illicit
sexual conduct. Indeed, McLeod’s underlying conduct as to all charges was
sufficiently related such that the nature of the evidence, within the context of this
case, was not unduly inflammatory. See Jayavarman, 871 F.3d at 1063–64.
Further, for the reasons discussed above, trying all counts in the same trial
8
“was not so manifestly prejudicial that it outweigh[ed] the dominant concern with
judicial economy and compel[led] the exercise of the court’s discretion to sever.”
United States v. Lopez, 477 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original). Accordingly, McLeod has not
met his burden of proving that he was prejudiced from the joint trial. See Vasquez-
Velasco, 15 F.3d at 845.
4. Finally, McLeod argues that his due process rights were violated
when he was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) without requiring proof that he
knew the victims were underage. McLeod’s constitutional challenge is precluded
by United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., L.A., 858 F.2d 534, 538
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that “knowledge of the minor’s age is not necessary for
conviction under section 2251(a).”).
Accordingly, the district court did not commit any reversible error on any
issue on appeal, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
9
FILED
AUG 28 2018
United States v. Tony Lee McLeod, AKA Tony, No. 16-50013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
MOLLOY, District Judge for the District of Montana, dissenting in part and
concurring in part:
I respectfully disagree with the majority reasoning and rulings in this case.
1. The district court abused its discretion when it admitted Detective
Jackson’s expert testimony without making a reliability finding, and the error
prejudiced McLeod.
First, Jackson provided expert testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). Jackson
testified based on technical knowledge—specifically, technical knowledge about
the use of the Cellebrite device. Jackson testified as to what the Cellebrite device
is, what it does, how it works, and what it produces. Jackson also testified he
performed a “logical extraction” on the Blackberry, and explained the resulting
report to the jurors at length.
The majority cites to United States v. Seugasala for the proposition that
testimony by an officer who uses Cellebrite to extract the contents of a cellular
device is not expert testimony. 702 F. App’x 572, 575 (9th Cir. 2017). But
Seugasala, a non-binding memorandum opinion, involved plain error review, not
abuse of discretion. Moreover, simply because the user can follow prompts from
the program does not mean that expert testimony is not required or that the
underlying technology is reliable. In the context of this case, McLeod presented
evidence that the Cellebrite device Jackson used can produce significant errors,
including not acquiring files and misreporting data.
Even if Jackson only provided lay testimony, as the majority found, he
nevertheless received the court’s expert imprimatur in front of the jury. See
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 926–27 (1983), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), as recognized in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473
(2000) (“Where the public holds an exaggerated opinion of the accuracy of
scientific testimony, the prejudice is likely to be indelible.”). The district court
stated that, based on Jackson’s experience, he was “more than qualified” to testify
about the Cellebrite report. When McLeod objected to further introduction of the
Cellebrite report into evidence, the district court stated Jackson “[had] . . . the
experience and the knowledge to present the[] documents.” Later, the district court
overruled McLeod’s relevance objection as the government questioned Jackson
about his continued use of Cellebrite in the years following the extraction at issue
in this case. In other words, the district court first endorsed Jackson as an expert,
and then permitted the government to bolster Jackson’s credentials in front of the
jury.
Second, the district court made no reliability finding before admitting
Jackson’s testimony and the Cellebrite report. “[T]he failure to make an explicit
2
reliability finding [i]s error,” even where “the district court’s ruling suggests an
implicit finding of reliability.” United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d 565, 583 (9th
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
While erroneous admission of expert testimony is harmless where the record
shows the witness was reliable and qualified, see United States v. Figueroa-Lopez,
125 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 1997), the record here casts doubt on Jackson’s
qualifications. Although Jackson testified he holds multiple computer forensic
certifications, none of them pertained to Cellebrite, and they all post-dated his
work with the victim’s Blackberry. He was not certified by Cellebrite to perform
extractions, seemed unsure about the types of Cellebrite extractions that could be
performed, and did not know when the device he used was last updated. Jackson’s
lack of certification is particularly troubling given that, as McLeod notes,
Cellebrite itself “strongly encourages all users to attend certification training in
order to best understand—and explain—how to extract, decode, analyze and
document mobile device evidence using these advanced methodologies.” In short,
Jackson’s testimony did not demonstrate reliable scientific or technical principles
reliably applied. See Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Third, Jackson’s report and testimony prejudiced McLeod. Where evidence
has been improperly admitted, this Court must “consider whether the error was
harmless.” Estate of Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457, 464 (9th Cir.
3
2014) (quotation and citation omitted). Prejudice is presumed, and the burden is
on the benefitting party to show “that it is more probable than not that the jury
would have reached the same verdict even if the evidence had not been admitted.”
Id. at 464–65 (quotation and citation omitted). “Prejudice is at its apex when the
district court erroneously admits evidence that is critical to the proponent’s case.”
Id. at 465.
Jackson’s testimony and the Cellebrite report were critical to the
government’s case. The government relied on the report to establish which
messages were sent and received, as well as the time of each message. The timing
of the messages rebutted McLeod’s claim that he did not know the victim was a
teenager when the images were produced. The government also used the
Cellebrite report to create demonstrative exhibits showing a “more readable”
format that was “closer to the way [the messages] would have looked on the
[Blackberry] device when the individual was holding it.” The government relied
on that report in closing.
In sum, the district court erred when it allowed Detective Jackson to provide
expert testimony without making a reliability finding and accepted the Cellebrite
report he prepared. That error was not harmless because it involved evidence
critical to the government’s case, prejudicing McLeod. Reversal and a new trial is
appropriate for this reason and for the additional reasons set forth below.
4
2. The district court abused its discretion when it admitted the victim’s
testimony that McLeod molested him. While that testimony is relevant to
McLeod’s intent regarding the travel and transportation counts, United States v.
Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 2004), it had limited, if any, relevance to the
production counts, and its probative value was substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect, Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Id. “The probative value of
evidence against a defendant is low where the evidence does not go to an element
of the charge.” United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.
2005). In this case the proper balance of fairness and “judicial economy” should
tip to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
McLeod faced nine counts of persuading, or attempting to persuade, a minor
to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual
depiction of the conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251; one count of traveling
for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b); and one count of transporting a minor with the intent of
engaging in criminal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Of these
eleven charges, the touching testimony was probative of only two—the travel and
transportation counts—because those required the government to prove McLeod
5
had the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. See Dhingra, 371 F.3d at 565
(where intent was a “key element” of the charge—coercion of a minor in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2422—testimony that defendant fondled victim was not unduly
prejudicial, even though sexual contact was not an element of the offense).
Morever, “what counts as the Rule 403 ‘probative value’ of an item of evidence, as
distinct from its Rule 401 ‘relevance,’ may be calculated by comparing evidentiary
alternatives.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997). In this case,
the text messages provided alternative evidence of McLeod’s intent, further
diminishing the probative value of the touching testimony even as to those two
counts. See id.
On the other hand, the testimony was not probative of any of the elements
the government had to prove for the production counts, which were that (1) the
victims were minors, (2) McLeod persuaded (or attempted to persuade) them to
take part in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual
depiction, and (3) the visual depictions were transported in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce by any means, including by computer. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
Sexual contact between the defendant and the victim is not an element, as the
government conceded in its pretrial brief opposing severance. The district court
reasoned that the testimony “would be relevant to rebut a defense that the
defendant did not know that the victim was a minor” because “the subsequent acts
6
tend[ed] to rebut the inference raised by such a defense that the defendant would
not have committed the acts had he known the minor’s age.” But the victim
testified before McLeod presented his case, which forced McLeod into rebuttal
regardless. The same forced hand ruling took place in a pretrial exchange between
the court and defense counsel. Further, one of the production counts involved a
different victim than the one who testified about the physical contact, meaning not
only that the touching testimony was not probative of that count, but was not even
relevant.
McLeod suffered unfair prejudice because of the touching testimony. “The
term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some
concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground
different from proof specific to the offense charged.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180.
“In other words, unfairly prejudicial evidence is that having ‘an undue tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one.’” Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S.
at 180). “Where the evidence is of very slight (if any) probative value, it’s an
abuse of discretion to admit it if there’s even a modest likelihood of unfair
prejudice or a small risk of misleading the jury.” Id. (quotation and citation
omitted). A fair trial cannot be dependent on a “guilty anyway” assessment of the
evidence or the joinder of charges.
7
The graphic testimony about uncharged conduct was highly prejudicial.
Because it described sexual physical contact between the victim and McLeod, it
differed in kind from the texting, photo, and video evidence otherwise presented.
As to the production charges, then, the testimony was evidence “lur[ing] the
factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the
offense charged.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180. Finally, while the testimony itself
occupied little trial time, it required significant rebuttal—seven witnesses,
including three flight attendants, two passengers, an FBI agent, and a forensic
biologist. Had the counts been tried separately, the defendant may have prevailed
in his defense. Tried together, the defense to the touching was rendered
meaningless by virtue of the nature of the crimes and the reality of propensity
proof.
The district court erred by admitting the touching testimony because it was
not probative of the production counts and presented an unacceptably high risk of
prejudice. Reversal for a new trial on this ground is appropriate.
3. The district court’s failure to sever the travel and transportation counts
from the production counts after it decided to admit the touching testimony
abridged McLeod’s right to a fair trial. United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318,
1321 (9th Cir. 1986), amended on denial of reh’g, 798 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1986).
First, while McLeod failed to renew his motion to sever, he briefed and
8
argued it pretrial and also argued the touching testimony warranted severance in
his motion for a new trial. Further, severance was inextricably bound up in the
admission of the touching testimony, so much so that the district court’s decision
not to sever was premised on its conclusion that the touching testimony was
relevant to the production counts. Because severance had been thoroughly
litigated, renewal would have been an “unnecessary formality,” United States v.
Vasques-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 845 (9th Cir. 1994), and McLeod did not waive the
issue.
The question here “is whether joinder was so prejudicial that the trial judge
was compelled to exercise his discretion to sever.” Lewis, 787 F.2d at 1321.
“There is a high risk of undue prejudice whenever . . . joinder of counts allows
evidence of other crimes to be introduced in a trial of charges with respect to which
the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible.” Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in
original). McLeod “has the burden of proving that the joint trial was manifestly
prejudicial,” meaning that his “right to a fair trial was abridged.” Id. (citations
omitted). In my view he has satisfied that burden.
The district court concluded the touching testimony was relevant to the
production counts because it rebutted what the court presumed was McLeod’s
affirmative defense—that he did not know the victims were underage. But the
testimony does not go to any element of the production charges, and allowing the
9
government to introduce that evidence in its case in chief put the cart before the
horse. Whether McLeod touched the victim after the two exchanged photos and
video does not make it more likely that he knew how old the victim was during
those exchanges. The problem here was that the testimony was not probative of
the production counts but in the jury’s mind was more than likely evidence of bad
character. See id. at 1322. Such prejudice would have been at its peak regarding
the production count concerning the other victim.
Nor were the district court’s instructions to the jury that it could consider
evidence of other uncharged acts “only for its bearing, if any, on the question of
the defendant’s intent and for no other purpose,” and that it could not “consider
[such] evidence as evidence of guilt of the crimes for which the defendant is now
on trial” sufficient to cure the prejudice. This Court has expressed skepticism that
“general instructions” can “ameliorat[e] the prejudice arising from joinder.” Bean
v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Lewis, 787 F.2d at 1323
(“To tell a jury to ignore the defendant’s prior convictions in determining whether
he or she committed the offense being tried is to ask human beings to act with a
measure of dispassion and exactitude well beyond mortal capacities.” (quoting
United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
In my opinion, the district court abused its discretion by refusing to sever the
production counts from the travel and transport counts once it decided to admit the
10
touching evidence. Reversal and a new trial with the counts severed is appropriate
here.
4. McLeod argues that because he did not meet the victims face-to-face
before they sent him the pictures and videos—and so could not ascertain that they
were minors—his due process rights were violated when he was convicted under
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) without requiring proof that he knew the victims were
underage. I agree with the majority that McLeod’s challenge to the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 is foreclosed by United States v. U.S. Dist.
Court for Cent. Dists. of Cal., L.A. (“Kantor”), 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988).
However, McLeod’s argument that Kantor’s rationale is inapplicable to the facts of
his case is not without some merit.
The defendants in Kantor were charged under § 2251 after they produced a
sexually explicit film with a sixteen-year-old performer. Id. at 536. They sought
to present as a defense evidence that the performer misled them by “pass[ing]
herself off as an adult,” and argued their First Amendment and due process rights
required the government to prove they knew she was a minor. Id. A panel of this
Court considered the legislative history of § 2251(a), noting that the omission of a
mens rea requirement “was quite clearly deliberate.” Id. at 538. Nevertheless,
Kantor concluded that because § 2251 regulates speech, and “the first amendment
[sic] does not permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on the basis of strict
11
liability where doing so would seriously chill protected speech . . . . imposition of
major criminal sanctions on the[] defendants without allowing them to interpose a
reasonable mistake of age defense would choke off protected speech.” Id. at 540–
41. Accordingly, Kantor held that, as to mens rea, “[a] defendant may avoid
conviction only by showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that he did not
know, and could not reasonably have learned, that the actor or actress was under
18 years of age.” Id. at 543 (footnotes omitted). Kantor did not reach the
defendants’ due process claim. Id. at 538.
The Supreme Court, considering 18 U.S.C. § 2252, a related statute which
prohibits distributions of child pornography, addressed whether the statute required
that a defendant know that the person in the images distributed was a minor.
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). In its analysis, the
Supreme Court contrasted the legislative history of § 2252 with that of § 2251,
noting that Congress intentionally omitted “knowingly” from § 2251 but not from
§ 2252. Id. at 76. And in a footnote, it noted that “[t]he difference in congressional
intent with respect to § 2251 versus § 2252 reflects the reality that producers are
more conveniently able to ascertain the age of performers,” and cited to Kantor for
the proposition that “[i]t thus makes sense to impose the risk of error on
producers.” Id. at 76 n.5.
12
McLeod argues Kantor’s “rationale is inapplicable to [his] case, which
involves indirect communications over the internet—a forum known to be rife with
inaccurate information.” In other words, McLeod argues the facts of his case make
him more akin to a distributor than to a producer. McLeod is correct that Congress
could not have envisioned the circumstances of his case when it enacted § 2251,
and also correctly notes that the “producer” rationale underlying Kantor and X-
Citement Video seems to contemplate face-to-face meeting between the defendant
and the minor. The technology innovation since Kantor was decided raises a
serious question as to the factual predicate to its reasoning. That technology did
not exist when Congress enacted § 2251, nor was it available when Kantor was
decided. When the law was enacted, and when Kantor was decided, a producer,
almost of necessity, had to encounter the minor to produce the illicit film or image.
That is no longer the case, which gives rise to the need to revisit the question of
whether the government should be put to the task of proving the defendant knew
the victim was underage. Kantor’s precedent is binding here, as the majority
found, but the issue is worth reconsideration by an en banc panel of this Court.
Because the district court erred by admitting Jackson’s expert testimony and
the Cellebrite report without making a reliability finding, by admitting the touching
testimony, and by failing to sever the production counts from the travel and
transport counts, I respectfully dissent in part, and I would send this case back for
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new trials on the severed counts with instructions to the district court to reconsider
its evidentiary rulings.
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