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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-14959
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00222-ODE-JKL-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTONIO LEDON JONES,
a.k.a. Antonio Deangelo Jones,
a.k.a. Shorty P,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(August 29, 2018)
Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Antonio Ledon Jones appeals his 130-month sentence for possessing with
the intent to distribute heroin. He argues that his sentence was procedurally
unreasonable because the district court failed to sufficiently state its reasons for
imposing its sentence. He also argues that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because, he says, the district court failed to give adequate
consideration to other similarly-situated offenders and placed excessive emphasis
on his criminal history. Because we conclude that Jones’s sentence is reasonable,
we affirm.
I
Jones pleaded guilty to one count of possessing with the intent to distribute
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). According to the
presentence investigation report, by age 40, Jones had accumulated more than 20
prior convictions. Those crimes include, among other things, possessing cocaine,
battery causing injury to a police officer, aggravated battery (three times), selling
heroin, theft by shoplifting, and willful obstruction of law enforcement officers.
The PSI concluded that Jones qualified for the career offender enhancement,
resulting in a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court adopted the PSI’s guideline
calculations. At the request of the parties, it varied downward one offense level,
resulting in an adjusted guidelines range of 140 to 175 months imprisonment.
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Both Jones and the government requested a 72-month sentence. The government
noted that Jones was arrested as part of its “drug market intervention” initiative in
The Bluff, a neighborhood in Atlanta. The government argued that Jones was less
culpable than other defendants arrested as part of that initiative because he was
arrested at the beginning of the initiative, before the government had given fair
warning that it would start arresting individuals in that area who sold drugs.
The district court disagreed with the parties’ position that the career offender
designation was inappropriate, concluding that “the career offender designation in
Mr. Jones’s case is not merely technically correct, it’s actually correct.” The court
noted that Jones has “an extremely serious criminal history involving both drug
crimes and crimes of violence,” and reasoned that there was no “strong reason here
for going below the bottom end of the career offender guideline range.” The court
further noted Jones’s “pattern” of selling drugs, and found that “there is a very high
risk of recidivism.” The court concluded that “even taking into account the
argument that the defense and the Government have made I just don’t think a 72-
month sentence is the right sentence in this case.” The court continued, “I think a
sentence of 140 months is more appropriate given Mr. Jones’s significant criminal
history.” The court then allowed Jones to present a chart showing how his crime
compared to other defendants arrested as part of the drug market intervention
initiative. The court concluded that the chart didn’t “add[] a lot,” given that Jones
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“has a terrible criminal history.” The court then imposed a 130-month sentence,
which was 10 months below the bottom of the guidelines range.
II
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first determine if the
district court committed a significant procedural error such as miscalculating the
guideline range, treating the sentencing guidelines as mandatory, failing to
consider the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on
erroneous facts, or failing to explain the sentence selected. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Assuming we find no procedural error, we then ask
whether the sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the Section 3553(a) factors. Id.
A
Jones argues that the district court imposed a procedurally unreasonable
sentence by failing to state the reasons for the imposition of the sentence. 1 A
sentencing court must state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the
particular sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). To satisfy Section 3553(c), the district
court’s reasons must be specific enough to allow an appellate court to
meaningfully review the sentence in the manner envisioned by the sentencing
guidelines. United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990, 997 (11th Cir. 2016). “The
1
Our review is de novo. United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1181 (11th Cir. 2006).
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length and amount of detail describing the district court’s reasoning depends on the
circumstances.” United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2010).
A sentencing court is not required to incant the specific language used in the
guidelines, articulate its consideration of each factor, or state that a particular
factor is not applicable, so long as the record reflects the court’s consideration of
many of the factors. United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir.
2006). The district court needs only to set forth enough to demonstrate that it
considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own
legal decision-making authority. Ghertler, 605 F.3d at 1262.
We conclude that the district court adequately explained why it sentenced
Jones to 130 months imprisonment. The court heard argument from both parties
about “what a reasonable sentence would be in this case.” The court
acknowledged Jones’s mitigating circumstances—including his difficult childhood,
the small amount of drugs involved in the instant offense, and the showing of
support from his family—but nonetheless determined that a significant downward
departure was not justified in light of his “significant criminal history” and “very
high risk of recidivism.” The court also heard further argument about how Jones
compared to other defendants arrested as part of the same initiative, but rejected
those arguments because Jones’s “terrible criminal history” warranted a higher
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sentence. We therefore conclude that the district court satisfied its responsibility
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).
B
Jones also argues that his below-guidelines 130-month sentence is
substantively unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1188-89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). We will affirm any sentence that falls within
the range of reasonable sentences, even if we would have decided that a different
sentence was more appropriate. Id. at 1191. The party who challenges the
sentence bears the burden to show that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the
record and the Section 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371,
1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
A district court must select a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary,” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
provide just punishment, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2). In making its selection, the district court must also consider (1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the characteristics of the defendant, (2)
the kinds of sentences available, (3) the sentencing guideline range, (4) the
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, (5) the need to avoid
sentencing disparities among similarly-situated defendants, and (6) any need for
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restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1)–(7). We will vacate a sentence as
substantively unreasonable only if we are “left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the Section 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190.
Jones asserts that the district court gave “undue weight to [his] criminal
history, which he had in common with” other defendants arrested as part of the
initiative. Br. of Appellant at 32. But the weight to give to each factor under
Section 3553(a) is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court,
United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007), and the court is
permitted to “attach great weight to one factor over others,” United States v.
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). Here,
as the district court explained, Jones had a “terrible criminal history,” which was
more serious than the criminal records of other defendants arrested as part of the
initiative. It was reasonable for the district court to conclude that the 130-month
sentence—10 months below the bottom of the guidelines range—was appropriate
considering “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of this particular defendant.”
Jones also asserts that the district court “failed to give adequate
consideration to the sentences of other … defendants” arrested as part of the same
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initiative and “created unwarranted sentencing disparities between” himself and
those other defendants. Br. of Appellant at 32. But the court did consider the
sentences of other defendants arrested as part of the initiative. Specifically, the
court considered a chart prepared by Jones’s counsel comparing him to other
career offender defendants arrested as part of the same initiative. The court
concluded that the chart didn’t “really add[] a lot” because Jones had a “terrible
criminal history” which showed a “pattern” of criminal behavior. The court
therefore did not ignore the sentences of other defendants, but instead considered
them and found that factor to be outweighed by his criminal history. See United
States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 936 (11th Cir. 2009) (“It is sufficient that the
district court considers the defendant’s arguments at sentencing and states that it
has taken the § 3553(a) factors into account.”).
Nor did the district court “ignor[e] mitigating factors.” Br. of Appellant at
32. The district court acknowledged those factors—including his difficult
childhood, the small amount of drugs involved in the instant offense, and the
showing of support from his family—but again, concluded that they were
outweighed by his criminal history. See Sanchez, 586 at 936.
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III
Given the deference owed to the district court’s decision that the Section
3553(a) factors, on balance, justify the sentence, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion.
AFFIRMED.
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