Case: 18-11011 Date Filed: 08/29/2018 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-11011
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cv-00071-TCB
J. T. HATCHER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION,
Defendant-Appellee,
JUDGE MAUREEN GOTTFRIED,
Interested Party-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(August 29, 2018)
Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 18-11011 Date Filed: 08/29/2018 Page: 2 of 10
J.T. Hatcher, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of Exel, Inc. (“Exel”),
the denial of leave to amend his complaint to add parties, and the dismissal of his
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction against the State of Alabama
Department of Human Services, Child Support Enforcement Division (“ADHS”).
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Hatcher filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against ADHS for
ordering and enforcing child-support payments against him in violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He alleged that
Alabama lacked jurisdiction over him when it entered a child-support order against
him because he and his wife were still married at the time and they were not
citizens of Alabama. He further alleged that ADHS failed to notify the State of
Georgia, where he is a citizen, of the child support sought; that there was no valid
divorce between him and his wife and, consequently, Alabama lacked the authority
to enter a child-support order against him; and that the withholdings have been
ongoing since 2013. Hatcher sought injunctive relief to suspend enforcement of
the order and to direct any law-enforcement agency to disregard it.
Hatcher filed his first amended complaint and added Exel, his employer, as a
defendant for illegally withholding income to satisfy the Alabama child-support
order despite his sending a cease-and-desist letter. He sought to enjoin the
2
Case: 18-11011 Date Filed: 08/29/2018 Page: 3 of 10
company from further withholdings from his paycheck. Exel filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, arguing that it
had a legal obligation to comply with the Alabama order and that an employer may
not be liable for withholding income in accordance with a valid court order. Exel
further argued that Hatcher’s requested relief was moot because it received and
complied with a termination notice regarding the child-support withholdings.
Hatcher moved for leave to amend his complaint to add two parties: Judge
Maureen Gottfried, a Georgia state court judge who oversaw his divorce
proceedings, and Maxine Wallace, an attorney representing his ex-wife in that
case. Wallace and Judge Gottfried filed responses in opposition to Hatcher’s
motion seeking leave to add them as parties.
In a combined order, the district court granted Exel’s motion to dismiss and
denied Hatcher’s motion for leave to amend. The court concluded Exel was under
a legal obligation to comply with the child-support order and could not know the
circumstances that Hatcher alleged it should know in order to refuse to comply.
The court denied Hatcher’s motion for leave to amend based on judicial immunity
and Younger 1 grounds because the state divorce proceeding was ongoing.
The district court ordered Hatcher to file briefing regarding the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over ADHS as the only remaining defendant, raising
1
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971).
3
Case: 18-11011 Date Filed: 08/29/2018 Page: 4 of 10
concerns about sovereign immunity. Hatcher filed a motion to set aside in part or
modify the order dismissing Exel and denying leave to amend and moved the court
to enter a default judgment against ADHS for failure to respond. He also filed a
response to the court’s order directing his briefing on sovereign immunity,
reiterating that he was entitled to a default judgment and arguing that a sovereign-
immunity defense did not take precedence over his constitutional rights.
The court entered an order addressing the jurisdictional issue and dismissed
the case sua sponte without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
court concluded that, as a state agency, ADHS was entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity, which acted as a jurisdictional bar.
Hatcher raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the court erred in
dismissing Exel for failure to state a claim. Second, he argues that the district
court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for leave to amend the
complaint to add two parties. Hatcher finally argues that the district court erred
when it dismissed his complaint against ADHS for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction on sovereign-immunity grounds.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal of Exel
We review a grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim de novo, “accepting the allegations
4
Case: 18-11011 Date Filed: 08/29/2018 Page: 5 of 10
in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Behrens v. Regier, 422 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005). An employer
has several statutory duties to comply with income-withholding orders for child
support. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 19-11-154; see also 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(6)(C). An
employer that complies with an income-withholding order may not be subject to
civil liability to an individual or agency for withholding income pursuant to the
order. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(6)(A)(i); O.C.G.A. § 19-11-153.
Hatcher filed a complaint against Exel because it was withholding payments
from his income in accordance with an Alabama child-support order and sought an
injunction to cease withholdings. Accepting Hatcher’s allegations as true and
construing them in the light most favorable to him, Exel was nonetheless under
statutory duties to follow the order and cannot be held liable for complying. See
42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(6)(A)(i), (b)(6)(C); O.C.G.A. §§ 19-11-153, 19-11-154;
Behrens, 422 F.3d at 1259. Thus, the district court did not err in granting Exel’s
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. Denial of Leave to Amend
We review a district court’s order denying a motion for leave to amend for
abuse of discretion; however, we review de novo the underlying legal conclusion
of whether a particular amendment to the complaint would be futile. Chang v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 845 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (11th Cir. 2017). A district
5
Case: 18-11011 Date Filed: 08/29/2018 Page: 6 of 10
court “should freely give leave” to amend a complaint “when justice so requires.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “But ‘a district court may properly deny leave to amend
the complaint under Rule 15(a) when such amendment would be futile,’ such as
‘when the complaint as amended is still subject to dismissal’ . . . .” Chang, 845
F.3d at 1094 (quoting Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (11th
Cir. 2004)).
1. Judicial Immunity
“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those
acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the
‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir.
2000) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1105
(1978); Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (11th Cir. 1996)). Absolute
judicial immunity “applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or
were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Id.
Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting in his judicial
capacity depends on whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a
normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s
chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case
pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately
out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.
Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005).
Hatcher sought to add a state court judge based on her entering a divorce
decree, a normal judicial function taken during a controversy in a case pending
6
Case: 18-11011 Date Filed: 08/29/2018 Page: 7 of 10
before her. Id. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave
to amend to add Judge Gottfried as a party.
2. Younger Doctrine
We review a district court’s decision to abstain on Younger grounds for an
abuse of discretion. Wexler v. Lepore, 385 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004).
“Under Younger v. Harris and its progeny, federal district courts must refrain from
enjoining pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.”
Old Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Tillis Trucking Co., 124 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir.
1997).
“The question . . . is threefold: first, do [the proceedings] constitute an
ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate important
state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings
to raise constitutional challenges.” Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 2521 (1982) (emphasis omitted).
Georgia has recognized that marriage “continues to be of vital interest to the
State.” Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662, 665 (Ga. 1982) (quoting Posner v.
Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970)).
Hatcher sought to add parties who participated in his underlying divorce
case in state court that he conceded was ongoing due to his appeal to the Georgia
Court of Appeals, satisfying the first factor in the Middlesex analysis. Middlesex,
7
Case: 18-11011 Date Filed: 08/29/2018 Page: 8 of 10
457 U.S. at 432, 102 S. Ct. at 2521. Moreover, divorce cases implicate important
state interests, as they pertain to marriage. Id.; Scherer, 292 S.E.2d at 665.
Finally, Hatcher presents no argument that the state proceeding does not provide an
adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional challenges. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at
432, 102 S. Ct. at 2521. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying leave to amend when it concluded that amendment would be futile based
on Younger grounds.
C. Dismissal of the Complaint
We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
de novo. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009). Federal courts
are “obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it
may be lacking.” Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 975 (11th Cir.
2005). A court must dismiss an action if it “determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Thus,
Eleventh Amendment immunity is a threshold issue that should be decided at an
early stage. Ross v. Jefferson Cty. Dep’t of Health, 701 F.3d 655, 659 (11th Cir.
8
Case: 18-11011 Date Filed: 08/29/2018 Page: 9 of 10
2012) (holding that the Alabama Health Department was an arm of the state
entitled to sovereign immunity).
“The Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court from exercising
jurisdiction over a lawsuit against a state, except where the state has consented to
be sued or waived its immunity, or where Congress has overridden the state’s
immunity.” Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1502 (11th Cir. 1995). Congress has
not overridden a state’s immunity for § 1983 cases. Id. Alabama has not agreed to
be sued for violations of an individual’s civil rights. See Ala. Const. art. I, § 14
(“[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or
equity.”); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782, 98 S. Ct. 3057, 3058 (1978).
Sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment applies to states and to
“agencies and entities that function as an ‘arm of the state.’” Ross, 701 F.3d at 659
(quoting Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). We
determine whether an agency is an “arm of the state” by considering three factors:
“(1) how the state law defines the entity; (2) the degree of state control over the
entity; and (3) the entity’s fiscal autonomy—i.e., where the entity derives its funds
and who is responsible for judgments against the entity.” Walker v. Jefferson Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 771 F.3d 748, 751 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Stewart v. Baldwin Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1509 (11th Cir. 1990)). Alabama routinely treats the
Department of Human Services as a state agency entitled to sovereign immunity.
9
Case: 18-11011 Date Filed: 08/29/2018 Page: 10 of 10
See, e.g., Ex parte Ala. Dep’t of Human Res., 999 So. 2d 891, 898 (Ala. 2008)
(holding that sovereign immunity precluded a civil action against the child support
payment center of the Alabama Department of Human Services). We have held
that where an arm of the state is entitled to sovereign immunity, a district court
may dismiss without prejudice a § 1983 action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Nichols v. Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d 726, 733 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding
that the Alabama State Bar was an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment
immunity purposes).
Hatcher filed a complaint against ADHS, which is treated as an arm of the
state by Alabama and thus is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Ex parte
Ala. Dep’t of Human Res., 999 So. 2d at 898. Accordingly, the district court did
not err when it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the case.
AFFIRMED.
10