J-A14032-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
REBECCA F. YOUNG, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
KEITH W. YOUNG :
:
Appellee : No. 77 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered November 29, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
Domestic Relations at No.: C-48-CV-2012-6428
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED AUGUST 30, 2018
Appellant, Rebecca F. Young (Wife), appeals from the divorce decree
entered on November 29, 2017, which made final the March 23, 2017 order
dismissing her exceptions to the Divorce Master’s report.1 We affirm.
We take the relevant facts and procedural history of this case from the
trial court’s May 15, 2017 opinion and our independent review of the certified
record. Wife and Appellee Keith W. Young, (Husband), were married in
February of 1977. Wife filed a complaint in divorce on July 5, 2012. The
parties appeared for a hearing before a Divorce Master on December 6, 2016,
at which Wife proceeded pro se.
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1 We note that a pre-divorce order cannot be reviewed until it has been
rendered final by the entry of a decree in divorce. See Wilson v. Wilson,
828 A.2d 376, 378 (Pa. Super. 2003).
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On January 9, 2017, the Master filed a report detailing his
recommendations regarding the equitable distribution of the parties’ marital
assets and Husband’s support obligations. Wife filed pro se exceptions to the
Master’s report on January 19, 2017. She did not appear at the scheduled
February 21, 2017 hearing on the exceptions. The trial court relisted the
matter for March 21, 2017, and instructed Wife that she must comply with
Northampton County Local Rule of Civil Procedure N1920.55-2, regarding
transcription of the record before a Divorce Master.2 (See Order, 2/22/17).
The court advised that “[f]ailure to comply with this Rule will result in the
dismissal of the Exceptions.” (Id.).
Wife retained current counsel to represent her on March 8, 2017, and
she requested another continuance. The trial court denied this request,
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2 Local Rule N1920.55-2, Exceptions to Divorce Master’s Report, provides:
(a) If exceptions are filed to the report of a Divorce Master, the
excepting party shall within ten (10) days arrange for the
transcribing of the testimony for filing with the court and pay to
the stenographer within said time the estimated cost thereof,
unless the court on motion shall grant an extension for cause
shown. The completed transcript shall be filed within thirty (30)
days of the filing of the exceptions unless the court on motion shall
grant an extension for cause shown.
(b) Absent good cause shown, failure of the excepting party to act
promptly in accordance with (a) above to pay the cost and secure
the transcript shall result in the dismissal of said exceptions by
the court upon motion.
Rule N1920.55-2.
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reiterated its admonition regarding Rule N1920.55-2, and advised that
counsel could either argue the exceptions at the hearing, or the court would
accept the matter on the briefs. (See Order, 3/10/17, at 1-2). Wife’s counsel
did not appear at the March 21, 2017 proceeding, and the parties submitted
briefs to the court. Wife had not secured the transcript of the hearing before
the Master, or demonstrated that she had paid for it, nor had she filed a motion
requesting an extension of time to obtain it. (See Order, 3/23/17). On March
23, 2017, the trial court dismissed Wife’s exceptions with prejudice, for her
failure to comply with Rule N1920.55-2. (See id.). The court entered the
divorce decree on November 29, 2017. This timely appeal followed.3
Wife raises the following overlapping issues for our review:
[1.] Did the [trial c]ourt err by not determining Wife was denied
due process by not being allowed or advised to retain counsel for
the master’s hearing?
[2.] Did the [trial c]ourt err by not determining Wife was denied
due process by having her claim of equitable distribution decided
when by the Master’s own admission almost 70% of the issues
required to be addressed by statute are not even mentioned,
much less established?
[3.] Did the [trial c]ourt err by not determining Wife was denied
due process when her request to leave the record open in order
to bring forth two (2) subpoenaed witnesses was denied as the
Master felt them unnecessary?
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3 Wife timely filed a court-ordered concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal on January 23, 2018. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court
entered a Rule 1925(a) statement on February 6, 2018, in which it referred
this Court to its previous opinion, filed May 15, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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[4.] Did the [trial c]ourt err by not directing a second hearing be
held to establish at least a whisper of seven of the eleven
enumerated subsections of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502 to be addressed?
[5.] Did the [trial c]ourt err by not directing that a second hearing
be held in order to allow the Master an opportunity to provide a
discussion and rationale for the split of the assets?
[6.] Did the [trial c]ourt err when it denied the exceptions of
[Wife] when a transcript was ordered but could not be completed
prior to the hearing on the exceptions?
[7.] Was [Wife] denied her due process by not being allowed the
opportunity to be heard through presenting her own testimony?
(Wife’s Brief, at 31-33).
We begin by noting:
[a] trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an
award of equitable distribution. Our standard of review when
assessing the propriety of an order effectuating the equitable
distribution of marital property is whether the trial court abused
its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow
proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of
discretion, which requires a showing of clear and convincing
evidence. This Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless
the law has been overridden or misapplied or the judgment
exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified
record. In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution
award, courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole.
We measure the circumstances of the case against the objective
of effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving
a just determination of their property rights.
Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to weigh
the evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse
those determinations so long as they are supported by the
evidence. We are also aware that a master’s report and
recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest
consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of
witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe and
assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.
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Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Wife’s first three issues allege the denial of her due process rights at the
hearing before the Divorce Master, at which she proceeded pro se. (See
Wife’s Brief, at 55-60). Wife argues that she was denied due process because
she did not adequately waive her “right” to counsel, and because the Master
made his decision based on an insufficient record and without testimony from
her or two subpoenaed witnesses. (Id. at 55; see id. at 55-60).4 These
issues are waived.
An appellate brief must support the claims presented with citation to
and discussion of pertinent legal authorities. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c). “This
Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an
appellant.” Krauss v. Trane U.S. Inc., 104 A.3d 556, 584 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted). “When deficiencies in a brief hinder our ability to conduct
meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find
certain issues to be waived. Pa.R.A.P. 2101.” Id. (case citation omitted).
Here, Wife has cited one criminal case concerning PCRA relief, (for the
general proposition that due process requires an opportunity to be heard and
to defend oneself before a fair tribunal), throughout her six-page argument,
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4 Wife claimed that she subpoenaed two witnesses, the parties’ son and a
stockbroker, who did not appear at the Master’s hearing. (See Wife’s Brief,
at 58-59). However, she did not provide confirmation to the Master that these
individuals had actually been subpoenaed. (See Master’s Report, 1/09/17, at
2 n.1; N.T. Hearing, 12/06/16, at 120).
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wherein she purports to raise three questions. (See Wife’s Brief, at 55-60)
(citing Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied sub
nom. Turner v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 1771 (2014)). Wife has failed to
discuss the law applicable in the civil divorce context, or to apply these
precepts to the facts of this case. Therefore, she has waived her first three
claims. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101, 2119(a)-(c); Krauss, supra at 584; see also
Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 402 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 880
A.2d 1239 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092 (2006).
Moreover, her issues would not merit relief. “The law is well settled that
there is no right to counsel in civil cases.” Rich v. Acrivos, 815 A.2d 1106,
1108 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Additionally, a pro se litigant “is
not entitled to any particular advantage because [s]he lacks legal training.”
Id. (citation omitted). “Further, any layperson choosing to represent
h[er]self in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the
risk that h[er] lack of expertise and legal training will prove h[er] undoing.”
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In short, an uncounseled
litigant cannot expect the court to act as her attorney. See Krauss, supra
at 584.
Here, the trial court provided the following analysis of Wife’s claims:
While [Wife] proceeded without counsel at the parties’
hearing before [the Master], the record reflects that [she] was
previously represented by three different attorneys throughout
the parties’ divorce proceedings. Moreover, [Wife] was able to
retain [current counsel] for her appeal, demonstrating her ability
to retain counsel when she chooses.
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[Wife] proceeded without legal counsel at the parties’
hearing before [the Master] at her own risk. Neither [the Master],
nor this court were required to suspend procedural rules or walk
[Wife] through the procedural requirements necessary to reach
the merits of [her] claims. . . .
(Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/17, at 7-8) (citations and footnote omitted).
We agree. Thus, Wife’s first three issues would not merit relief, even if
they were not waived.5
In Wife’s fourth, fifth, and sixth issues, she argues that the trial court
erred by not directing the Master to hold a second hearing to supplement the
record, and by dismissing her exceptions without first allowing a continuance
for production of the Master’s hearing transcript. (See Wife’s Brief, at 60-63).
However, Wife neither discusses nor cites any legal authority in her
arguments on these three issues, which collectively span only two and one-
half pages. (See id.). These undeveloped claims therefore are waived.6 See
Pa.R.A.P. 2101, 2119(a)-(c); Krauss, supra at 584.
In her final issue, Wife reiterates her argument that she was denied due
process at the Master’s hearing because she was not permitted to testify, and
requests that this Court remand for completion of the record. (See Wife’s
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5 We note that Wife’s repeated assertion that she was not allowed to testify at
the Master’s hearing, (see Wife’s Brief, at 56-58, 63-65), is belied by the
record, which shows that the Master did give her the opportunity to testify.
(See N.T. Hearing, 12/06/16, at 120-21).
6 Wife appears to concede that her argument regarding the necessity for a
second Master’s hearing to supplement the record is a regurgitation of her
second issue. (See Wife’s Brief, at 60-61).
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Brief, at 63-65) (again citing Turner, supra). This issue is waived and would
not merit relief, for the reasons discussed above. (See supra, at *5-7).
Accordingly, Wife’s final claim fails.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/30/18
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