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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-15295
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. 016614-16 L
CHRISTOPHER E. HUMINSKI,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent - Appellee.
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Petition for Review of a Decision of the
U.S. Tax Court
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(August 30, 2018)
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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In this tax appeal, Christopher Huminski, proceeding pro se, argues that the
Tax Court erred in granting the motion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
for summary judgment and to permit levy, and in denying his motion to compel
discovery. These arguments, however, suffer from the same fatal flaw—Mr.
Huminski had notice of his tax liability, but did not timely dispute it. Because the
Internal Revenue Code prohibits him from now challenging it in a collection
proceeding, see 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B), we affirm.
I
On June 22, 2015, the IRS mailed Mr. Huminski a notice of deficiency,
alerting him that he failed to report income from 2012 and owed $25,643 in
overdue taxes and penalties. The IRS demanded payment in November of 2015,
but Mr. Huminski did not pay. In February of 2016, the IRS sent a final notice of
intent to levy, to which Mr. Huminski responded by requesting a collection due
process hearing. After considering Mr. Huminski’s arguments, the Settlement
Officer determined that a collection action was appropriate. The Tax Court
ultimately granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. It also
denied Mr. Huminski’s motion to compel discovery into alleged fraud and record
falsification.
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II
We review the Tax Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, see
Packard v. Comm’r, 746 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2014), and the denial of a
motion to compel discovery for abuse of discretion, see Holloman v. Mail-Well
Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 2006). We also review challenges to the
appropriateness of a collection action for abuse of discretion. See Roberts v.
Comm’r, 329 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2003). We read Mr. Huminski’s pro se
brief liberally. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
III
On appeal, Mr. Huminski argues that the IRS engaged in record falsification
and other fraud when it determined that he owed a tax deficiency for the year 2012.
He suggests that summary judgment was inappropriate because the Tax Court did
not permit him to take discovery on the alleged fraud and that he was deprived of
the evidence required to prove his case.
These arguments, which challenge “the existence or amount of the
underlying tax liability,” come too late. See 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B). Although
taxpayers may raise “any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed
levy” during a collection due process hearing, § 6330(c)(2)(A), they may not
challenge the amount or existence of the underlying tax liability unless they “did
not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability or did not
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otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability,” § 6330(c)(2)(B). The
record is clear, and Mr. Huminski does not dispute, that he received the June 22,
2015 notice of deficiency. As the notice of deficiency letter he received instructed,
his fraud-based challenges had to be made by filing a timely petition with the Tax
Court in response to that notice. See § 6213(a). He did not do so, nor did he
present any other argument as to why collection was not appropriate. See
§ 6330(c)(2)(A) (listing appropriate defenses and issues that may be raised at
collection due process hearings). Accordingly, summary judgment was properly
granted.
For the same reason, the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
his motion to compel discovery. Mr. Huminski’s fraud-based challenges were
irrelevant to the collection action because he was prohibited from contesting his
underlying tax liability at that stage. See § 6330(c)(2)(B).
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the rulings of the Tax Court.
AFFIRMED.
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