NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 30, 2018*
Decided August 30, 2018
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
No. 18‐1133
ERIN JESSICA EILER Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
v. No. 16 C 4665
SOUTH DAKOTA HUMAN SERVICES Amy J. St. Eve,
CENTER and EQUAL EMPLOYMENT Judge.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Defendants‐Appellees.
O R D E R
The South Dakota Human Services Center declined to hire Erin Eiler. She
responded by suing the Center and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
alleging that the Center did not hire her because she was disabled, and the EEOC failed
to rectify that problem. The district court dismissed her complaint. Because it correctly
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 18‐1133 Page 2
reasoned that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the Center and that Eiler neither
timely served the EEOC nor stated a valid claim against it, we affirm.
The Center rejected Eiler’s application to work as a counselor. She filed a charge
of discrimination at the South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation, alleging
that the Center did not select her because of an unspecified disability. When the
Department dismissed the charge after finding no violation, it informed her that she
could request review by the EEOC. Eiler did so by turning to the Chicago office of the
EEOC, which issued her a right‐to‐sue letter after adopting the Department’s findings.
Dissatisfied with the lack of administrative relief, Eiler sued the Center and the
EEOC in the Northern District of Illinois under various employment statutes including
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. She alleged that the
“defendant interfered with the plaintiff’s exercise of and equal enjoyment of rights by
discriminating against plaintiff based on disabilities.” Eiler applied to proceed in forma
pauperis, but the district court denied her request and, once she failed to pay the filing
fee, dismissed her lawsuit. We affirmed that decision as a valid exercise of discretion.
Eiler v. S. D. Human Servs. Ctr., 676 F. App’x 595, 596 (7th Cir. 2017).
When Eiler later paid the filing fee, the district judge reopened the case to
consider other preliminary issues. The judge first granted Eiler more time to serve the
defendants, requiring service by October 20, 2017. Then, two months after that deadline
passed, the judge dismissed the case. The EEOC was dismissed from the suit because
Eiler had not properly served it by the deadline. Furthermore, because Eiler did not
allege that she had pursued an employment relationship with the EEOC, Eiler stated no
claim under the ADA, the only possibly applicable law. Finally, the court lacked
personal jurisdiction over the Center because it operated only in South Dakota.
On appeal, Eiler first argues that the district court denied her due process when
it charged her a filing fee. But we resolved this issue in her last appeal, see Eiler, 676 F.
App’x at 596, and Eiler is precluded from relitigating it. Bravo‐Fernandez v. United States,
137 S. Ct. 352, 358 (2016).
Eiler next turns to her claim against the EEOC. She asserts in her brief on appeal
that she eventually served the EEOC; therefore, she argues, her failure to meet the
deadline for service of process should not be cause for dismissal. Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(i)(1) and (2), Eiler had to deliver process to three different offices by
the court‐ordered deadline of October 20: the EEOC’s office, the United States Attorney
No. 18‐1133 Page 3
in Chicago, and the Attorney General of the United States. She explains that she
delivered process to the EEOC’s office before October 20, but she concedes that she was
eleven days late in serving the other two offices. A district court does not abuse its
discretion by enforcing a service‐of‐process deadline if the plaintiff offers no valid
excuse for non‐compliance with the deadline. Cardenas v. City of Chicago, 646 F.3d 1001,
1007 (7th Cir. 2011). And Eiler offers none. She says only that she attempted service in
April 2016 when she asked the EEOC to waive formal service. But she admits that a
year later she was still “waiting on a signed waiver of service of summons that never
came.” Attempted service (including a hope that the defendant will waive service) is
not actual service of process. Williams v. Illinois, 737 F.3d 473, 475–76 (7th Cir. 2013).
After already granting one extension of time to serve and receiving no valid reason for
another, the district court reasonably dismissed the claim against the EEOC for lack of
proper service. See Cardenas, 646 F.3d at 1007.
In any event, Eiler’s suit against the EEOC fails on the merits. The ADA—the
only statute that she invokes on appeal—prohibits employers from discriminating
against job applicants and employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). But Eiler did not allege that
she applied for a job at the EEOC or had an existing employment relationship with the
agency. Therefore, she did not state a claim that the EEOC violated the employment
provisions of the ADA. See id.; Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S.
440, 449–51 (2003). And to the extent that Eiler is suing the EEOC for failing to process
her charge satisfactorily, the law provides no private right to sue over such an alleged
injury. See Jordan v. Summers, 205 F.3d 337, 342 (7th Cir. 2000).
That brings us to the dismissal of Eiler’s claim against the Center for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Eiler invokes the Illinois Long Arm Statute, which permits the
exercise of personal jurisdiction if it is allowed under the Illinois and United States
Constitutions. 735 ILCS 5/2‐209(c). There is “no operative difference” between the two
constitutional limits. Mobile Anesthesiologists Chicago, LLC, v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Houston
Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010). For purposes of personal jurisdiction,
Eiler must show that the Center has enough “minimum contacts” with Illinois “such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Intʹl Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
Eiler argues that two “contacts” establish personal jurisdiction over the Center
within Illinois, but neither one is availing. First, she observes that she is a resident of
Illinois; she argues that because the Center had contact with her, she thus established
No. 18‐1133 Page 4
the Center’s minimum contacts with Illinois. But a “plaintiff’s mere residence in the
forum state” does not give a court personal jurisdiction over an out‐of‐state defendant.
Mobile Anesthesiologists, 623 F.3d at 447. The “defendant himself” must initiate contacts
with the forum state. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). And Eiler has not shown
that the Center initiated any contacts with her; rather she contacted the Center. Second,
Eiler points to the EEOC, which has an office in Chicago. But again she, not the Center,
contacted the EEOC. When the only link a defendant has to the forum state is a plaintiff
who sought out the defendant, personal jurisdiction does not exist. See id; Brook v.
McCormley, 873 F.3d 549, 553 (7th Cir. 2017).
We have considered Eiler’s other contentions, and none has merit.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.