UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-6060
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DONTA BETTS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge. (1:15-cr-00557-CCB-1)
Submitted: August 21, 2018 Decided: August 31, 2018
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and DUNCAN and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary E. Davis, DAVIS & DAVIS, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Robert K. Hur,
United States Attorney, Matthew J. Maddox, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Donta Betts pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a superseding information
charging him with making a destructive device, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) and
26 U.S.C. § 5861(f) (2012), and discharging a firearm during and in relation to and in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)
(2012). The parties agreed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) that a prison
sentence of between 14 and 16 years was the appropriate disposition of the case, and the
district court sentenced Betts to a total of 15 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Betts
challenges the validity of his guilty plea and claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance. Relying on the appeal waiver in Betts’ plea agreement, the Government urges
dismissal of those claims falling inside the waiver’s scope. For the reasons that follow,
we dismiss the appeal in part and affirm in part.
A criminal defendant may waive the right to appeal if that waiver is knowing and
voluntary. United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 349, 354 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
Generally, if the district court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his
right to appeal during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy and a review of the record reveals
that the defendant understood the full import of the waiver, the waiver is both valid and
enforceable. United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013). Whether a
defendant validly waived his right to appeal is a question of law we review de novo.
Davis, 689 F.3d at 354-55. We will enforce an appeal waiver if the waiver is valid and
the issue appealed is within the scope of the waiver. Id. at 355.
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Having reviewed the record, we conclude that Betts knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to appeal his convictions and his 15-year sentence. Thus, review of any
claims raised by Betts that fall within the scope of this broad waiver is barred.
On appeal, Betts claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to advise the district court at the guilty plea hearing that he had an intellectual disability
and by failing to have him evaluated for competency to plead guilty and be sentenced.
Betts did not preserve in his plea agreement the right to appeal his convictions or
sentence based on any alleged ineffective assistance by trial counsel, and his ineffective
assistance challenges fall squarely within the compass of the valid and enforceable appeal
waiver. We therefore dismiss the appeal in part.
Betts also challenges the validity of his guilty plea, claiming it was not knowing
and voluntary. Betts’ appeal waiver does not foreclose this challenge. See, e.g., United
States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732-33 & n. 2 (4th Cir. 1994).
“A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In federal cases, Rule 11 “governs the duty of the
trial judge before accepting a guilty plea.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5
(1969). The Rule “require[s] a district court, before accepting a guilty plea, to personally
inform the defendant of, and ensure that he understands, the nature of the charges against
him and the consequences of his guilty plea.” United States v. Hairston, 522 F.3d 336,
340 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Because Betts did not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, we
review the acceptance of the plea for plain error only. United States v. Williams,
811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). It is thus Betts’ burden to show (1) error; (2) that was
plain; (3) affecting his substantial rights; and (4) that this court should exercise its
discretion to notice the error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 529, 532 (4th Cir.
2002). In the guilty plea context, a defendant meets his burden to establish that a plain
error affected his substantial rights by showing a reasonable probability that, but for the
error, he would not have entered the guilty plea. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d
337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009).
Betts contends on appeal that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary
because the district court did not: explain at the guilty plea hearing the meaning of the
term “destructive device” when reviewing the offenses to which he was pleading guilty;
ask whether he understood and agreed with “the [S]entencing [G]uidelines calculations”;
inquire whether defense counsel believed he was competent to plead guilty; and “broaden
its inquiry” when he answered affirmatively to misstatements in two questions. Having
reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that Betts fails to establish plain
error in the acceptance of his guilty plea.
The district court was not required to explain to Betts the definition of a
destructive device in accepting his guilty plea. Rather, the court was required, using the
factors set forth in Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, “to assure that [Betts was] not misled as to the
nature of the offense[s] with which he st[oo]d[] charged.” United States v. Reckmeyer,
786 F.2d 1216, 1221 (4th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Betts has not
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suggested that, as a result of the district court’s failure to explain the definition of a
destructive device, he was misled as to or did not understand the nature of the charges to
which he pled guilty.
It is also clear from the record that the district court ensured Betts understood its
obligations, in determining a sentence, to calculate the applicable range under the
Sentencing Guidelines and to consider that range in determining the sentence, see Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(M), and the parties’ stipulations in the plea agreement regarding
applicable Guidelines provisions. Rule 11 contains no requirement that a district court
calculate the applicable Guidelines range or ensure a defendant understands and agrees
with that range as part of its acceptance of his guilty plea. The district court thus did not
plainly err in failing to ask Betts at the plea hearing whether he understood and agreed
with the Guidelines calculations.
Next, based on Betts’ responses to its questions at the plea hearing, the district
court determined he was competent to plead guilty. Betts has not suggested how any
questioning by the district court of defense counsel’s view of his competence would have
had any bearing on the competency finding. He also has not pointed to anything in the
record supporting the conclusion that the court’s failure to question defense counsel
amounted to its ignoring of facts raising a bona fide doubt regarding his competency to
plead. Accord United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (observing
that a defendant may prevail on a claim that a district court erred in failing to hold a
competency evaluation when the trial court ignored facts raising a bona fide doubt
regarding his competency). We therefore discern no plain error in this regard.
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Finally, although Betts answered affirmatively at the plea hearing when the
courtroom deputy initially asked him whether he wished to plead guilty to a count in the
indictment—rather than to the two charges in the superseding information—and when the
district court initially asked him whether he understood the parties’ agreed-upon
sentencing range was 14 to 16 months—rather than 14 to 16 years—each misstatement
was immediately corrected, and Betts confirmed his agreement with the corrected
questions. Betts has not suggested with respect to this claim or any of his others that, but
for the district court’s omissions, he would not have entered his guilty plea.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the criminal judgment in
part. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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