NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 18a0465n.06
No. 16-3595
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Sep 07, 2018
CARLTON ROBINSON, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
) OHIO
Respondent-Appellee. )
Before: GILMAN, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Carlton Robinson moved to vacate his sentence under
28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that he no longer qualifies as a career offender after Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). The district court denied the motion. We affirm.
In 2002, Robinson pled guilty to two federal offenses: being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). In his plea agreement, Robinson
conceded that his two prior state convictions for robbery and for the preparation of drugs for sale
both qualified as “crimes of violence,” and that he thus qualified as a career offender under the
federal sentencing guidelines. As a result, Robinson received an enhanced sentence of 262
months’ imprisonment.
Robinson now argues that his conviction for robbery no longer qualifies as a “crime of
violence” and thus that he no longer qualifies as a career offender. Specifically, Robinson contends
No. 16-3595, Robinson v. United States
that Johnson—which declared the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act
unconstitutional—applies to an identical provision of the then-mandatory federal sentencing
guidelines, which defined a “crime of violence” at the time of his sentencing. Compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2002).
To seek post-conviction relief, Robinson must show that the Supreme Court has
“recognized” a new right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). To that end, Robinson argues that in
Johnson the Court recognized a new constitutional right that extends to mandatory sentencing
schemes. But as Robinson acknowledges, we have previously held that the “right . . . recognized
by the Supreme Court” in Johnson does not extend to the federal sentencing guidelines—whether
mandatory or not. Raybon v. United States, 867 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 903 n.4 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in judgment). Hence Robinson may not seek post-conviction relief under § 2255(f)(3).
Robinson further argues that we should reconsider Raybon because, he says, the decision
was wrongly decided and conflicts with the decisions of other circuits. See Cross v. United States,
892 F.3d 288, 293-94 (7th Cir. 2018); Moore v. United States, 871 F.3d 72, 80-84 (1st Cir. 2017).
But see United States v. Greer, 881 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Brown, 868 F.3d
297, 301-04 (4th Cir. 2017). But we are bound by Raybon until the decision is overruled by the
Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc. See Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 774
F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985).
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
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