17‐2538
Akinde v. NYC Health & Hosp. Corp.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 12th day of September, two thousand eighteen.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK,
REENA RAGGI,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
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OLUDOTUN AKINDE,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v. 17‐2538
NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
CORPORATION, C/O HARLEM HOSPITAL
CENTER, SHARI SINGLETON, LABOR
RELATIONS,
Defendants‐Appellees.
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FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: Oludotun Akinde, pro se, Mount
Vernon, New York.
FOR DEFENDANTS‐APPELLEES: Fay S. Ng, Qian Julie Wang, Assistant
Corporation Counsels, for Zachary W. Carter,
Corporation Counsel of the City of New York,
New York, New York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Forrest, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED
and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.
In this case, plaintiff‐appellant Oludotun Akinde, proceeding pro se, filed a
lawsuit against defendants‐appellees, the New York City Health and Hospitals
Corporation (ʺHHCʺ), and Shari Singleton, an employee in HHCʹs labor relations
department (together, ʺdefendantsʺ), after he was placed on involuntary leave from his
job without pay. In his complaint, Akinde (1) challenged HHCʹs decision to place him
on leave, which occurred after he reported to management that coworkers had showed
up to his house to intimidate him because he filed a state discrimination lawsuit against
HHC, and (2) sought an order compelling defendants to provide him with a hearing,
reinstate him, and pay his salary while he was on leave. The district court dismissed
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the complaint had
become moot after Akinde received the due process hearing that he had requested in
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his complaint. This appeal followed. We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the
underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
When a district court has dismissed a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, we review its factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de
novo. Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2012). An action can become moot
if ʺan event occurs during the course of the proceedings or on appeal that makes it
impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party.ʺ
Cty. of Westchester v. U.S. Depʹt of Hous. & Urban Dev., 778 F.3d 412, 416 (2d Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Insofar as Akinde sought a hearing and reinstatement of his job, the
district court correctly determined that his complaint became moot after he received a
hearing that denied him reinstatement. Less clear, however, is whether Akindeʹs
complaint also sought monetary damages in the form of lost wages from the time he
was placed on medical leave until he received a hearing. The district court appears not
to have considered whether such a claim survives a mootness challenge,
notwithstanding Akindeʹs receipt of a hearing. See Cty. of Westchester, 778 F.3d at 416.
To that extent, we vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand for further
consideration of such a damages claim.
Defendants urge us to affirm on the alternative ground that Akindeʹs
complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief. Although we have discretion to
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affirm on any ground supported by the record, McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 323 (2d
Cir. 2000), we decline to decide that question in the first instance, and remand to the
district court to consider Defendantsʹ alternative arguments. See Absolute Activist Master
Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 2012) (declining to address alternate grounds
for dismissal of a complaint where district court did not consider the arguments in the
first instance).
Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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