MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 13 2018, 10:13 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Scott King Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Russell W. Brown, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana
King, Brown & Murdaugh, LLC
Merrillville, Indiana Laura R. Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Charles Gerron, September 13, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-393
v. Appeal from the La Porte Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael S.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Bergerson, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46D01-1612-MR-8
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Charles Gerron appeals his conviction for murder, a felony. Gerron raises four
issues for our review, which we restate as the following two issues:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in the
admission of certain evidence.
2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
his conviction.
[2] We affirm.1
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On July 24, 2011, three girls held a joint Sweet-16 birthday party at Krueger
Memorial Hall in Michigan City. About 125 people attended, including
numerous other teenagers. Gerron, a juvenile at the time, attended, as did
fellow juveniles Cameron Kent, Skyiesha Pender, Ne’Keisha Hodges, James
Sanders, Michael Cooper, and Jamiela Hodges. Prior to the party that day,
Kent had seen Gerron with a .38 caliber handgun. And, at the party, Pender
observed Gerron with a revolver.
[4] Around 11:00 p.m., the party ended, and a large group of guests—about
twenty-five to thirty people, including Kent, N. Hodges, and Sanders—began
1
Gerron also argues on appeal that he should be released from incarceration “upon remand” under Indiana
Criminal Rule 4(A). Appellant’s Br. at 19. However, as we affirm Gerron’s convictions and do not remand,
we need not consider that argument.
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walking away from the building and downhill toward Springland Avenue.
Cooper also left the party and found Gerron near a moped. Gerron stated that
“[h]e needed the moped started just in[ ]case somethin[g] happened.” Tr. Vol.
III at 101. Cooper left Gerron and joined the crowd walking toward Springland
Avenue.
[5] Gerron then shot his firearm into the crowd three times. Gerron struck and
killed N. Hodges. He struck and wounded Sanders. Both injuries
demonstrated a downward trajectory consistent with the shot having been fired
from a higher elevation. The wounds were inflicted with a .38-caliber bullet.
Immediately after firing the shots, Gerron ran past Cooper and said, “I just shot
that n****r,” referring to Sanders. Id. at 106. Cooper then saw Gerron run
toward his moped. J. Hodges also saw Gerron running after the shots and
heard him say, “Come on brah we just shot somebody.” Tr. Vol. IV at 250.
[6] Cooper rode home with Gerron’s mother. Gerron’s cousin, Jerry Lemons, was
also in the vehicle. While in the car, Cooper told Lemons that Gerron had shot
N. Hodges and Sanders. The three then went to Lemons’ house, and Gerron
was there when they arrived. Lemons asked Gerron if Gerron had shot N.
Hodges and Sanders, and Gerron said, “yeah, I shot three times.” Tr. Vol. III
at 116. When Lemons told Gerron that Gerron had killed N. Hodges, Gerron
“asked for some bleach” to “wash his hands.” Id.
[7] On December 20, 2016, the State charged Gerron with murder, a felony.
During Gerron’s ensuing jury trial, the State moved to admit a video-recorded
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interview police had conducted with Gerron and Gerron’s mother. Gerron
objected to the interview on the basis that the statements of Gerron’s mother
during that interview were inadmissible hearsay. The trial court overruled
Gerron’s objection, but the court instructed the jury that the statements of
Gerron’s mother in that exhibit “are not testimony or evidence” and
may only be considered for the purpose of showing . . . the
context of the defendant’s comments to the extent that he
responded . . . . You may consider only the statements of the
defendant as evidence . . . and cannot consider the statements of
the defendant’s mother . . . as evidence.
Tr. Vol. VI at 73-74. The court repeated its instruction during its final
instructions to the jury.
[8] Also during Gerron’s trial, the State moved to admit evidence of prior bad acts
under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). Specifically, the State sought to admit
evidence to show that, thirty-four days prior to the shooting, Gerron had been
admitted to a local hospital’s emergency room after a firearm he had been
carrying in his pants discharged and wounded him. The State’s evidence also
showed that, in the course of a police investigation into that incident, Gerron
had lied to an investigating officer by stating that he had been shot by a third
party. The trial court admitted the State’s 404(b) evidence over Gerron’s
objection.
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[9] Following the trial, the jury found Gerron guilty of murder, a felony. The trial
court entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Gerron accordingly.
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Admission of Evidence
[10] On appeal, Gerron first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in the
admission of evidence. We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings “for an
abuse of discretion.” Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 176 (Ind. 2017). “An abuse
of discretion occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances.” Id. Here, Gerron asserts that the trial court abused
its discretion when it admitted the unredacted, video-recorded interview, which,
Gerron argues, contained inadmissible hearsay from Gerron’s mother. Gerron
also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
evidence of Gerron’s gunshot incident from thirty-four days prior to the
shooting that resulted in the death of N. Hodges. We address each argument in
turn.
Hearsay
[11] Gerron first asserts that his mother’s statements in the video-recorded interview
were inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is a statement “not made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing” that is “offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Out-of-court
statements offered for a reason other than to prove the truth of the matter
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asserted are not hearsay. See id.; Williams v. State, 930 N.E.2d 602, 608 n.3 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. For example, we have recognized that an out-of-
court statement is “nonhearsay” when it “merely provided context for [the
defendant’s] own recorded statements.” Williams, 930 N.E.2d at 609.
[12] Here, the trial court declined to order the State to redact Gerron’s mother’s
statements from the interview because the court concluded that her statements
were not being offered for their truth but, rather, for context to Gerron’s own
recorded statements. Indeed, while on appeal Gerron isolates a handful of
sentences from the lengthy interview, he ignores the interplay between him, his
mother, and the investigating officers during the interview. As the State
summarized to the trial court:
there are all kinds of statements made during this interview, but
all of them are necessary for the context of the interview. His
mother responds to a question, [Gerron] responds to a question[,
o]ften times elaborating upon or discussing what his mother has
said. But it’s not offered for the truth of the matter asserted[.
I]t’s offered for the context of the conversation generally.
Tr. Vol. V at 197-98. We agree. As Gerron’s mother’s statements were not
offered for the truth of the matters asserted, they were not hearsay.
[13] Moreover, Gerron’s argument on appeal disregards the trial court’s limiting
instruction, in which the court expressly instructed the jury that Gerron’s
mother’s statements were not evidence, could not be considered as evidence,
and were being admitted only to provide context to Gerron’s own statements.
We presume the jury follows the trial court’s instructions. E.g., Harris v. State,
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824 N.E.2d 432, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion when it admitted Gerron’s mother’s statements for
context, which admission the court coupled with a clear limiting instruction.
We affirm the court’s admission of this evidence.
Prior Bad Acts
[14] Gerron also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
evidence of the gunshot incident that occurred thirty-four days before N.
Hodges’ death. Gerron’s specific argument on this issue is unclear, but it
appears to be that the trial court abused its discretion under Indiana Evidence
Rule 403. Under that Rule, a court “may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair
prejudice . . . .” Evid. R. 403. “[T]his balancing is committed to the trial
court’s discretion,” and, where the unfair prejudice is “not so high that it
overrode the trial court’s wide discretion,” we will not reverse. Snow, 77
N.E.3d at 179. In other words, we will not “second-guess the trial court’s
determination” under Rule 403 where the court “could have admitted or
excluded” the evidence.” Id.
[15] We cannot say that the danger of unfair prejudice here was so high that it
overrode the trial court’s wide discretion under Rule 403. The evidence of the
gunshot incident demonstrated that Gerron had access to a firearm and, thus,
the opportunity to commit the crime alleged. See Evid. R. 404(b)(2). The trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence.
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Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence
[16] Finally, Gerron argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
show that he committed murder, a felony. When reviewing a claim of
sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the
credibility of the witnesses. Jackson v. State, 925 N.E.2d 369, 375 (Ind. 2010).
We look only to the probative evidence supporting the judgment and the
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence to determine
whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative
value to support the conviction, it will not be set aside. Id.
[17] To prove that Gerron committed murder, the State was required to show that
Gerron knowingly or intentionally killed another human being. Ind. Code § 35-
42-1-1(1) (2011). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he
engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.”
I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). “A knowing killing may be inferred from the use of a
deadly weapon in a way likely to cause death.” Young v. State, 761 N.E.2d 387,
389 (Ind. 2002).
[18] According to Gerron, “[t]he State failed to present any evidence that Gerron
knew . . . that when he fired three shots blindly down a hill into a
crowd . . . that there was a high probability [N. Hodges] would die.”
Appellant’s Br. at 20. We cannot agree. A reasonable trier of fact could readily
conclude that Gerron knowingly killed N. Hodges when he fired a deadly
weapon into a crowd. See Young, 761 N.E.2d at 389. Moreover, the State’s
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evidence demonstrated that Gerron had a .38 caliber firearm on his person at
the party. The State’s evidence further demonstrated that, immediately before
the shooting, Gerron had started his moped “in[ ]case somethin[g] happened,”
Tr. Vol. III at 101, and that, immediately after the shooting, several witnesses
observed him fleeing the scene while saying he had fired his gun into the crowd.
And, later that night, when he learned of N. Hodges’ death, Gerron asked for
bleach to wash his hands.
[19] The State presented sufficient evidence to show that Gerron knowingly killed
N. Hodges. We affirm his conviction for murder, a felony.
[20] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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