MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Sep 17 2018, 8:47 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
R. Brian Woodward Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Crown Point, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
George P. Sherman
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Donnell Howard, Jr., September 17, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-344
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Diane Ross Boswell,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45G03-1702-F3-10
Barteau, Senior Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Donnell Howard, Jr., appeals his convictions and sentence following his guilty
plea to charges of resisting law enforcement resulting in the death of another
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person, a Level 3 felony,1 and resisting law enforcement resulting in serious
bodily injury to another person, a Level 5 felony.2 We affirm.
Issues
[2] Howard raises three issues, which we restate as:
1. Whether Howard’s convictions violate federal and state
constitutional prohibitions of double jeopardy.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion while sentencing
Howard.
3. Whether Howard’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offenses and his character.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On February 15, 2017, thirty-one-year old Howard and his companion, Jessica
Pichon, arrived at a grocery store in East Chicago, Lake County, Indiana.
Pichon entered the store, picked up a case of beer, and fled to Howard’s vehicle
without paying. She jumped in and shouted at Howard to “go, go, go!” as a
police officer chased her. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 32. The officer, who was
in full uniform, ordered Howard to stop, but Howard refused and drove
forward even though the officer had grabbed a door handle. The officer let go
as Howard sped away.
1
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1 (2016).
2
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1.
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[4] Several officers followed Howard with their emergency lights and sirens
activated, but he did not stop. Howard fled for several miles to Hammond,
Indiana, where he entered an intersection and crashed into a vehicle driven by
Theresa Paramo. Paramo had a passenger: her thirteen-year-old
granddaughter, Juliana Chambers. Chambers died in the crash and Paramo
was critically injured. After the crash, Howard attempted to flee on foot but
was captured.
[5] The State charged Howard with resisting law enforcement as a Level 3 felony;
resisting law enforcement as a Level 5 felony; reckless homicide, a Level 5
felony; resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony; resisting law enforcement
as a Class A misdemeanor; and theft, a Class A misdemeanor. The parties
executed a plea agreement. According to the agreement, Howard would plead
guilty to resisting law enforcement resulting in death, a Level 3 felony, and
resisting law enforcement resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 5 felony. In
exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Sentencing would
be left to the trial court, with the parties free to present argument, including
whether the sentences for the two offenses “shall be run concurrent or
consecutive to each other.” Id. at 29.
[6] The agreement further provided: “The Defendant has been informed by his
attorney as to the nature and cause of every accusation against the Defendant,
and that the attorney for the Defendant has consulted and advised the
Defendant with regard to such matters and as to any possible defense which the
defendant [sic] might have in this case.” Id. at 28. In addition, “The Defendant
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also understands that by pleading guilty he will not have the right to directly
appeal the conviction(s), but may appeal the sentence imposed . . . .” Id. at 30.
[7] The trial court accepted the plea agreement, entered a judgment of conviction
for the two counts of resisting law enforcement as Level 5 and Level 3 felonies,
and dismissed the remaining counts upon the State’s motion. The court
imposed a sentence of ten years for the Level 5 felony and five years for the
Level 3 felony, to be served consecutively for a total sentence of fifteen years.
This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
1. Double Jeopardy - Waiver
[8] Howard argues his two convictions for resisting law enforcement violate his
federal and state constitutional protections against double jeopardy. He claims
that one of his convictions must be vacated because the offenses arose from the
same wrongful act.
[9] The State responds that Howard waived his right to present double jeopardy
claims on appeal because he executed a plea agreement. We agree with the
State. “Plea bargaining is a tool used by both prosecutors and defendants to
expedite the trial process.” Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind. 2002).
“Defendants who plead guilty to achieve favorable outcomes in the process of
bargaining give up a plethora of substantive claims and procedural rights.”
Games v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (Ind. 2001). A defendant who enters a
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plea agreement to achieve an advantageous position must keep the bargain.
Kunberger v. State, 46 N.E.3d 966, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
[10] In Mapp, the defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to
deliver and knowingly delivering cocaine, both Class B felonies. 770 N.E.2d at
333. Mapp attempted to claim on appeal that the convictions amounted to
double jeopardy because they arose from the same act. The Indiana Supreme
Court noted that Mapp received a benefit from the plea agreement because one
of the charges was reduced from a Class A felony to a Class B felony. The
Court held that Mapp “waived his right to challenge his conviction on double
jeopardy grounds when he entered his plea agreement.” Id. at 334. “To hold
otherwise would deprive both prosecutors and defendants of the ability to make
precisely the kind of bargain that was made here.” Id. at 335.
[11] In Howard’s case, he received a substantial benefit from the plea agreement,
specifically the dismissal of four other charges, including two felonies. He
stated in the agreement that he had discussed each offense and possible defense
with his attorney and understood he waived his right to appeal his convictions.
Further, the parties agreed that they were free to argue to the trial court whether
Howard should serve his sentences concurrently or consecutively. To allow
Howard to present a double jeopardy claim on appeal would deprive the State
of its benefit in entering the plea agreement.
[12] Howard cites to Crider v. State, 984 N.E.2d 618 (Ind. 2013), and Edmonds v.
State, 86 N.E.3d 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. granted, in support of his claim.
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Those cases are factually dissimilar. In Crider, the defendant claimed that the
trial court illegally ordered the defendant to serve consecutive habitual offender
sentences, an issue that was not addressed by the parties’ plea agreement. By
contrast, in the current case Howard explicitly agreed in the plea agreement that
the parties would be free to argue concurrent versus consecutive sentences at
sentencing. Edmonds has been vacated by the Indiana Supreme Court, and in
addition it involved an appeal after a jury trial, not a plea agreement. 3 We
conclude Howard has waived his double jeopardy claims.
2. Sentencing – Trial Court Discretion
[13] Howard claims the trial court failed to adequately explain how it calculated his
sentence. The Indiana General Assembly has determined:
A court may impose any sentence that is:
(1) authorized by statute; and
(2) permissible under the Constitution of the State of Indiana;
regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating
circumstances or mitigating circumstances.
Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d) (2015). In the course of selecting a sentence, “if the
court finds aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances, [the court
3
The Indiana Supreme Court issued its decision in Edmonds v. State, 100 N.E.3d 258 (Ind. 2018), after the
briefs were filed in this case. The Court determined in Edmonds that where a single act of resisting law
enforcement results in the death of one person and serious bodily injury to others, the defendant may only be
punished for the highest chargeable offense. As is noted above, Edmonds is factually distinguishable from this
case because Howard pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, but Edmonds appealed after a jury trial.
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shall issue] a statement of the court’s reasons for selecting the sentence that it
imposes.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-3 (1983).
[14] When imposing a sentence for a felony offense, the trial court must issue “a
reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court’s reasons for imposing a
particular sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007),
clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). We review the sentence for an abuse of
discretion. Sloan v. State, 16 N.E.3d 1018, 1026 (Ind. 2014). The trial court
abuses its discretion by (1) failing to issue a sentencing statement, (2) finding
aggravating or mitigating factors that are not supported by the record, (3)
omitting factors that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for
consideration, (4) or by finding factors that are improper as a matter of law.
Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91.
[15] By statute, the maximum sentence for a Level 3 felony is sixteen years, the
minimum sentence is three years, and the advisory sentence is nine years. Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-5 (2014). Further, the maximum sentence for a Level 5 felony
is six years, the minimum sentence is one year, and the advisory sentence is
three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2014). Here, the court imposed enhanced
sentences of ten years for the Level 3 felony and five years for the Level 3
felony, and further ordered the sentences served consecutively.
[16] The court stated consecutive sentences were necessary because “there are two
victims in this matter, and each victim deserves justice.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 41. It is
well established that “enhanced and consecutive sentences seem necessary to
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vindicate the fact that there were separate harms and separate acts against more
than one person.” Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2003). Further,
“the same factors may be used to enhance a presumptive sentence and to justify
consecutive sentences.” Kilpatrick v. State, 746 N.E.2d 52, 62 (Ind. 2001). The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering enhanced, consecutive
sentences because there were two victims in this case.
[17] Howard argues the trial court erroneously overlooked his guilty plea as a
mitigating factor. An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a
mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence
is not only supported by the record but also that the mitigating evidence is
significant. Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 220-21, on reh’g. The trial court is not
required to find mitigating factors, nor is it obligated to accept as mitigating
each of the circumstances proffered by the defendant. Green v. State, 65 N.E.3d
620, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. A guilty plea may not be
significantly mitigating when the defendant receives a substantial benefit in
return for the plea. Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221, on reh’g.
[18] Here, Howard received a substantial benefit from his guilty plea. The State
agreed to dismiss four other charges, including two felonies. We conclude
Howard’s guilty plea was not a significant mitigating circumstance and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by omitting reference to it. See id. (no abuse of
discretion in failing to find guilty plea was mitigating factor; defendant received
sentence reduction and dismissal of other charges in exchange for plea).
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3. Sentencing - Appropriateness
[19] Howard next argues that the Court should exercise its constitutional power to
review his sentences and reduce them to the advisory sentences, to be served
concurrently. Even when a trial court has acted within its sentencing
discretion, article VII, section 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorizes this
Court to review and revise sentences. This authority is implemented through
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that we “may revise a sentence
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, [we
find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
the character of the offender.”
[20] We assess the trial court’s recognition or non-recognition of aggravating factors
as an initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was
appropriate. Caraway v. State, 977 N.E.2d 469, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans.
denied. As we conduct our review, we also consider any other factors appearing
in the record. Walters v. State, 68 N.E.3d 1097, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans.
denied. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating the sentence is
inappropriate. Id.
[21] The trial court sentenced Howard to enhanced sentences of ten and five years,
to be served consecutively for a total sentence of fifteen years. The nature of the
offenses is troubling. As the trial court noted, there were multiple victims.
Further, Howard displayed extreme indifference to human life throughout the
chase by driving away while an officer held onto a door handle and by
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endangering other motorists. After crashing into Theresa Paramo’s car,
Howard attempted to run away rather than see if the victims needed help.
Thirteen-year-old Juliana Chambers died, and Paramo suffered extreme injuries
above and beyond what was necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense.
Specifically, she had to undergo multiple surgeries to repair a lung and ten
broken ribs. In addition, Paramo had been undergoing treatment for cancer,
but the treatment was interrupted while she healed from her injuries caused by
the collision. The interruption allowed her cancer to resurge.
[22] The evidence also demonstrates Howard has a less than sterling character. As a
juvenile, he was adjudicated a delinquent in Illinois for an act that, if
committed by an adult, would have constituted residential burglary, a Class 1
felony. As an adult, Howard has accumulated convictions for delivery of a
controlled substance, a Class 2 felony (Illinois offense); possession of a
controlled substance, a Class D felony; one count of conversion, a Class A
misdemeanor; one count of theft, a Class A misdemeanor; and domestic
battery, a Class B misdemeanor. Howard steadily accumulated these
convictions, committing a new offense every several years. He was placed on
probation once but violated the terms. Further, on the day of the accident
Howard did not have a driver’s license. He told officers he and Pichon had
planned to steal the beer to sell it and buy crack. Finally, Howard and Pichon
have three children, but on the day of the offenses the children were in the
custody of the Indiana Department of Child Services. We conclude from this
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record that Howard has failed to demonstrate that his fifteen-year sentence is
inappropriate.
Conclusion
[23] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[24] Affirmed.
[25] Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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