In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 18‐1480
RAUL PEREZ‐GONZALEZ,
Petitioner‐Appellant,
v.
JACQUELINE LASHBROOK,
Respondent‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 15 C 4210 — John Z. Lee, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JUNE 1, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 17, 2018
____________________
Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Raul Perez‐Gonzalez pleaded
guilty to first degree murder for his role in a gang‐related kill‐
ing. His plea agreement called for a thirty‐five year prison
sentence and required him to testify truthfully in any prose‐
cution against his co‐defendants. More than one year after
agreeing to these terms and pleading guilty, as the trial of a
co‐defendant approached, Perez‐Gonzalez had second
2 No. 18‐1480
thoughts and declined to testify. For this refusal, he was con‐
victed of contempt of court, resulting in an additional ten‐
year sentence.
After exhausting his state court remedies, Perez‐Gonzalez
petitioned for habeas corpus asserting the State breached the
plea agreement by requesting the contempt sanction, and that
the Illinois Appellate Court unreasonably concluded to the
contrary. The district court denied his habeas petition, but
granted his request for a certificate of appealability. Perez‐
Gonzalez contends the plea agreement immunized him from
contempt proceedings. Although he presents a reasonable in‐
terpretation of the plea agreement, he has not proved that the
state appellate court’s alternative interpretation was unrea‐
sonable, so we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. Background
Raul Perez‐Gonzalez made three critical decisions. The
first was on a January 2009 evening in Elgin, Illinois. What
began as posturing among rival street gangs in a fast food
parking lot intensified into a car chase and the senseless mur‐
der of Paola Rodriguez, who was shot as she drove the girl‐
friend of a gang member away from the confrontation. The
next day Perez‐Gonzalez confessed to driving the car from
which the fatal shots were fired. He also informed police that
his passengers included Manith Vilayhong, who ordered the
shooting, and Tony Rosalez, who shot the gun. All three men
were charged with first‐degree murder.
A. The Plea Agreement
Perez‐Gonzalez’s second pivotal decision was agreeing to
cooperate in the prosecution of his co‐defendants. On
August 27, 2010, the State presented Perez‐Gonzalez with a
No. 18‐1480 3
letter containing a plea offer. In exchange for pleading guilty
to first‐degree murder while in possession of a firearm, he
would receive a thirty‐five year sentence: twenty years for
first degree murder, plus a fifteen year add‐on for possession
of a firearm. The plea offer also included a conditional reduc‐
tion of his sentence by fifteen years if he cooperated “in all
aspects” with the prosecution of his co‐defendants, including
testifying truthfully at their trials. Once Perez‐Gonzalez’s co‐
operation was “successfully completed,” the State promised
to amend his charge to omit reference to a firearm and to va‐
cate the fifteen year add‐on, reducing his sentence to twenty
years. The letter emphasized that:
Any deviation from that truthful [testimony]
will be grounds for the [State]–at [its] sole dis‐
cretion–to withdraw its agreement to delete ref‐
erence to a firearm as well as to withdraw its
agreement to vacate the 15‐year add‐on. In such
event, the defendant would then be required to
serve the terms of the initial agreement, which
would be 35 years [in the Illinois Department of
Corrections], plus [mandatory supervised re‐
lease] as well as fees.
At the plea hearing, the parties relayed the agreement’s
terms to the trial court. After describing the State’s offer letter
to the trial court, the Stateʹs attorney remarked, “I think that’s
all the terms.” In response, counsel for Perez‐Gonzalez
acknowledged the State presented an accurate description of
the agreed upon terms. The trial court accepted the plea
agreement and sentenced Perez‐Gonzalez to thirty‐five years.
4 No. 18‐1480
B. Contempt of Court Proceedings
More than one year after Perez‐Gonzalez pleaded guilty,
pretrial proceedings began against his co‐defendant
Rosalez. When called to testify against Rosalez, Perez‐
Gonzalez made his third pivotal decision: he refused to an‐
swer any questions regarding the case, even spurning the trial
court’s order to answer. Perez‐Gonzalez never testified un‐
truthfully; he refused to testify at all. Rosalez was convicted
of first‐degree murder and sentenced to thirty‐five years, but
the allegation that Rosalez discharged the firearm was
not proved, which would have added twenty‐five years to
Rosalez’s sentence.
In response to Perez‐Gonzalez’s decision, the State peti‐
tioned for criminal contempt. Perez‐Gonzalez agreed to a
bench trial for that proceeding, at which the parties stipulated
in writing that Perez‐Gonzalez‘s plea agreement “required”
him to testify “in any case against any co‐defendant.” The trial
court found him in contempt for failing to testify in the
Rosalez case.
At Perez‐Gonzalez’s sentencing hearing for contempt, he
again stipulated in writing that his plea agreement “re‐
quired” him to testify against co‐defendants Vilayhong and
Rosalez. This second stipulation also provided that Rosalez
was tried without Perez‐Gonzalezʹs testimony. The sentenc‐
ing judge determined that Perez‐Gonzalez’s refusal to testify
hindered the State’s prosecution of Rosalez, and sen‐
tenced Perez‐Gonzalez to ten years’ imprisonment for con‐
tempt, served consecutive to his thirty‐five year murder sen‐
tence, for a total sentence of forty‐five years.
No. 18‐1480 5
C. Direct Appeal and Collateral Attacks in State Court
Perez‐Gonzalez appealed his contempt conviction and
sentence to the Illinois Appellate Court arguing, among other
issues, that the contempt prosecution breached the plea agree‐
ment. He contended the initial thirty‐five year sentence
should be the exclusive repercussion for refusing to testify. To
him, the plea agreement contained a “built‐in sanction” so the
only consequence for his failure to testify would be that the
State could decline to vacate the fifteen year add‐on.
The Illinois Appellate Court rejected this reasoning. After
reviewing the plea offer letter, the transcript of the plea hear‐
ing, and the written stipulations at the contempt proceedings,
that court held that the plea agreement did not bar the State
from pursuing a contempt conviction. The court acknowl‐
edged Perez‐Gonzalez may have a due process right to en‐
force the plea agreement if it induced his guilty plea. How‐
ever, the court determined that the State never promised to
refrain from filing a contempt of court petition if he refused
to testify against Rosalez. Instead, the court held that “the plea
agreement clearly required [Perez‐Gonzalez] to testify against
Rosalez and his failure to do so violated that agreement.” Be‐
cause Perez‐Gonzalez—not the State—had breached the
agreement, his due process claim failed.
The Illinois Appellate Court also concluded that the stip‐
ulations did not expressly or impliedly (via the “built‐in sanc‐
tion”) support the outcome that Perez‐Gonzalez insists upon:
that the only consequence for refusing to testify would be the
State not moving to vacate the fifteen year add‐on. Even if the
State had breached the agreement, the Illinois Appellate
Court reasoned that would not be a defense to the contempt
6 No. 18‐1480
charge because the breach would not authorize Perez‐Gonza‐
lez to refuse the trial court’s order to testify. The Illinois Su‐
preme Court rejected Perez‐Gonzalez’s petition for leave to
appeal that decision.
D. Federal Proceedings
Perez‐Gonzalez petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, ar‐
guing that when the State sought the contempt sanction it
breached the plea agreement. He requested relief from his
contempt conviction and its consecutive ten year sentence.
The district court denied the petition, but issued a certificate
of appealability. We review the district courtʹs denial of a ha‐
beas petition de novo and its findings of fact for clear error,
Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d 513, 525 (7th Cir. 2017), and have ap‐
pellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standards
Perez‐Gonzalez seeks habeas relief under the Antiterror‐
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
according to which we may grant relief if a state court’s deci‐
sion was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law as determined by Supreme
Court precedent; or (2) rested on an unreasonable factual de‐
termination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). These standards are
“difficult to meet” and “highly deferential.” Makiel v. Butler,
782 F.3d 882, 896 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011)).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a state‐court decision in‐
volves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court prece‐
dent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
rule from Supreme Court cases but unreasonably applies it to
No. 18‐1480 7
the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case, unreasonably
extends a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a
new context where it should not apply, or unreasonably re‐
fuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should
apply. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407–08 (2000).
An “unreasonable application of” federal law means “ob‐
jectively unreasonable,” not merely wrong; even clear error
will not suffice. Campbell v. Smith, 770 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir.
2014) (citing White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014)).
As for 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a decision is based upon an
“unreasonable determination of the facts” if it “rests upon
fact‐finding that ignores the clear and convincing weight of
the evidence.” Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 921, 928 (7th
Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). We presume that the state court’s
factual determinations are correct unless the petitioner rebuts
the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1); Newman, 726 F.3d at 928.
The Illinois Appellate Court described the interpretation
of Perez‐Gonzalez’s plea agreement as presenting a question
of law. If the appellate court’s interpretation was a determi‐
nation of state law, then we are barred from performing ha‐
beas review. See King v. Pfister, 834 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“It is well‐established that on habeas review, a federal court
cannot disagree with a state court’s resolution of an issue of
state law.”). In this case, however, the parties dispute the con‐
sequences of the plea agreement’s terms; specifically, whether
or not those terms immunized Perez‐Gonzalez from the
State’s contempt prosecution for his refusal to testify. Both Il‐
linois and federal courts recognize that the interpretation of
ambiguous plea agreement terms present factual rather than
legal questions. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 198 F.3d 988,
8 No. 18‐1480
992 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[D]isputed terms in a plea agreement are
matters of fact … .”); People v. Navarroli, 521 N.E.2d 891, 893
(Ill. 1988) (“The existence of a plea agreement and its terms
and conditions are questions of fact … .”). So this case pre‐
sents a factual question properly subject to our review.
B. Application
1. Perez‐Gonzalez’s claim under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1) fails.
Perez‐Gonzalez does not dispute that the Illinois Appel‐
late Court identified the correct legal rule governing his case.
Rather, he argues the rule was unreasonably applied. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Specifically, he contends the appellate
court unreasonably applied Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held that “when a
plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement
of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the in‐
ducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”
Id. at 262. Perez‐Gonzalez maintains that the plea agreement
prohibited the State from seeking additional punishment for
his refusal to testify, so that the original thirty‐five year sen‐
tence was the exclusive consequence for his noncooperation.
To him, the only reasonable interpretation is that the con‐
tempt proceedings breached the plea agreement.
Perez‐Gonzalez’s interpretation is plausible, but he has
not met his burden of showing, as he must, that the appellate
court’s contrary interpretation was unreasonable. A state’s
decision may stand as long as it is one of several equally plau‐
sible outcomes. See Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 748–49
(7th Cir. 1997). Perez‐Gonzalez’s petition turns on the reason‐
ableness of the appellate court’s interpretation of the plea
No. 18‐1480 9
agreement under Santobello, in which the defendant received
an express and unambiguous promise that the government
breached. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. This case, unlike Santo‐
bello, involves a plea agreement with no express promise that
the State would, or would not, do the activity Perez‐Gonzalez
objects to: pursue contempt proceedings for refusing to tes‐
tify.
Without a promise, there can be no breach. United States v.
OʹBrien, 853 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1988) (challenge that prison
sentence exceeded plea agreement insufficient for reversal
under Santobello where government made no promises re‐
garding sentencing other than those clearly set forth in the
agreement). Perhaps recognizing this principle, Perez‐
Gonzalez argues the plea agreement impliedly promises that
the State would not pursue additional sanctions for refusing
to testify, relying on Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987).
Although Ricketts recognized that plea agreements may
include implied and binding terms, it is distinguishable from
this case. In Ricketts, the Supreme Court held that double jeop‐
ardy rights could be waived by implication where the conse‐
quence of such waiver “could not be clearer” on the face of
the plea agreement. Id. at 9–10. The defendant pleaded guilty
to a lesser charge of second‐degree murder in exchange for
his testimony against his co‐conspirators. Id. at 3–4. After the
defendant refused to testify, the Court explained that the ex‐
press terms of the plea agreement—that first‐degree murder
charges could be reinstated if the defendant refused to testify
against co‐conspirators—were “precisely equivalent” to an im‐
plied waiver of a double jeopardy defense. Id. at 10 (emphasis
in original). A conclusion that the defendant had not waived
his double jeopardy rights “would render the agreement
10 No. 18‐1480
meaningless.” Id. at 9–10 (“[W]e do not find it signifi‐
cant … that “double jeopardy” was not specifically waived by
name in the plea agreement.”).
Ricketts does not compel the conclusion that the State im‐
pliedly waived a contempt case against Perez‐Gonzalez. The
agreement in Ricketts spelled out exactly what would happen
to the defendant if he refused to testify. Perez‐Gonzalez’s plea
agreement, on the other hand, lacks the clarity and express
terms of the agreement in Ricketts. The implied term in Rick‐
etts (waiver of double jeopardy defense) was per se equivalent
to the explicit terms; an alternative interpretation would viti‐
ate the meaning and integrity of the agreement. Id. at 10. The
implied term Perez‐Gonzalez proposes—that the State
waived its ability to pursue contempt—is not equivalent to
the express terms of the agreement. Nor does the state appel‐
late court’s alternative interpretation that no implied term ex‐
ists render the agreement meaningless.
At best, Ricketts would require that the Illinois Appellate
Court reasonably interpret the plea agreement to include the
implied term Perez‐Gonzalez prefers. The appellate court did
not act unreasonably by determining no such implied term
exists here. Perez‐Gonzalez must do more than provide an al‐
ternative reading of the plea agreement. Because he has not
shown that the state appellate court unreasonably applied the
legal rule of Santobello, he also has not shown that the court’s
interpretation of the agreement was objectively unreasonable,
and thus fails to meet the highly deferential requirements of
§ 2254(d)(1).
No. 18‐1480 11
2. Perez‐Gonzalez’s claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2) fails.
Perez‐Gonzalez also finds no refuge in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2). Sufficient record evidence supports the Illinois
Appellate Court’s conclusion that the State was not prohib‐
ited from pursuing sanctions for his refusal to testify.
a. The reasonable expectations of the parties
Perez‐Gonzalez argues the state appellate court’s conclu‐
sion is inconsistent with the parties’ expectations, so the court
unreasonably interpreted the plea agreement’s terms. When
language in a plea agreement is ambiguous, as here, we look
to “the parties’ reasonable expectations and construe ambigu‐
ities against the government as the drafter.” United States v.
Malone, 815 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States
v. Munoz, 718 F.3d 726, 729 (7th Cir. 2013)).
Perez‐Gonzalez contends the parties’ expectations are
clear in the plea offer:
Any deviation from that truthful [testimony] will be
grounds for the [State] at [its] sole discretion–to
withdraw its agreement to delete reference to a
firearm as well as to withdraw its agreement to
vacate the 15‐year add‐on. In such event, the de‐
fendant would then be required to serve the terms of
the initial agreement … .
(Emphases added.)
Perez‐Gonzalez contends the phrase “in such event” es‐
tablished a binary and conclusive set of possibilities: either he
would testify and receive the reduced sentence, or he would
12 No. 18‐1480
refuse to testify and “in such event” would not receive the re‐
duced sentence. He also asserts the State attorney’s comment
at the plea hearing, “I think that’s all the terms,” binds the
State to this interpretation. As such, he believes he was im‐
munized from contempt proceedings. The State responds that
“in such event” refers to when Perez‐Gonzalez testifies un‐
truthfully. According to the State, the “built‐in sanction” (im‐
position of the original thirty‐five year sentence) was the con‐
sequence for untruthful testimony, and the plea agreement
was silent regarding the consequences for refusing to testify.
The record does not support Perez‐Gonzalez’s categorical
reading of the plea offer. His argument assumes that the
“built‐in sanction” would apply whether he refused to testify,
or he testified and lied. Perez‐Gonzalez sees no distinction be‐
tween testifying untruthfully, and not testifying at all. But his
own conduct proves he believed the plea agreement required
him to testify. He stipulated twice that the agreement re‐
quired him to testify against Rosalez and Vilayhong, eliminat‐
ing any ambiguity as to the parties’ expectations. Perez‐
Gonzalez cannot reasonably expect the State to adhere to a
deal that he himself violated. See, e.g., United States v.
Ramunno, 133 F.3d 476, 484 (7th Cir. 1998) (defendant “lost his
gamble” and breached agreement when he failed to provide
“complete” and “truthful” information about criminal activ‐
ity); United States v. Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1331 (7th Cir. 1988)
(defendant’s post‐sentencing testimony against co‐defendant
“was undoubtedly a part of the government’s reasonable ex‐
pectations in entering the agreement,” so refusal to testify re‐
lieved government of reciprocal obligations) (internal quota‐
tions omitted).
No. 18‐1480 13
The Illinois Appellate Court did not ignore the clear and
convincing weight of the evidence when it concluded that
Perez‐Gonzalez broke his promise to cooperate and that the
State did not violate the plea agreement by petitioning for a
contempt order. Rather, its interpretation was objectively rea‐
sonable. See Morgan v. Hardy, 662 F.3d 790, 798 (7th Cir. 2011)
(petitioner must establish state court committed “unreasona‐
ble error” in its determination of this issue) (quoting Ward v.
Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 703–04 (7th Cir. 2003)).
b. The enforcement of agreed upon terms
Even without Perez‐Gonzalez’s stipulations at his con‐
tempt hearing and contempt sentencing, his habeas claim un‐
der § 2254(d)(2) is foreclosed. “Although the government
must fulfill any express or implied promise made in exchange
for a guilty plea, the parties’ rights under the plea agreement
are limited to those matters upon which they actually
agreed.” United States v. Lacy, 813 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2016)
(citations omitted). Lacy illustrates this court’s application of
this principle. There, we rejected the defendant’s argument
that the government had violated a plea agreement by re‐
questing consecutive state and federal sentences. Id. at 657–
58. The plea agreement was silent as to whether the sentences
would run consecutively or concurrently, and the govern‐
ment did not make any implied promises on that topic. Id.
Therefore, we concluded, the government did not breach the
agreement by making a request on a matter that was simply
not contemplated by the agreement. Id.
Here, the plea offer, the transcript of the plea hearing, and
the parties’ stipulations are silent as to the consequences for
Perez‐Gonzalez’s blanket refusal to testify. None of these
sources establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
14 No. 18‐1480
sole outcome for refusing to testify is the imposition of the
original thirty‐five year sentence, as Perez‐Gonzalez claims.
The State never promised immunity from contempt proceed‐
ings or implied any such promises. Because Perez‐Gonzalez’s
plea agreement is silent as to whether the imposition of his
original sentence would be the exclusive consequence for his
failure to testify, the Illinois Appellate Court’s conclusion—
that the State did not breach the agreement through the added
ten year sentence for contempt of court—was neither unrea‐
sonable nor implausible.
c. Alternative grounds for denying habeas relief
Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal on the
these grounds, we need not reach the State’s last contention
that, even assuming a breach by the State, immunity from
contempt proceedings would not be a proper remedy. See
Rhodes v. Dittmann, 783 F.3d 669, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Sec‐
tion 2254(d) focuses on the ultimate decision of the state court,
not on parts of a written opinion that are not necessary to the
outcome.”).
AFFIRMED.