J-S39002-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SAMANTHA RAE STANTON
Appellant No. 111 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence imposed August 28, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Criminal Division at No: CP-14-CR-0001327-2016
BEFORE: STABILE, MURRAY, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2018
Appellant, Samantha Rae Stanton, appeals from the judgment of
sentence the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County imposed on August 28,
2017. Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying her
weight of the evidence challenge. We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts as follows:
This case involves an incident that occurred on May 25, 2016 at
Circleville Park in State College, Pennsylvania. [Appellant]
Samantha Stanton, her husband Bentley Stanton, and an
acquaintance, Josh Parris, were playing frisbee golf at the park on
that date. Paul Kaminski [hereinafter “victim”] was also at the
park, test-flying a new drone he had recently purchased.
Apparently believing [victim] had been sexually assaulting
Samantha Stanton by following her through the park with the
drone, the Stantons and Parris approached and confronted
[victim], physically assaulting him. The group pursued [victim]
through the park as he tried to escape the assault. It was not
until the arrival and intervention of a third party good Samaritan
that victim was able to escape to his vehicle. The police were
J-S39002-18
called to the scene and interviewed all participants. [Victim]
suffered physical injuries as a result of the incident and his drone
was destroyed.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/18, at 2.
As a result, Appellant was charged with simple assault, recklessly
endangering another person, disorderly conduct, and summary harassment.
On July 7, 2017, following a jury trial, the jury convicted Appellant of simple
assault, and acquitted her of the endangering another person and disorderly
conduct charges. The trial court found Appellant guilty of the summary
harassment charge.
On August 28, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 24 months’
probation on the simple assault conviction, and 90 days’ probation on the
summary offense to run concurrently with the other sentence.
On September 6, 2017, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion alleging
that the guilty verdict on the simple assault conviction was against the weight
of the evidence. After holding a hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s
motion. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying her weight of the evidence challenge on two grounds. First, pointing
to her testimony and that of her co-defendants, Appellant argues there was
no evidence that Appellant attempted to cause bodily injury, and, second, she
was not an accomplice to the assault perpetrated by co-defendants.
Appellant’s Brief at 17.
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In Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 2000), our Supreme
Court explained:
An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence
is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should
not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or
because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a
different conclusion. A trial judge must do more than reassess
the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would not have
assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, in
reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the
trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
Id. at 751-52 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
On review, an appellate court does not substitute its judgment for that
of the finder of fact and consider the underlying question of whether the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence, but, rather, determines only
whether the trial court abused its discretion in making its determination. Id.
at 753.
By alleging that there was no evidence corroborating the simple assault
charges against Appellant, it appears that Appellant does not consider relevant
portions of the testimony of several witnesses. For example, the victim
testified at trial to being assaulted and pursued by, among others, Appellant.
Indeed, the victim testified that Appellant “struck him with a frisbee, and then
with her fist, after bystander Troy Teresak came upon the scene and stopped
the assault[.] “ Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/18, at 4. Additionally, Appellant must
ignore the testimony of Teresak saying he saw the men “swinging punches at
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the victim, and saw the woman kick at him while he was on the ground.” Id.
Finally, Appellant ignores that the responding officer testified that she
“admitted to some level of involvement in the assault.” Id. at 5.
The jury heard, considered, and credited the victim’s and the other
witnesses’ testimony that Appellant assaulted the victim, and as part of the
assailing group. It was the jury’s prerogative to decide whom and what to
believe. Upon consideration, the jury found against Appellant. It is not the
trial court’s nor our Court’s role to reweigh or reassess the evidence, or, as
suggested by Appellant here, disregard inconvenient testimony.
Upon review of the facts of the case, the applicable law, and the trial
court opinion, we discern no error in the trial court’s exercise of discretion in
denying Appellant’s challenge, and we affirm the judgment of sentence based
on the trial court’s well-reasoned January 3, 2018 opinion. We further direct
that a copy of the trial court’s opinion of January 3, 2018 be attached to any
future filings in this case.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 09/18/2018
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J-S39002-18
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Circulated 08/28/2018 11:25 AM
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, CENTRE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
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Attorney for the Commonwealth: Michael Osterburg, Esq.
Attorney for the Defendant: Patrick McAreavy, Esq.
Oliver, J.
OPINION & ORDER
Presently before the Court is Defendant Samantha Stanton's Post-Sentence Motion filed
on September 6, 2017. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion is denied.
Procedural Background
Samantha Stanton (Defendant) was charged with simple assault (Count 1), recklessly
endangering another person (Count 2), disorderly conduct (Count 3), and summary harassment
(Count 4) on June 30, 2016 based on events that occurred on May 25, 2016 at Circleville Park in
State College, Pennsylvania. Following a one-day jury trial on July 7, 2017, the jury returned a
guilty verdict against Defendant on the simple assault charge (bodily injury attempted) at Count
1, and not guilty verdicts on the charges of recklessly endangering another person and disorderly
conduct. The Court found Defendant guilty on the summary harassment charge.
Defendant was sentenced on August 28, 2017 after completion of a pre-sentence
investigation. On the simple assault charge, the Court imposed a sentence of probation for a
period of twenty-four (24) months. Defendant was also ordered, inter alia, to make restitution,
devote two days to community service, and to attend and complete the Centre County Education
and Resistance Training Program, ("CCERT"), as part of her sentence on the simple assault
charge. On the summary harassment charge, the Court imposed a sentence of ninety (90) days
probation to run concurrent with the simple assault sentence. Participation in the CCERT
program was also included as a condition of the probation at Count 4.
Defendant filed a Post-Sentence Motion on September 6, 2017. A briefing schedule was
entered, and both Defendant and the Commonwealth filed timely briefs. A hearing was held on
Defendant's Post-Sentence Motion on October 24, 2017.
Defendant's Post-Sentence Motion raises two grounds in support of her request that the
Court grant her a new trial as to Count 1. Alternatively, Defendant requests that her sentence be
modified to eliminate the CCERT program. These issues are addressed below.
Brief Factual Background
This case involves an incident that occurred on May 25, 2016 at Circleville Park in State
College, Pennsylvania. Defendant Samantha Stanton, her husband Bentley Stanton, and an
acquaintance, Josh Parris, were playing frisbee golf at the park on that date. Paul Kaminski was
also at the park, test-flying a new drone he had recently purchased. Apparently believing Mr.
Kaminski had been sexually harassing Samantha Stanton by following her through the park with
the drone, the Stantons and Parris approached and confronted Mr. Kaminski, physically
assaulting him. The group pursued Mr. Kaminski through the park as he tried to escape the
assault. It was not until the arrival and intervention of a third party good Samaritan that Mr.
Kaminski was able to escape to his vehicle. The police were called to the scene and interviewed
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all participants. Mr. Kaminski suffered physical injuries as a result of the incident and his drone
was destroyed.
Discussion
1. Request for New Trial
Defendant raises a post-sentence motion under Rule 607 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure, contending the guilty verdict on the simple assault charge at Count 1 was
against the weight of the evidence. A challenge to the weight of the evidence requires inquiry
into whether, '"notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to
ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice."' Commonwealth
v. Richard, 150 A.3d 516-17 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.2d 1049,
1055 (Pa. 2013)). In considering a weight of the evidence challenge, the Court must determine
whether the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to "shock one's sense of justice" and
dictate that a new trial be granted in order that "right may be given another opportunity to
prevail." Id.
In evaluating a weight of the evidence challenge, the Court must adhere to the
fundamental principle that determinations of witness credibility are within the sole discretion of
the jury as fact finder; a trial judge may not grant a new trial based on mere conflicts in
testimony or because the judge would have decided differently. Commonwealth v. Vandivner,
962 A.2d 1170, 1178 (Pa. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1038 (2010). Furthermore, a jury is
"free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Forbes, 867 A.2d 1268,
1272-73 (Pa. Super. 2005). The court may not sit as a "thirteenth juror" in deciding a motion for
new trial based on a weight of the evidence challenge. Commonwealth v. Hunter, 768 A.2d
1136, 1143 (Pa. Super. 2001), appeal denied, 796 A.2d 979 (Pa. 2001).
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In the case at bar, Defendant argues that the trial evidence showed that she did not
attempt to cause bodily injury to victim Paul Kaminski, and that she was not an accomplice to
the assault committed by her husband and by an acquaintance, Josh Parris. In so arguing,
Defendant points to her own trial testimony and to that of her husband and co-Defendant,
Bentley Stanton, as proving that she did not ever touch the victim, attempt to touch the victim, or
threaten to touch the victim. (See Def's, Memo. of Law Supp. Post-Sent. Mot., at 5-6, 9-10).
Defendant also argues that her only role was to attempt to stop the altercation after it began.
(Id.).
Defendant would have the Court completely discredit the trial testimony of victim Paul
Kaminski that Defendant Samantha Stanton, as well as the two men with her, struck Defendant
during the events on May 25, 2016. Mr. Kaminski testified to being assaulted and pursued in
Circleville Park by Bentley Stanton, Josh Panis and Samantha Stanton. He specifically testified
that Ms. Stanton struck him with a frisbee, and then with her fist, after bystander Troy Teresak
came upon the scene and stopped the assault by Bentley Stanton. (Trial Tr., at 98-99).1 Mr.
Kaminski also testified that, as the two men were punching him, Ms. Stanton was screaming at
him for following her with his drone, "fueling the fire," as the men assaulted him. (Id at 97-98).
Defendant also asks the Court to downplay the trial testimony of witness Troy Teresak
regarding Ms. Stanton's involvement. Witness Teresak testified that, as he drove by Circleville
Park on the day of the incident, he saw a group of four individuals, with three of them appearing
to be aggressors and the fourth backing away. (Trial Tr., at 172). The three aggressors -- two
men and a woman -- were yelling angrily at the fourth, and one of the male aggressors pushed
him over. Witness Teresak saw the men start swinging punches at the victim, and saw the
woman kick at him while he was on the ground. (Id. at 173). He saw the victim get up and try to
1
All references to the transcript are to the trial transcript of the July 7, 2017 jury trial in this case.
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back away before the attack started again. He testified that the victim appeared to be trying to
escape to his car, and that the three individuals were following him. (Id. at 174). Mr. Teresak
ran over to stop the fight and became involved in a heated discussion with Bentley Stanton. (Id.
at 175). Mr. Teresak stayed at the scene until the police arrived. In addition to testimony from
Mr. Kaminksi and Mr. Teresak, Officer Brian Shaffer of the Patton Township Police Department
testified that both Bentley and Samantha Stanton admitted to some level of involvement in the
assault. (Id. at 200-01 ).
On review of the record, it is clear that Defendant's arguments for a new trial in this case
fail to acknowledge the fundamental role of the jury as the trier of fact and the decision maker on
issues of both credibility and weight to be accorded to the evidence. Although Defendant would
have the Court give greater weight to her testimony and to that of her husband, the Court is not
permitted to second-guess the jury in this manner and to act as a "thirteenthjuror." Reviewing
the record as a whole, the Court concludes that the verdict of the jury was supported by the
evidence, and was certainly not so contrary to the evidence that it would shock one's sense of
justice. Thus, Defendant's motion for new trial on weight of the evidence grounds is denied.
In her post-sentence motion, Defendant also challenged the Court's denial of her motion
for a mistrial on the ground that video evidence from the victim's drone had been edited and the
original tape was never been produced to defense counsel. (See Def. Post-Sentence Mot., at ,i 8).
Defendant did not further develop this issue at oral argument or in her brief. On review of the
record, the Court cannot agree that the testimony established the video had, in fact, been edited,
let alone that the Commonwealth was aware of any edits to the video or that Defendant was
somehow prejudiced. Accordingly, the Court rejects this allegation of error as a basis for a new
trial.
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2. Motion to Modify Sentence
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge.
Commonwealth v. High, 450 A.2d 158, 159 (Pa. Super. 1982). The Sentencing Code sets forth
three overarching factors for the court's consideration in sentencing: (1) the protection of the
public; (2) the gravity of the offense in relation to the impact on the victim and community; and,
(3) the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9271 (b ).
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the Court must consider the "particular
circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Moury, 992
A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010). When a pre-sentence investigation report was considered by
the sentencing court, the law presumes the sentencing court was aware of information contained
therein as to the defendant's background and character, and that this information was duly
considered by the court. See id. The sentencing court must also consider the sentencing
guidelines established by the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission. When the court imposes
sentence within the standard guideline range, the sentence is viewed as appropriate under
Pennsylvania law. Id.
When imposing a sentence of probation, courts may include reasonable conditions as are
deemed necessary to "insure or assist the defendant in leading a law abiding life." 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9754(b). Among other specified conditions, as part of the sentencing order, courts are
authorized to impose probation conditions reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the
defendant and "not unduly restrictive of [the defendant's] liberty or incompatible with his
freedom of conscience." Id § 9754(c)(13).
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Defendant in the case at bar was sentenced to a period of two years' probation on count 1,
to make restitution to the victim, and to attend and complete the Centre Country Education and
Resistance Training Program (CCERT). The probationary sentence was within the standard
guidelines, and the conditions imposed were determined based on Defendant's individual
circumstances and the circumstances of the crime. Defendant now asks the Court to modify her
sentence to eliminate the CCERT requirement.
Defendant argues that the CCER T program requirement presents a conflict of interest
because one of the probation officers employed by the Centre County Probation and Parole
Department ("Probation Department") is paid on an hourly basis to facilitate weekly CCERT
program meetings. According to Defendant, a financial incentive thus exists for the Probation
Department to recommend people for the CCERT program. (Def's Memo. Supp. Post-Sent.
Mot., at 13-14). Defendant did not present any evidence to support her argument, but instead
cites to testimony from a 2008 hearing raising a similar challenge to the CCERT program based
on circumstances existing at that time. (See id. at 13-16 and Exhibit 2 thereto).
Defendant's argument is primarily built on the erroneous premise that the decision to
include CCERT participation in Defendant's sentence in this case was made by the Probation
Department. (See Def s Memo. Supp. Post-Sent. Mot., at 13) (stating that the Centre County
Probation Department decides who is accepted into the CCERT program). As noted by the
Commonwealth, however, participation in the CCERT program in this instance was a
requirement imposed by the Court, and did not stem from a Probation Department
recommendation. The CCERT program aims to instill accountability and responsibility in
offenders and to educate individuals about errors in judgment and the choices leading them to
offend. In fashioning Defendant's sentence, the information considered by the Court included
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the information contained in the pre-sentence investigation report regarding Defendant's
background and individual circumstances, the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, and the facts
developed at trial regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense. Although the Court
determined that a probationary sentence was appropriate, the Court also determined that the
aggressive nature of the offense and the surrounding circumstances suggested that an educational
program geared toward recognition of rash decision making and accepting personal
responsibility would serve Defendant's rehabilitative needs as well as the safety of the
community. The Court believes participation in CCERT is a condition reasonably related to
Defendant's rehabilitation, and there has been no suggestion that the condition is unduly
restrictive of her liberty or incompatible with her freedom of conscience. The Court thus
concludes there is no merit to Defendant's argument that imposition of CCERT in this case was
spurred by any kind of financial incentive, that it presents an inappropriate conflict of interest, or
that it is otherwise an inappropriate condition of probation in this case.
Finally, Defendant complains that there is no contract between Centre County and the
Probation Department with respect to the CCERT program and services thereunder. Defendant
has not fully developed her argument in this regard or cited to any case authority for
consideration by the Court, nor was an evidentiary record developed on this issue. The Court is
not persuaded that the absence of a contract for the CCERT program renders the program
unlawful.
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court enters the following Order:
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ORDER
this�
AND NOW, day of January, 2018, for the reasons set forth in the
accompanying Opinion, Defendant's Post-Sentence Motion is hereby DENIED.
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BY THE COURT:
Katherine V. Oliver, Judge
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