MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 19 2018, 9:56 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Christopher Sturgeon Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Clark County Public Defender’s Office Attorney General of Indiana
Jeffersonville, Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Christopher D. McCoy, September 19, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1022
v. Appeal from the
Clark Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Andrew Adams, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
10C01-1505-FA-5
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1022 | September 19, 2018 Page 1 of 5
[1] Christopher D. McCoy (“McCoy”) appeals from the trial court’s order on the
resentencing ordered by this court in McCoy v. State, 96 N.E.3d 95 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2018). In its new sentencing order, the trial court sentenced McCoy to
twelve years for Class C felony child molesting and eight years for Level 4
felony child molesting.1 McCoy raises two issues for our review, of which we
find the following dispositive: whether his twelve-year sentence for Class C
felony child molesting is illegal. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Toward the end of 2013, McCoy began molesting S.M., his ten-year-old
adopted daughter. He fondled S.M.’s vagina and made her “clean” his penis in
the shower by masturbating it until he ejaculated. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 5-7.
At least twice McCoy partially penetrated S.M.’s vagina, once with his penis
and another time with an item described as “blue rubber with several connected
circles.” Id. He also touched the exterior of her vagina with a vibrator. Id.
These and other acts continued through January of 2015.
[3] The State charged McCoy under Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3 with four
counts of child molesting, two committed before July 1, 2014 and two
committed after June 30, 2014: Count I, a Class A felony; Count II, a Class C
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b). We note that both of these counts of child molesting were charged under
Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(b). The classifications of these charges are different, however, because the
Class C felony was committed prior to July 1, 2014 and the Level 4 felony was committed after June 30,
2014, a date when a new version of the criminal statute was enacted, which changed the classifications of
crimes to levels rather than classes.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1022 | September 19, 2018 Page 2 of 5
felony; Count III, a Level 1 felony; and Count IV, a Level 4 felony. McCoy v.
State, 96 N.E.3d 95, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 3. In
January of 2017, McCoy entered into an open plea agreement in which he
agreed to plead guilty to Count II, Class C felony child molesting and Count
IV, Level 4 felony child molesting, and, in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss
Counts I and III. Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 19-22.
[4] The trial court imposed an eight-year sentence on the Class C felony and a
twelve-year sentence on the Level 4 felony with four years to be served on
Community Corrections. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 125, 130, 187; McCoy, 96
N.E.3d at 98. On direct review, we found that the trial court erroneously
classified McCoy as a credit restricted felon and relied on two invalid
aggravating factors. We also found that the sentencing order did not clearly
state whether McCoy was to serve the sentences concurrently or consecutively
and what, if any, mitigating factors were found by the trial court. We
remanded for resentencing. See McCoy, 96 N.E.3d at 99, 100-02.
[5] When resentencing McCoy, the trial court correctly observed that the
sentencing range for a Class C felony is between two and eight years and that
the sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is between two and twelve years. Tr.
Vol. II at 11. However, moments later, the trial court appeared to transpose
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1022 | September 19, 2018 Page 3 of 5
those ranges when it imposed a twelve-year sentence on the Class C felony and
an eight-year sentence on the Level 4 felony. Id. at 12.2
Discussion and Decision
[6] McCoy argues that his twelve-year sentence for Class C felony child molesting
is illegal and should be reversed. The State agrees that the sentence is illegal but
asks us to remand the case to let the trial court clarify whether it inadvertently
transposed the sentences for Count II and Count IV, or whether it intended to
revise both sentences from the original sentencing order.
[7] A trial court may impose any sentence authorized by statute and the Indiana
Constitution. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d). Although a sentencing judge holds
broad discretion, he or she must act within statutorily prescribed limits. Dillman
v. State, 16 N.E.3d 445, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A sentence contrary to the
penalty mandated by statute is illegal. Id.; compare Poore v. State, 613 N.E.2d
478, 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (a facially defective sentence is one that violates
express statutory authority).
[8] We acknowledge that the trial court here may have intended to impose the
same sentence it ordered the first time but simply transposed the sentences.
Nonetheless, the twelve-year sentence it imposed for the Class C felony is
2
The trial court also ordered consecutive sentences and, as it had done at the first sentencing
hearing, it allowed McCoy to serve his final four years on Community Corrections. Id. at 12;
Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 19, 72).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1022 | September 19, 2018 Page 4 of 5
outside the statutorily prescribed range, which is two to eight years. See Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-6(a). Thus, the sentence is illegal.
[9] McCoy asks this court to “reverse” the sentence without specifying a term of
years, other than to suggest that we could revise the sentence to eight years in
accord with the trial court’s apparent desire to impose the maximum sentence.
McCoy urges this court to resist the State’s request for a full resentencing
because he challenges only the Class C felony sentence. However, such a
limitation would undermine the trial court’s ability to craft an aggregate
sentence in accord with its determination about McCoy’s culpability and the
severity of his offenses. Therefore, under these circumstances, a “trial court
[has] flexibility upon remand, including the ability to increase sentences for
individual convictions without giving rise to a presumption of vindictive
sentencing, so long as the aggregate sentence is no longer than originally
imposed.” Sanjari v. State, 981 N.E.2d 578, 583 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans.
denied. This flexibility recognizes that “a trial court is likely to view individual
sentences in a multi-count proceeding as part of an overall plan, a plan that can
be overthrown if one or more of the convictions is reversed or reduced in
degree.” See id. Therefore, the trial court may simply revert to its original
sentence as to the length of each individual sentence or impose other sentences
on each count so long as those sentences lie within statutory parameters.
[10] Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1022 | September 19, 2018 Page 5 of 5