NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 19 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD JONES; et al., No. 17-16788
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No. 1:16-cv-01725-LJO-EPG
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MICHAEL KEITZ; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O'Neill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 12, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Ronald Jones, John Cayanne, and Jim Glasscock appeal from the district
court’s judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and
state law claims arising from their arrest and criminal prosecution. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Eclectic Props. East,
LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims
against defendants Anderson and Biehm because plaintiffs failed to allege facts
sufficient to show that former District Attorney Keitz did not “exercise[]
independent judgment in determining that probable cause for [plaintiffs’] arrest
exist[ed] . . . .” Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled on
other grounds by Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir. 2008); see
also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim against defendants
Madera County and the Madera County Sheriff’s Department because plaintiffs
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that plaintiffs were arrested pursuant to an
expressly adopted official policy or a long-standing practice or custom, or that
defendants “possess[ed] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect
to the [arrest].” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986); see also
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th
Cir. 2013) (county may be subject to damages under § 1983 “when the plaintiff
was injured pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy, a long-standing
2 17-16788
practice or custom, or the decision of a final policymaker” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs further
leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Chodos v. West Publ’g
Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and
noting that a district court’s discretion is particularly broad when it has already
granted leave to amend).
AFFIRMED.
3 17-16788