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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-10768
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cv-01749-CEH-TBM
EDWARD A. BEHL, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
R. TIMOTHY PETERS,
Circuit Court Judge in his/her official capacity,
CHRISTINA T. HELINGER,
Circuit Court Judge in his/her official capacity, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(September 19, 2018)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN, and ROSENBAUM , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Edward Behl, Sr., a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s order dismissing his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He
argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint because his
complaint did not challenge the fact and duration of his confinement. We affirm
on the alternative ground that Mr. Behl’s complaint is barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.1
I.
In 2002, Behl was convicted of a number of counts of sexual battery on a
minor and, he was sentenced to life in prison. After a direct appeal, resentencing,
and another direct appeal, Behl sought state post-conviction relief under Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. In September 2008, Judge Timothy Peters of
the Florida Sixth Judicial Circuit Court denied Behl’s Rule 3.850 motion as
untimely. Behl explains that “[i]t is this erroneous order by Judge Peters that is the
genesis and foundation of [his] Complaint for the deprivation of his federal rights
to access to the courts, due process, and habeas relief.” Judge Peter’s denial of
Behl’s Rule 3.850 motion was affirmed on appeal. Behl then filed a petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal district court, but his petition was denied. Behl v.
Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Case No. 8:10-cv-1583-T-17EAJ, 2011 WL 3331207
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2011). This Court denied a certificate of appealability. Behl v.
1
The doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct.
149 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983).
2
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Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 11-14160 (11th Cir. Feb. 21, 2012). Since then,
Behl has sought relief from other courts by way of mandamus, certiorari, a writ of
habeas corpus, and a motion for relief from judgment. His argument in all of these
filings was that his Rule 3.850 motion was timely. However, none of Behl’s
attempts have been successful.
On July 18, 2017, Behl filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against fifteen Florida
justices and judges as well as the Florida Attorney General, three assistant attorney
generals, a Florida state attorney, and various unknown assistant state attorneys. In
general, Behl alleged the defendants perpetuated Judge Peters’s incorrect ruling on
timeliness and, in doing so, denied Behl his federal constitutional right to due
process. For these violations, Behl sought three forms of relief. First, he wanted a
declaratory judgment that Judge Peters’s “misrepresentations” were “erroneous as
a matter of law and fraudulent,” and that all other defendants were complicit in
perpetuating that fraud. Second, he wanted an injunction ordering the defendants
to reinstate Behl’s state post-conviction proceedings. And third, he sought a
declaration that the Attorney General of Florida and two of her assistants had
committed fraud on the federal courts by “willfully misrepresenting that Behl had
procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claims in the state courts.” His complaint
expressly disavowed any intention to “challenge either the fact or duration of [his]
confinement.”
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The district court reviewed Behl’s complaint as required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and ordered it dismissed on four alternative grounds. Two of
those grounds are based on the district court’s characterization of his complaint as
seeking relief from his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as opposed to relief
available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court also ruled that it lacked power to
order the mandamus relief sought by Behl. Last, the court found Behl’s complaint
was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This appeal followed. 2
II.
We review a district court’s legal rulings in dismissing a complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction de novo, and its findings of jurisdictional facts for
clear error. Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 839 F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th
Cir. 2016). We also “review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for
failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).” Evans v. Ga. Reg’l
Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017). “Dismissal under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as a dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Evans, 850 F.3d at 1253. To
satisfy this pleading standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
2
Behl also appealed the denial of his post-judgment Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, his Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration, and
his Rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from an erroneous order. Behl made no arguments about
these rulings in his brief and has therefore abandoned any challenge to them. See Timson v.
Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
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accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).
III.
Now on appeal, Behl challenges the district court’s ruling that his complaint
challenged the fact or duration of his confinement. That interpretation led the
district court to decide that Behl’s complaint is an unauthorized second or
successive § 2254 habeas petition, rather than a § 1983 claim. See Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372–73 (1994). We agree the
district court erred on this issue.
The district court construed Behl’s complaint as seeking to challenge the fact
or duration of his confinement, in the face of the complaint’s express statement
that it does not. Behl’s complaint instead alleges that the state post-conviction
court made a procedural error in denying his state petition that infected his federal
habeas proceedings. And Behl did not seek immediate release from confinement
or a shorter sentence, but, instead, sought review of the state judge’s untimeliness
ruling and reinstatement of his action for state post-conviction relief. Thus, a
judgment in Behl’s favor would, at most, result in a ruling that the state post-
conviction court’s holding on timeliness was incorrect and reinstatement of his
state post-conviction proceedings. Such a ruling in Behl’s favor would not
necessarily entitle him to federal habeas relief or imply the invalidity of his
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conviction and sentence. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81, 125 S. Ct.
1242, 1248 (2005). The district court therefore erred in dismissing Behl’s
complaint as a second or successive 2254 petition and for failing to state a claim
under § 1983.
Yet the district court made an alternative ruling. The district court also held
that Behl’s complaint was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine
applies where “the losing party in state court file[s] suit in federal court after the
state proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-court
judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.” Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1526 (2005). In
those circumstances, federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction because
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) “vests authority to review a state court’s judgment solely” in
the Supreme Court. Id. at 292, 125 S. Ct. at 1526. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
applies both to claims that were decided in a state-court judgment and to claims
that are “inextricably intertwined” with the state-court judgment. May v. Morgan
Cty. Ga., 878 F.3d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
Behl failed to challenge the district court’s alternative holding, so we could
affirm for this reason alone. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678,
681–83 (11th Cir. 2014). But we also agree with the merits of the district court’s
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holding that Behl’s complaint is barred by Rooker-Feldman because it effectively
seeks to overturn the procedural rulings in his state post-conviction case.3
AFFIRMED.
3
We note a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is not subject to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292 n.8, 125 S. Ct. at 1526 n.8
(“Congress, if so minded, may explicitly empower district courts to oversee certain state-court
judgments and has done so, most notably, in authorizing federal habeas review of state prisoners’
petitions.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). But as discussed above, Behl did not file a § 2254
petition, and his complaint did not seek to invalidate his conviction or sentence.
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