J-A20021-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
CLYDE L. HARGROVE AND BARBARA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
J. HARGROVE, HIS WIFE : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 1583 WDA 2017
KOPPERS, INC., A CORPORATION; :
UNITED STATES STEEL :
CORPORATION, A CORPORATION; :
UCAR CARBON COMPANY INC., A :
CORPORATION; GREAT LAKES :
CARBON CORPORATION, A :
CORPORATION, A/K/A GREAT LAKES :
CARBON LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY :
COMPANY, A/K/A SGL CARBON :
CORPORATION, F/K/A SIGRI GREAT :
LAKES CARBON CORPORATION AND :
SGL CARBON AG, F/K/A SIGRI :
GREAT LAKES CARBON GMBHH; :
EXXON MOBIL CORP, A :
CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR IN :
INTEREST OF EXXON CORP AND :
STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY; :
AND CROMPTON CORPORATION, A :
CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR IN :
INTEREST OF CK WITCO :
CORPORAITON AND WITCO :
CORPORATION
Appeal from the Order September 25, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
No(s): GD-05-015942
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2018
J-A20021-18
Barbra J. Hargrove1 appeals from the trial court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellees, Koppers, Inc., a corporation; United
States Steel Corporation, Ucar Carbon Company Inc., a corporation; Great
Lakes Carbon Corporation, a corporation, a/k/a Great Lakes Carbon LLC, a
limited liability company, a/k/a SGL Carbon Corporation, f/k/a SIGRI Great
Lakes Carbon Corporation and SGL Carbon AG, f/k/a SIGRI Great Lakes
Carbon GMBHH; Exxon Mobil Corp., a corporation, successor in interest of
Exxon Corp. and Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey; and Crompton Corporation,
a corporation, successor in interest of CK Witco Corporation and Witco
Corporation (collectively, Defendants). The Hargroves instituted the
underlying negligence action against Defendants after Clyde Hargrove was
diagnosed with kidney cancer following long-term occupational exposure to
coal tar pitch volatiles (CTPVs) while working at Alcoa.2 Alcoa owns and
operates aluminum smelting plants throughout the United States. After
careful review, we reverse and remand.
Clyde Hargrove was employed at Alcoa’s Rockdale, Texas plant for 30
years, from May 14, 1973, until his retirement in January 2003. While
employed by Alcoa, Clyde Hargrove worked as a production helper, pot room
trainee, rodding operator and janitor. In January 2002, Clyde Hargrove was
____________________________________________
1 Although Barbara J. Hargrove’s now deceased husband, Clyde L. Hargrove,
is listed on the caption of this appeal, he is no longer a party to the action.
For the reasons discussed infra, his personal representative must be
substituted in his place.
2 The named Defendants manufactured and supplied Alcoa with the CTPVs.
-2-
J-A20021-18
diagnosed with renal small cell carcinoma (kidney cancer); he had his left
kidney surgically removed in 2002. Clyde Hargrove returned to Alcoa in May
2002 and continued to work until his retirement. On April 19, 2005, Clyde
Hargrove received a medical letter and report from Dr. David K. Parkinson
which notified him that his kidney cancer was potentially related to his work
at Alcoa.
The Hargroves instituted the underlying negligence and strict liability
action by filing a writ of summons in July 2005 and a complaint against
Defendants on September 12, 2005. Clyde Hargrove died on October 30,
2013, from metastasized kidney cancer. On September 26, 2016, Defendants
filed a joint summary judgment motion raising the statute of limitations and
arguing that, upon diagnosis in 2002 or shortly thereafter, Clyde Hargrove
knew or should have known that his cancer was caused by exposure to CTPVs
in the aluminum smelters at Alcoa.
The parties fully briefed the issues presented in the summary judgment
motion and argued them before the court on May 17, 2017. On September
25, 2017, the Honorable Robert J. Colville granted the Defendants’ motion in
the instant case.3 The trial court gave its reasons for collectively granting
____________________________________________
3 Defendants filed summary judgment motions in fourteen cases, all based
upon the alleged expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Judge
Colville wrote a single opinion denying Defendants’ motion in seven of the
other 14 cases. He granted summary judgment, like in the instant case, in
six cases. The plaintiffs in one case voluntarily dismissed their claim against
Defendants after the court entered its summary judgment order.
-3-
J-A20021-18
summary judgment in favor of Defendants in the instant case and five other
CTPV cases, all based upon the discovery rule:
In each of the above-captioned cases where I have entered
summary judgment on behalf of the Defendants, I have concluded
that the fact that there exists record evidence demonstrating
either an admission by the Plaintiff, other actions or conduct which
demonstrates the Plaintiff’s actual subjective awareness of the
possibility, if not likely probability that their occupational
exposures contributed to their diseases, or that there exists facts
of record which would not permit a jury to fail to infer that the
Plaintiff had information available to him from which he
reasonably should have suspected occupational exposure as a
contributing factor in the cause of his disease.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9/25/17, at 2 (emphasis in original).
Barbara Hargrove timely filed a notice of appeal and court-ordered
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. 4 On
appeal, she presents the following issues for our consideration:
(1) Whether the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in
favor of the Defendants is contrary to the applicable
summary judgment standard which requires the court to
draw inferences from the evidence in favor of the non-
moving party and prohibits the court from resolving factual
issues which create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the statute of limitation had begun to run.
(2) Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
based on the conclusion that the evidence demonstrated
that the Plaintiff had “subjective awareness of the
possibility, if not probability” that the exposure to CTPVs
____________________________________________
4 Notably, the trial court did not issue a separate Rule 1925(a) opinion
specifically addressing the Hargroves and their issue on appeal following the
filing of the notice of appeal in the instant case. Rather, the court issued an
order stating that “[t]he reason for my September 25, 2017 Order of Court
[is] set forth in my September 25, 2017 Memorandum Opinion and Order of
Court.” See Order, 12/18/17.
-4-
J-A20021-18
contributed to his disease when such a determination
requires the Court to charge the layman plaintiff with
knowledge greater than that which is communicated to him
by his treating physician.
(3) Whether in a latent disease case, where defendants strongly
dispute a medical link between the exposure and the
disease, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
on the basis that the layman plaintiff had sufficient
information to begin the running of the statute of limitations
on his claim prior to receiving notice from a medical
professional that there was a link between his disease and
his exposure to CTPVs.
(4) Whether the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in
favor of the Defendants placed Plaintiffs in an untenable
position of being required to file a lawsuit, based on
suspicion, before there was medical proof to link the cancer
to workplace exposure to coal tar pitch and [CTPVs].
Appellants’ Brief, at 4.
Before addressing the merits of the claims raised on appeal, we must
discuss a jurisdictional issue. Our Court may sua sponte consider whether the
trial court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the matter below, as it
relates directly to the “competency of the individual court, administrative body
of other tribunal to determine the controversies of the general class to which
a particular case belongs.” Green Acres Rehab. & Nursing Ctr. V.
Sullivan, 113 A.3d 1261, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted); see also
Turner Constr. v. Plumbers Local 690, 130 A.3d 47 (Pa. Super. 2015). In
Grimm v. Grimm, 149 A.3d 77 (Pa. Super. 2016), our Court held that “the
death of a party deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over
litigation by or against the deceased until such time as the deceased’s personal
representative is substituted in his or her place.” Id. at 80.
-5-
J-A20021-18
Here, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants
on September 25, 2017. However, Clyde Hargrove died prior to the entry of
the order, on October 30, 2013, and there is nothing in the record indicating
that the Hargroves’ attorney of record filed a notice of his client’s death, that
any qualified party ever filed for letters of administration/testamentary,
and/or that a personal representative was substituted in Hargrove’s place.
See Pa.R.C.P. 2355 (Notice of Death of a Party. Substitution of Personal
Representative); see also Pa.R.C.P. 2352 (Substitution of Successor).
Rule 2355 states:
(a) If a named party dies after the commencement of an action,
the attorney of record for the deceased party shall file a notice
of death with the prothonotary. The procedure to substitute
the personal representative of the deceased party shall be in
accordance with Rule 2352.
Pa.R.C.P. 2355(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, under section 3375 of the
Decedents, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, if a plaintiff dies and a personal
representative is not appointed within one year after a suggestion of death is
filed, the court, upon petition, shall abate any pending action if the delay in
taking out letters is not reasonably explained. See 20 Pa.C.S. § 3375; see
also Pa.R.C.P. 2355 (Note) (“Counsel for the deceased party should file the
notice of death promptly upon learning of the death of the party and serve a
copy upon every other party to the action.”) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, we must vacate the instant summary judgment order,
where the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter such. We
remand the matter to the trial court for a determination as to whether the
-6-
J-A20021-18
cause of action should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction or whether a
reasonable explanation exists regarding the failure to promptly file a notice of
death, take out letters of administration following Clyde Hargrove’s death, and
the failure to substitute a personal representative. See Cholewka v. Gelso,
2018 PA Super 216 (Pa. Super. filed July 27, 2018).
Order vacated. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with the
dictates of this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/21/2018
-7-