NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 30, 2018*
Decided September 21, 2018
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 17‐2128
JESSE McMILLAN, et al., Appeal from the
Plaintiffs‐Appellees, United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
v.
No. 92‐cv‐2187
MARK A. HYZY,
Proposed Plaintiff‐Intervenor‐ Harold A. Baker,
Appellant, Judge.
v.
AUDREY McCRIMON and
PHIL BRADLEY,
Defendants‐Appellees.
* We agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 17‐2128 Page 2
O R D E R
Mark Hyzy moved to intervene in this long dormant case to enforce a permanent
injunction that requires the Illinois Department of Human Services to accept and
process applications for the Home Services Program (“HSP”), which allows
Medicaid‐eligible persons to receive in‐home care rather than placement in a nursing
home. He seeks declaratory relief, unspecified damages, and a supplemental injunction
requiring the agency to respond to applications by a certain date and to pay a fine to the
applicant if it does not.
Hyzy’s chief complaint is that the Department took more than two years to
process his HSP application. The district court denied Hyzy’s intervention motion,
stating that the case was closed.
On appeal Hyzy argues that there was no procedural impediment preventing the
district court from considering the merits of his motion to intervene. He contends that
the administrative closure of a case from the active docket has nothing to do with the
court’s ability to entertain a motion to intervene to enforce a permanent injunction. He
is correct on that point. Contrary to the agency’s argument, the administrative closure
of a case is not a sufficient reason to deny intervention when a permanent injunction
remains in place.
A permanent injunction persists until it expires on its own terms or is formally
dissolved by a court order, such as when the restrained party moves for relief under
Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—which never happened here. See
Zbaraz v. Madigan, 572 F.3d 370, 378 (7th Cir. 2009). And generally a district court retains
jurisdiction to enforce its own judgment where, as here, the judgment incorporates the
terms to be enforced and the suit is not dismissed with prejudice. (Here it was simply
closed by stipulation, presumably under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.) See Shapo v. Engle, 463 F.3d 641, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2006); McCall‐Bey v.
Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 1985). Intervention in an administratively closed
case is not inherently improper. Fla. Assʹn for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Bush, 246 F.3d
1296, 1298 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Designating a case ‘closed’ does not prevent the court from
reactivating a case either of its own accord or at the request of the parties.”); cf. Kifer v.
Ellsworth, 346 F.3d 1155, 1157 (7th Cir. 2003).
But even though the judge denied the intervention motion on an improper
ground, a remand is unwarranted because Hyzy lacks standing to seek enforcement of
No. 17‐2128 Page 3
the permanent injunction. Standing is required for intervention as of right and for
permissive intervention under most circumstances. See Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061,
1070–71 (7th Cir. 2009). To establish Article III standing, a “plaintiff must have (1)
suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). Hyzy made clear in his intervention motion
that he withdrew his administrative appeal of the agency’s action and “declined to
complete the HSP application process due to improvement in his physical condition
rendering HSP services unnecessary.” So Hyzy has no current need for services and
therefore no injury that could be remedied by a favorable decision. See id.
And although Hyzy sought unspecified damages, no statute or regulation allows
damages for an alleged violation of HSP requirements. And we see no basis for
damages under any other theory of relief cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Accordingly, we MODIFY the judgment to reflect that the intervention motion is
dismissed for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction. As modified, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.