In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-18-00244-CV
___________________________
IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF MAY K. JONES, INCAPACITATED
On Appeal from the Probate Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. PR-2014-00591
Before Meier, Gabriel, and Kerr, JJ.
Per Curiam
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants Kathy Jones, Judy Jones, and Candice Schwager attempt to appeal
four orders: an “Order Granting Second Successor Guardian Ad Litem’s Motion for
Use of Ourfamilywizard.com, for Medical Examination, and for Permanent
Injunction Regarding Communications” (the communications order) and three
recusal-related orders.1
On August 9, 2018, we notified appellants of our concern that we lack
jurisdiction over their appeal of the communications order—because the notice of
appeal was not timely filed—and of the recusal-related orders—because the orders are
neither final judgments nor appealable interlocutory orders. We explained that the
appeal would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction unless appellant or any party
desiring to continue the appeal filed a response by August 20, 2018, showing grounds
for continuing the appeal. Appellants did not file a response, but appellee Ellen
Nadene Smith did, conceding that the communications order was not timely appealed
but arguing that the recusal orders finally disposed of all parties or issues in a
particular phase of the proceedings—“all of the issues (including the sanctions issue)
The recusal-related orders are an “Order Denying Motion to Recuse and/or
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Disqualify,” an “Order Imposing Sanctions Regarding Motion to Recuse and/or
Disqualify and Issuing Writ of Injunction Regarding Further Motions to Recuse,” and
an “Order on Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Motion to Recuse
and/or Disqualify.”
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surrounding the Motion to Recuse filed by Kathy Jones and Judy Jones through their
counsel of record Candice Schwager.”2
We agree with Smith that appellants did not timely appeal the communications
order. The order was signed on November 7, 2017, and assuming without deciding
that the order was final for purposes of appeal, the notice of appeal was due
December 7, 2017, but was not filed until August 6, 2018, approximately eight
months later. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1.
But we disagree with Smith that the recusal orders finally disposed of a discrete
phase of the underlying guardianship proceedings. See De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d
575, 578‒79 (Tex. 2006) (op. on reh’g) (explaining that for probate order to be final
under exception to “one final judgment” rule, order must dispose of all parties or
issues in a particular phase of the proceedings). We have clarified that a recusal order
is appealable only after a final judgment has been entered, see In re Guardianship of Hart,
460 S.W.3d 742, 743 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (per curiam) (citing Tex.
R. Civ. P. 18a(j)(1)(A)), and there is no indication that the sanctions order, which the
trial court entered in connection with the recusal order, ended any particular phase of
the guardianship proceedings. See In re Aguilar, No. 04-16-00813-CV, 2018 WL
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Smith also seemed to suggest that appellants had failed to timely appeal the
June 29, 2018 recusal orders, but appellants filed their August 7, 2018 notice of appeal
within rule 26.3’s fifteen-day extension window. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.3.
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1176914, at *2‒3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(dismissing appeal of sanctions order in probate matter).
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App.
P. 43.2(f).
Per Curiam
Delivered: September 20, 2018
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