MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 25 2018, 10:27 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David Becsey Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Zeigler Cohen & Koch Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kim Townsend, September 25, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1046
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Helen Marchal, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff Trial Court Cause No.
49G15-1601-F6-734
Crone, Judge.
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[1] Kim Townsend appeals her convictions for level 6 felony resisting law
enforcement and level 6 felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator.
Townsend contends that the trial court erred in excluding a video of her arrest
by police officers after a car chase. Finding no error, we affirm.
[2] Around 5:00 p.m. on January 6, 2016, a Marion County sheriff’s deputy saw
Townsend make a turn in her vehicle without using a turn signal. The deputy
“activated his emergency equipment to initiate a traffic stop on the vehicle.”
Tr. Vol. 2 at 38. Townsend, who knew that her driving privileges were
suspended, initially stopped her vehicle. But as the deputy approached her car,
Townsend “sped off at a high rate of speed.” Id. at 39. The deputy pursued
Townsend with his “lights and siren going[,]” and several other law
enforcement vehicles joined the pursuit. Id. at 47. Townsend, who was driving
“[e]rratic[ally,]” led the officers on a circuitous chase through city streets for
approximately ten minutes until she stopped in an alley behind her residence.
Id. at 44. As Townsend ran toward the back door, officers arrested her.
[3] The State charged Townsend with level 6 felony resisting law enforcement
(knowingly fleeing from a law enforcement officer after the officer, by visible or
audible means, identified himself and ordered her to stop) and level 6 felony
operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator (operating a motor vehicle while
knowing that her driving privileges were suspended as a habitual traffic
violator). Before trial, the State moved to exclude a surveillance video of
Townsend’s arrest, contending that it was irrelevant to the charges and had “the
danger of confusing the issues of the case and creating unfair prejudice.”
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Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 163. Townsend objected, arguing that the video
showed that the force used to subdue her justified her concern for her safety and
her failure to stop. The trial court remarked, “Well I can see the relevance if it
was a resist by force or a battery on an officer[…]; I am not seeing the relevance
that it has to operating as a habitual traffic violator and resist by fleeing.” Tr.
Vol. 2 at 8. The court granted the State’s motion, and Townsend made an offer
to prove during trial. The jury found her guilty as charged, and the court
sentenced her to 545 days, all suspended except for time served.
[4] On appeal, Townsend argues that the trial court committed reversible error in
excluding the video, claiming that it violated her constitutional right to present
a defense. The decision to admit or exclude evidence is a matter within the trial
court’s sound discretion. Green v. State, 65 N.E.3d 620, 630 (Ind. Ct. App.
2016), trans. denied (2017). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial
court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances of the case or misinterprets the law.” Id. “We afford an
evidentiary decision great deference upon appeal and reverse only when a
manifest abuse of discretion denies the defendant a fair trial.” Id.
[5] “While a defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense, this right is
not absolute.” James v. State, 96 N.E.3d 615, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans.
denied. “In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State,
must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to
assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.”
Id. (quoting Roach v. State, 695 N.E.2d 934, 939 (Ind. 1998) (quoting Chambers v.
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Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). “One such rule requires that the evidence
presented by the parties be relevant.” Id. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ind.
Evidence Rule 401. “Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Ind. Evidence
Rule 402.
[6] Townsend argues that “[t]he charge of fleeing placed into issue [her] state of
mind” and that “[n]ot allowing her to play the video of her arrest for the jury
tipped the scales of justice unfairly in favor of the State.” Appellant’s Br. at 9.
Townsend cites no authority for the proposition that concern for one’s safety is
a valid defense to the crime of resisting law enforcement by fleeing. Moreover,
as the State points out, the crime was completed before Townsend’s arrest
occurred. In sum, the video of Townsend’s arrest was irrelevant, and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it. Therefore, we affirm.
[7] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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