MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Sep 27 2018, 7:04 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Scott King Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Russell W. Brown, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana
King, Brown & Murdaugh, LLC
Caroline G. Templeton
Merrillville, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyler Steffey, September 27, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-798
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Salvador Vasquez,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45G01-1603-F1-4
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-798 | September 27, 2018 Page 1 of 10
Statement of the Case
[1] Tyler Steffey (“Steffey”) appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for Level
3 felony aggravated battery1 and Level 6 felony auto theft.2 Steffey argues that
there was insufficient evidence to support both convictions. Finding that there
was sufficient probative evidence and reasonable inferences for jurors to find
Steffey guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm his convictions.
Issue
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Steffey’s convictions.
Facts
[2] During the afternoon of February 19, 2016, a friend of Steffey, Kendra Skinner
(“Skinner”), drove her car and picked Steffey up at a gas station in Hammond,
Indiana. After Skinner picked up Steffey, she drove to another gas station
located in Gary to purchase cigarettes. During this second stop, Steffey
proposed that he and Skinner rob a marijuana dealer. Once they agreed to
commit the robbery, Skinner drove to the apartment she shared with her sister,
Brittany Sullivan (“Sullivan”), to obtain a gun that she had stolen a few days
earlier.
1
IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.5.
2
I.C. § 35-43-4-2.5(b)(1) (repealed, effective July 1, 2018).
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[3] After retrieving the gun, Skinner and Steffey drove to a third gas station. Before
Skinner went inside the gas station to buy cigarettes, Steffey leaned his seat
back and told her not to tell anyone she was with him. Later, Steffey directed
Skinner to drive to an alleyway behind a church at 10th Avenue and Chase
Street in Gary to wait for the marijuana dealer they had planned to rob.
Skinner parked her vehicle near a dumpster in the alleyway. Skinner was in the
driver’s seat, and Steffey was in the front passenger seat.
[4] During the approximately hour and a half they waited, Skinner never saw
anyone else in the area. Indeed, she had time to clean out her vehicle and place
bags of clothing in the nearby dumpster. While waiting, Steffey possessed the
gun, and he showed her how it worked. He showed her how to load a clip and
where the safety was. “After he showed [her] the clips and the 9 mm and he
put the clip in, the last thing [Skinner] remember[ed] was waking up on the
ground” in the alleyway near the dumpster. (Tr. 123). Skinner saw her vehicle
being driven down the alleyway but could not see who was driving. Skinner
was shot twice, once on the right side of her head and once in the chest. She
crawled to a nearby house on Chase Street and asked for help. The homeowner
called the police and Skinner was taken by ambulance to the hospital.
[5] As a result of being shot, Skinner suffered injuries to her left abdominal area, a
broken jaw that had to be wired shut for several months, a loss of hearing in her
right ear, and a loss of her sense of smell. She also suffered from severe
headaches and poor short-term memory. After arriving at the hospital, Skinner
was unconscious for two days. When she woke up, she was unable to open her
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mouth. Using a chalkboard, she wrote down the following: “Where is my
car?”, “Does my sister know?”, and “Tyler Steffey.” (Tr. 79). Skinner wrote
Steffey’s name because she knew “he did this to [her].” (Tr. 79).
[6] Skinner’s sister, Sullivan, called Steffey and asked him what happened to her
sister after learning she was in the hospital. Steffey responded that Skinner
never picked him up. Sullivan called Steffey a second time, and he stated that
Skinner had picked him up and dropped him off at his mother’s home. Sullivan
called Steffey a third time, and he said he had never seen Skinner.
[7] Two months later, on April 13, 2016, Skinner’s vehicle was found in an
apartment complex. Inside the car, police found blood splatter on the front
windshield and dashboard. The driver’s side front window was shattered and
there was a bullet hole in the driver’s seat. A spent bullet casing was also
located inside the driver’s side front door. The police did not attempt to recover
fingerprints because any number of people could have entered the vehicle
between February and April. The police also did not perform DNA testing on
any of the blood stains in the car because the information suggested that
Skinner had been the only person injured.
[8] The State charged Steffey with: Level 1 felony attempted murder; Level 3
felony aggravated battery; Level 5 felony battery with a deadly weapon; Level 5
felony battery causing serious bodily injury; Level 6 felony auto theft; and Class
A misdemeanor theft. A two-day jury trial began on October 3, 2017. Skinner,
Sullivan, and the police testified to the facts above. There was a dispute
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regarding what side of the head Skinner was shot on. The jury returned guilty
verdicts on the aggravated battery and the felony auto theft charges, and it
found Steffey not guilty on the remaining charges.
[9] Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Steffey to twelve (12) years for the Level 3
felony aggravated battery conviction and two (2) years for the Level 6 felony
auto theft conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served
consecutively in the Department of Correction for an aggregate sentence of
fourteen (14) years. Steffey now appeals.
Decision
[10] On appeal, Steffey challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both of his
convictions. Our standard of review for sufficiency of evidence claims is well
settled. We do not assess the credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the
evidence in determining whether the evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867
N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Id. (emphasis added). Reversal is
appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, the evidence is not
required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and is sufficient
if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at
147.
1. Aggravated Battery
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[11] In order to convict Steffey of aggravated battery, the State was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Steffey; (2) knowingly or intentionally; (3)
inflicted injury on Skinner; (4) that created a substantial risk of death or caused
serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss of impairment of a bodily
member or organ. I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5. A person engages in conduct
“knowingly” if he “is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-
41-2-2(b). A person engages in conduct “intentionally” if “it is his conscious
objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a).
[12] Steffey concedes that the injuries Skinner suffered created a substantial risk of
death or caused serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss of
impairment of a bodily member or organ. Instead, he first argues that the
“record is devoid of any direct evidence” that he inflicted injury on Skinner.3
(Steffey’s Br. 10). Alternatively, Steffey argues that there was no evidence that
he knowingly or intentionally inflicted injury on Skinner.
[13] With regard to Steffey’s first argument, that the record is devoid of any direct
evidence that he inflicted injury on Skinner, we note that a verdict may be
sustained based upon circumstantial evidence alone if that circumstantial
evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt. Houston v. State, 730 N.E.2d
1247, 1248 (Ind. 2000). Our review of the record shows that there was
3
Steffey also argues that the State failed to present evidence that he possessed a motive to injure Skinner.
The State was only required to prove the statutory elements of the offense, which do not include motive. See
Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2016).
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sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable inference that Steffey
inflicted injury on Skinner. Specifically, Skinner identified Steffey as the only
other occupant in her vehicle. See Thompson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1307, 1311
(Ind. 1996) (a conviction may rest solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a
victim). She testified that Steffey was in possession of the gun immediately
before she lost consciousness. Just before she was shot, Steffey showed Skinner
how to load the clip, and he showed her the safety. Skinner did not see anyone
else in the alleyway during the hour and a half that she and Steffey waited in
the alleyway. Steffey’s argument that the record is devoid of any direct
evidence that he inflicted injury on Skinner is nothing more than a request that
we reweigh the evidence. This we will not do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.
[14] Alternatively, Steffey argues that there was no evidence that he knowingly or
intentionally inflicted injury on Skinner. Because intent is a mental function,
absent an admission by the defendant, it must be determined from a
consideration of the defendant’s conduct and the natural and usual
consequences thereof. Metzler v. State, 540 N.E.2d 606, 609 (Ind. 1989). The
trier of fact usually must resort to “reasonable inferences based upon an
examination of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether, from the
person’s conduct and the natural consequences that might be expected from
that conduct, a showing or inference [of] the intent to commit that conduct
exists.” Id.
[15] The State presented evidence that: Skinner was seated in the driver’s seat, and
Steffey in the front passenger seat; Steffey was the only person with Skinner as
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they waited to rob a marijuana dealer; he possessed the a gun right before
Skinner lost consciousness; Skinner was shot twice, once in the head and once
in the chest; Skinner testified that she was shot on the right side of her face;
there was blood spatter on the front windshield and across the dashboard; there
was a bullet hole in the driver’s seat; and a spent bullet casing was located
inside the driver’s side door. Sullivan also testified that Steffey gave conflicting
accounts as to whether he saw Skinner at all on the day she was shot twice. She
stated that she spoke to Steffey three times and that he denied seeing Skinner
twice and admitted to being with her once. The cumulative effect of the
evidence supports the reasonable inference that Steffey knowingly or
intentionally shot Skinner. Thus, after consideration of the circumstantial
evidence and Steffey’s conduct and the natural and usual consequences thereof,
it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the elements of Level 3 felony
aggravated battery were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Auto Theft
[16] In order to convict Steffey of felony auto theft as charged, the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Steffey; (2) knowingly; (3)
exerted unauthorized control over the motor vehicle of Skinner; (4) with the
intent to deprive her of its value or use. I.C. § 35-43-4-2.5(b)(1).
[17] Steffey argues that “the State did not present any evidence that [he] stole
[Skinner’s] vehicle.” (Steffey’s Br. 11). Our review of the record shows that the
State presented circumstantial evidence that Steffey was the person who exerted
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unauthorized control over Skinner’s vehicle. Circumstantial evidence alone
may support a theft conviction. Rogers v. State, 902 N.E.2d 871, 875 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009). The question for an appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether a reasonable jury could draw inferences from
circumstantial evidence that would establish the defendant’s guilt. Sidener v.
State, 55 N.E.3d 380, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
[18] The evidence presented at trial was that Skinner, who was seated in the driver’s
seat, and Steffey, who was in the front passenger seat, were the only occupants
in her vehicle during the time they were waiting for the marijuana dealer. The
State also presented evidence that Steffey was the only person in the vicinity
with Skinner. See, e.g., Kindred v. State, 257 N.E.2d 667, 668 (Ind. 1970) (“[T]he
fact that appellant was in the room alone at a time the evidence shows the cash
register was opened and the fact that immediately thereafter the money was
missing is sufficient upon which the trier of fact could find appellant had taken
the money”). Skinner testified that she observed her vehicle being driven away
after she regained consciousness on the ground. Additionally, she stated that
she never gave anyone permission to drive her vehicle. The circumstantial
evidence and inferences drawn therefrom support a reasonable inference that
Steffey was the person who exerted unauthorized control over Skinner’s
vehicle. Again, our role is not to reweigh the evidence; we determine whether
sufficient probative evidence and reasonable inferences support a guilty verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.
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[19] Finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove Steffey committed aggravated
battery and felony auto theft, we affirm his convictions.
[20] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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