[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-15500 August 18, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 04-60029-CR-WJZ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KRYSTAL THOMPSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 18, 2005)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Krystal Thompson appeals her sentence for trafficking in at least one or
more unauthorized access devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1029(a)(2).
Thompson asserts: (1) the district court’s application of an abuse-of-trust
enhancement was error, and (2) her sentence violates United States v. Booker, 125
S. Ct. 738 (2005). We vacate and remand for resentencing.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Abuse of Trust
Thompson asserts the district court erred by imposing an abuse-of-trust
enhancement because she had little, if any, managerial or professional discretion, a
necessary element to qualify as one with a public or private position of trust. She
contends she did not occupy a position of trust with respect to customers or credit
card companies.
“In assessing a district court’s application of the abuse-of-trust enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear
error, but review de novo the district court’s determination that the facts justify an
abuse-of-trust enhancement.” United States v. Britt, 388 F.3d 1369, 1371 (11th
Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, No. 04-9748 (April 13, 2005). Section 3B1.3
directs district courts to increase a defendant’s sentencing level two levels “[i]f the
defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a
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manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the
offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. The government must prove “(1) that the defendant
held a place of public or private trust; and (2) that the defendant abused that
position in a way that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of
the offense.” Britt, 388 F.3d at 1371 (quotation omitted). A position of trust is
“characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial
discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference),” and a
person in such a position ordinarily is “subject to significantly less supervision
than employees whose responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in nature.”
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.1).
This adjustment, for example, applies in the case of an embezzlement of
a client’s funds by an attorney serving as a guardian, a bank executive’s
fraudulent loan scheme, or the criminal sexual abuse of a patient by a
physician under the guise of an examination. This adjustment does not
apply in the case of an embezzlement or theft by an ordinary bank teller
or hotel clerk because such positions are not characterized by the
above-described factors.
Id. “A position of trust significantly facilitates the commission or concealment of
an offense when the person in the position of trust has an advantage in committing
the crime because of that trust and uses that advantage in order to commit the
crime.” Britt, 388 F.3d at 1371 (quotation omitted).
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The breach-of-trust enhancement is not appropriate unless the victim of the
breach itself conferred the trust. United States v Garrison, 133 F.3d 831, 837
(11th Cir. 1998). In the fraud context, this Court has found a position of trust to
exist under two circumstances: “(1) where the defendant steals from his employer,
using his position in the company to facilitate the offense, and (2) where a
fiduciary or personal trust relationship exists with other entities, and the defendant
takes advantage of the relationship to perpetrate or conceal the offense.” Id. at
837–38 (quotation omitted). “Since the primary concern of § 3B1.3 is to penalize
defendants who take advantage of a position that provides them freedom to
commit or conceal a difficult-to-detect wrong, only such a defendant whose
position enables or significantly facilitates the offense is eligible for this
enhancement.” Id. at 838 (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted).
“The determination of whether a defendant occupied a position of trust is
extremely fact sensitive.” Britt, 388 F.3d at 1372. We have held that
a security guard who stole money being transported in an armored car
he was hired to protect did not hold a position of trust with his employer
because he had very little discretion in performing his duty as a security
guard, and he was closely, albeit not constantly, supervised by his
employer. The money he guarded was processed . . . upon delivery, and
any discrepancy between the money received and delivered would
be—and was—noticed.
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Id. (quotation omitted). A food service foreman who smuggled drugs into the
prison where he worked did not hold a position of trust “because holding
otherwise would extend [the application of § 3B1.3] to virtually every
employment situation because employers ‘trust’ their employees.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
The district court erred by enhancing Thompson’s sentence for abuse of
trust.1 As a waitress, Thompson did not have professional or managerial
discretion, other deference, or less supervision; rather, she had little discretion in
the execution of her duties as a server. Her position is more akin to a bank teller,
hotel clerk, or security guard who steals money from his armored car. Although
Thompson’s employer and customers trusted her not to steal credit card
information, that trust alone does not create a fiduciary relationship or provide her
position as a waitress with the “freedom to commit or conceal a difficult-to-detect
wrong.” See Garrison, 133 F.3d at 838. Therefore, the district court erred by
imposing the two-level enhancement for abuse of trust.
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Post-Booker, the district court is still required to calculate the Guidelines range accurately.
United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
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B. Booker
Thompson preserved her Booker objection by objecting on Blakely v.
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), grounds to the district court’s imposition of
the abuse-of-trust enhancement. See United States v. Dowling, 403 F.3d 1242,
1246 (11th Cir. 2005). When a defendant preserves her objection, we review the
sentence de novo. United States v. Paz, 405 F.3d 946, 948 (11th Cir. 2005). We
will reverse the district court only if the error was harmful. Id.
The Government concedes the district court committed Booker error, and
that error was not harmless. We agree. The district court committed constitutional
Booker error by sentencing Thompson based on facts not admitted by her or
proven beyond a reasonable doubt under a mandatory guidelines system. See
United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 73
U.S.L.W. 3730 (2005). This error is not harmless because the Government cannot
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the sentence,
and the record does not reveal any such evidence. See Paz, 405 F.3d at 948
(stating a constitutional error is harmless when it is clear beyond a reasonable
doubt the error did not contribute to the sentence imposed).
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II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we vacate and remand with instructions that the district court
calculate an Guidelines advisory range that does not include the abuse of trust
enhancement. On remand, the district court is required to sentence Thompson
according to Booker, considering the Guidelines advisory range and “other
statutory concerns as well, see [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) (Supp. 2004).” Booker, 125
S. Ct. at 757.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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