In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-17-00351-CV
___________________________
IN THE MATTER OF T.R.
On Appeal from the 323rd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 323-103805-16
Before Kerr, Pittman, and Birdwell, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Under a plea agreement, the juvenile court adjudicated then-15-year-old T.R.
delinquent for committing two counts of aggravated robbery and assessed an eight-
year determinate sentence probated for eight years. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 53.045(a)(7) (West Supp. 2017), § 54.03 (West 2014), § 54.04 (West Supp. 2017); see
also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03 (West 2011). Less than six months later, the State
moved to modify the disposition because T.R. had violated the terms and conditions
of her probation. Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted the State’s motion
and modified the disposition to commit T.R. to the Texas Juvenile Justice
Department for a determinate-sentence period of eight years with a possible transfer
to the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05 (West Supp. 2017). T.R. has appealed from the juvenile
court’s judgment and commitment order.
T.R.’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief in which he states that he has
reviewed the record and believes the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief—filed
without a motion to withdraw—meets the requirements of Anders v. California by
presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no
arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967); In re D.A.S.,
973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (holding that Anders procedures
apply to juvenile appeals).
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Appellant’s counsel mailed T.R. a copy of the Anders brief along with a letter
notifying T.R. of her right to file a pro se response to that brief. We also notified T.R.
and her grandmother (T.R.’s guardian) by mail of the right to respond to counsel’s
Anders brief. T.R. wrote back stating that she wanted to appeal the juvenile court’s
judgment and made several “statements” in support. We then provided her a copy of
the record and gave her the opportunity to file an additional pro se response. T.R. did
not respond further, and the State declined to file a brief.
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files an Anders brief on the
ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the Anders requirements, we must
independently examine the record. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1995, no pet.). When analyzing whether any grounds for appeal exist, we consider the
record, the Anders brief, and any pro se response. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403,
408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief, T.R.’s letter, and the appellate
record. In the course of our review, we have found a statutory reference in the
commitment order that needs to be modified: that order states that T.R. is
“committed to the care, custody, and control of the TEXAS JUVENILE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT in accordance with Article 61.084, V.A.T.H.R.C. . . . .” Because that
statute was amended and redesignated as human resources code section 245.151, we
modify the commitment order by deleting “Article 61.084, V.A.T.H.R.C.” and
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replacing it with “Texas Human Resources Code Section 245.151.” See Act of May 19,
2011, 82d Leg., ch. 85, § 1.007, sec. 245.151, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws, 366, 427 (codified
at Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 245.151 (West 2017)). We otherwise agree with T.R.’s
counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit, and we find nothing in
the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,
827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re K.B., No. 02-11-00097-CV, 2012 WL 1868518,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). We thus affirm the
juvenile court’s judgment and the commitment order as modified. 1
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Delivered: September 27, 2018
1
As noted, T.R.’s counsel did not file a motion to withdraw with his Anders
brief. In his brief, counsel explicitly stated that he was not moving to withdraw,
recognizing that we have extended the reasoning of In re P.M., a termination-of-
parental-rights appeal, to Anders appeals in juvenile cases. In re A.H., 530 S.W.3d 715,
717 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.); see In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 26–27 (Tex.
2016) (order). When, as in this case, the trial court finds a child’s family indigent and
appoints counsel, that counsel must continue to represent the child “until the case is
terminated, the family retains an attorney, or a new attorney is appointed by the juvenile
court.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.101 (West Supp. 2017) (emphasis added); see A.H.,
530 S.W.3d at 717. As counsel has recognized, the record in this case does not show
that either of the latter two events has occurred, and this case has not “terminated”
because not all appeals have been exhausted. See A.H., 530 S.W.3d at 717 (citing P.M.,
530 S.W.3d at 26 & n.5, 27). As counsel knows, he has a continuing duty to represent
T.R. until he has exhausted all appellate proceedings, including possibly filing a
petition for review in the supreme court. See In re D.T., No. 02-17-00061-CV,
2017 WL 2806323, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 29, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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