Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 3, 2018.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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Nos. 3D17-633 & 3D17-293
Lower Tribunal Nos. 14-2520B, 14-4014C,
15-6, 15-1878A & 15-2741B
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U.T., a juvenile,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Angelica D. Zayas,
Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Billie Jan Goldstein, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Keri T. Joseph, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Before LAGOA, LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.
SCALES, J.
U.T., a juvenile, appeals two contempt orders and respective sentencings,
entered on January 17, 2017, in which the trial court found that U.T. committed
indirect contempt of court by his repeated violations of home detention orders.
Because the trial court did not violate the statutory blueprint of chapter 985 of the
Florida Statutes, as it relates to a juvenile who has been committed to the care and
custody of the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”), we affirm.
I. Relevant Facts and Procedural Background
On February 3, 2016, the trial court found U.T., then age fourteen,
delinquent in five cases, involving the charges of petit theft (twice), strong arm
robbery, burglary and resisting an officer with violence. Pursuant to section
985.441(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, the trial court committed U.T. to DJJ at a
“minimum risk nonresidential” restrictiveness level.1 Under the terms of the
commitment, U.T. would live at home with his mother and attend a day treatment
program at AMIkids Miami-Dade (“AMI”).
U.T.’s behavior problems persisted after his commitment to DJJ. He stopped
attending the AMI program. He was arrested again in May of 2016, on a new
charge of grand theft (lower court case number J16-1474). At a pivotal hearing on
June 20, 2016 – a docket sounding on U.T’s new criminal charge – DJJ requested
that the trial court place U.T. on home detention with an electronic monitor around
1 See § 985.03(44)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016).
2
his ankle. The trial court agreed to this procedure with the idea that once U.T.’s
daily life became stable the electronic ankle monitor could be removed. At this
hearing, the trial court asked U.T.’s counsel whether there was any reason the court
should not impose home detention on U.T. U.T.’s defense counsel offered no
objection. The trial court also set August 1, 2016, as the trial date on the grand
theft charge. During the summer of 2016, however, U.T.’s behavior worsened.
From June 20, 2016 through August 1, 2016, U.T. routinely violated his
home detention by leaving home. On July 5, 2016, U.T. cut off the electronic ankle
monitor and went missing for almost a month. U.T. was back in court on August 1,
2016, and, again with no objection from U.T.’s counsel, the trial court entered a
second home detention order, again with electronic monitoring.2 At this hearing,
the trial court warned U.T. that U.T. could be held in contempt of court if U.T.
continued violating court orders. Because U.T.’s family living situation was
unstable, the trial court urged U.T.’s mother to establish a structured living
environment for U.T., either at home or in another place, and to determine whether
AMI would allow U.T. to return to its day treatment program.
The trial court’s admonitions proved unsuccessful. From August 1, 2016
through September 7, 2016, U.T. continued to violate the August 1, 2016 detention
2 Although the trial court had set August 1, 2016, as the date of trial on U.T.’s
outstanding grand theft charge, the trial did not occur on this date. The State
entered a nolle prosequi on this charge on October 25, 2016, after the victim and a
witness failed to appear.
3
order. Notwithstanding U.T.’s ungovernable behavior, at no time did DJJ hold an
administrative transfer hearing pursuant to section 985.441(4) of the Florida
Statutes. Rather, DJJ continued to file affidavits of violation for U.T.’s ongoing
violations of the trial court’s home detention orders; and, for the violations that
occurred after August 1, 2016, these affidavits included a request that the trial
court find U.T. in contempt and place U.T. in secure detention.
The trial court responded to these affidavits by entering a September 9, 2016
order directing U.T. to show cause why he should not be held in indirect criminal
contempt for twelve alleged violations of the trial court’s prior orders. On
September 13, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on the contempt charges
and found U.T. guilty of ten of the twelve charges. While the trial court deferred
sentencing, the court, at the end of the hearing, admonished U.T. to follow the
rules associated with the previously ordered home detention.
Yet, in the days after the September 13th hearing, U.T. committed additional
home detention violations and, on October 7, 2016, U.T. picked up additional
criminal charges of burglary, grand theft and resisting an officer without violence
(lower court case number J16-2574).3 This behavior caused the trial court, on
October 11, 2016, to issue a second show cause order alleging five additional
3 On November 18, 2016, in yet another incident, U.T. was charged with battery
(lower court case number J16-2946). On February 22, 2017, the trial court found
U.T. delinquent in both J16-2574 (for the lesser included offense of petit theft
only) and J16-2946.
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violations of prior court orders. On October 28, 2016, the trial court started, but did
not conclude, both (i) the deferred sentencing hearing based on the findings of the
September 13th contempt hearing, and (ii) the second indirect contempt trial based
on the trial court’s October 11th show cause order. These proceedings continued
on January 9, 2017, and the trial court ultimately found U.T. guilty of three of the
five charges alleged in the October 11th show cause order.
At the conclusion of the January 9, 2017 hearing, the trial court entered a
Judgment of Guilt-Contempt, memorializing its adjudication of the September 9,
2016 show cause order (from which the trial court found U.T. guilty of ten
violations). In this order, the trial court sentenced U.T. to one hundred forty days
of secure detention; however, factoring concurrent sentences for two of the ten
counts, the net sentence for these violations amounted to one hundred twenty-five
days. U.T. timely appealed this judgment (case number 3D17-293).
In its judgment adjudicating its second show cause order (involving the
October 11, 2016 show cause order where the trial court found U.T. guilty of three
additional violations), the trial court sentenced U.T. to twenty days of secure
detention to run concurrently with the secure detention sentence related to the
September 9, 2016 show cause order. U.T. timely appealed this judgment (case
number 3D17-633). We granted U.T.’s motion to consolidate his two appeals.4
4 While not relevant to the issues in this appeal, we note that, while U.T. was
serving his sentence for contempt, he pleaded guilty in three open delinquency
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II. Analysis
A. Introduction
On appeal, U.T. asserts that, because U.T. had been “committed” to DJJ
pursuant to section 985.441(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, U.T.’s only disciplinary
remedy was for DJJ to conduct a transfer hearing pursuant to section 985.441(4).
U.T. argues that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to enter the two home
detention orders, and that the resulting contempt findings were therefore unlawful.
U.T. further asserts that the alleged error – entering the home detention orders
without the requisite statutory authority – is “jurisdictional” in nature, so as not to
require any contemporary objections. Because we conclude that the subject home
detention orders were authorized by the relevant provision of Chapter 985, we
affirm on this basis, and therefore, do not reach U.T.’s argument that the alleged
error can be raised for the first time on appeal.
B. Commitment Provisions of Chapter 985
At a disposition hearing on February 3, 2016, the trial court committed U.T.
to the care and custody of DJJ for a “Minimum Risk Non-Residential Program.”
From that point forward, U.T’s treatment and anticipated rehabilitation were
cases, and the parties agreed that U.T. would be placed on a waiting list for
commitment to a high-risk residential facility. Because U.T. would not be
transported to this facility until his contempt sentence was complete, U.T.
requested that the trial court mitigate his sentence. The trial court denied this
request, but directed DJJ to advise the court when and if a placement at a high-risk
residential facility became available during U.T.’s contempt sentence.
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governed by the provisions of chapter 985. Specifically, U.T.’s commitment was
authorized by section 985.441(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2016).5 The general
terms and conditions of commitment are outlined in section 985.455(3) of the
Florida Statutes (2016).
If commitment does not succeed in rehabilitating a child, DJJ may invoke an
administrative “transfer” option to find another facility or program to address the
child’s ongoing behavior problems. § 985.441(4), Fla. Stat. (2016). The trial court
may agree to the transfer or hold a hearing to review the proposed transfer. Id. In
this case, DJJ did not seek to transfer U.T. to another program after U.T. failed to
attend AMI on a regular basis. U.T. argues that, because DJJ sought and obtained
home detention of U.T., rather than a transfer to another rehabilitative program, the
5 The statute reads in relevant part:
(1) The court that has jurisdiction of an adjudicated delinquent child
may . . .
....
(b) Commit the child to the department at a restrictiveness level
defined in s. 985.03. Such commitment must be for the purpose of
exercising active control over the child, including, but not limited to,
custody, care, training, monitoring for substance abuse, electronic
monitoring, and treatment of the child and release of the child from
residential commitment into the community in a postcommitment
nonresidential conditional release program.
§ 985.441(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016).
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trial court violated chapter 985’s commitment protocol when it complied with
DJJ’s request. Concomitantly, U.T. argues that because the goal of chapter 985 is
the rehabilitation of a committed child, rather than punishment, the trial court’s
contempt orders violated the spirit of chapter 985.
C. Nonsecure detention provisions of Chapter 985
Chapter 985 does not give explicit instruction as to whether a court may
place a committed child in secure or nonsecure detention. When U.T. appeared
before the trial court on June 20, 2016, for a docket sounding on his new felony
charge (J16-1474), however, he was not merely a child committed to DJJ’s care.
U.T. was also a juvenile facing a new grand theft charge. At this June 20, 2016
hearing, the trial court placed U.T. on home detention and ordered that he wear an
electronic ankle monitor. Home detention, a form of nonsecure detention, is
defined in section 985.03(18). “Detention care” means “the temporary care of a
child in secure or nonsecure detention, pending a court adjudication or disposition.
. . .” § 985.03(18), Fla. Stat. (2016). In relevant part, this statutory provision
defines “nonsecure detention” as:
. . . temporary, non-secure custody of the child while the child is
released to the custody of the parent, guardian, or custodian in a
physically nonrestrictive environment under the supervision of the
department staff pending adjudication, disposition or placement.
Forms of nonsecure detention include, but are not limited to, home
detention, electronic monitoring. . . . Nonsecure detention may
include other requirements imposed by the court.”
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§ 985.03(18)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016).
When the trial court conducted this June 20, 2016 hearing, U.T. was
“pending a court adjudication” on the new felony charge. On August 1, 2016,
when the trial court extended U.T.’s home detention due to repeated violations of
the June 20 home detention order (including U.T.’s cutting off his electronic ankle
monitor), U.T. was still “pending a court adjudication” in that felony case. In fact,
case J16-1474 did not resolve until October 25, 2016, when the State dropped the
charge; and U.T. was “pending a court adjudication” in two additional cases (J16-
2574 and J16-2946) until those cases were disposed on February 22, 2017, when
the trial court found U.T. delinquent in both cases.
Section 985.03(18) does not exclude the placement of a committed child
such as U.T. from detention care, and U.T. has provided us with no authority for
the proposition that the nonsecure detention expressly authorized by section
985.03(18)(b) is unavailable for juveniles who, like U.T., are also “committed” to
DJJ. We read the plain and unambiguous language of section 985.03(18)(b) to
authorize a trial court to order home detention to a committed child who has
incurred a new criminal charge for which adjudication is pending. See DMB Inv.
Tr. v. Islamorada, Vill. of Islands, 225 So. 3d 312, 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (giving
fresh expression to the well-established rule that, where a statute is plain and
unambiguous, there is no occasion to resort to statutory interpretation).6
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III. Conclusion
U.T.’s repeated violations of trial court home detention orders were the
source of the two judgments holding U.T. in indirect contempt of court. Chapter
985 grants the trial court contempt powers over a juvenile for violation of court
orders. § 985.037, Fla. Stat. (2016). Because we conclude that the trial court’s
home detention orders – requiring U.T. to serve home detention with an electronic
ankle monitor – were authorized by Section 985.03(18)(b), we affirm the findings
of contempt and sentencing that resulted from U.T.’s violation of such orders.
Affirmed.
6 In 2018, the Florida Legislature amended section 985.03(18) to change
“nonsecure detention” to “supervised release,” eliminating home detention as a
type of custody for a child subject to supervised release. Ch. 2018-86, § 2, Laws of
Fla. Because the effective date of this amendment is July 1, 2019, this change has
no effect on our adjudication.
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