Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC18-1247
____________
JOSE ANTONIO JIMENEZ,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
____________
No. SC18-1321
____________
JOSE ANTONIO JIMENEZ,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
October 4, 2018
PER CURIAM.
Jose Antonio Jimenez, a prisoner under sentence of death and an active
death warrant, has filed two appeals in this Court since Governor Scott signed his
death warrant on July 18, 2018. Collectively, Jimenez appeals the postconviction
court’s orders summarily denying his fifth and sixth successive motions for
postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, the
postconviction court’s order denying his motion to amend his sixth successive
postconviction motion, and the postconviction court’s order denying his motion to
correct illegal sentence filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons below, we
affirm the denials of all four motions and lift the stay of execution entered on
August 10, 2018.
BACKGROUND
On October 2, 1992, Jimenez beat and stabbed to death 63-year-old Phyllis
Minas in her home in Dade County, Florida. Jimenez v. State, 703 So. 2d 437, 438
(Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1123 (1998). Jimenez’s jury found him guilty
of burglary with an assault and battery in an occupied dwelling and first-degree
murder, and he was subsequently sentenced to death for the murder consistent with
his penalty phase jury’s unanimous recommendation. Id. We previously described
the facts of the incident as follows:
During the attack [Minas’s] neighbors heard her cry, “Oh God! Oh
my God!” and tried to enter her apartment through the unlocked front
door. Jimenez slammed the door shut, locked the locks on the door,
and fled the apartment by exiting onto the bedroom balcony, crossing
over to a neighbor’s balcony and then dropping to the ground. Rescue
workers arrived several minutes after Jimenez inflicted the wounds,
and Minas was still alive. After changing his clothes and cleaning
-2-
himself up, Jimenez spoke to neighbors in the hallway and asked one
of them if he could use her telephone to call a cab.
Jimenez’s fingerprint matched the one lifted from the interior
surface of the front door to Minas’s apartment, and the police arrested
him three days later at his parents’ home in Miami Beach.
Id. We upheld Jimenez’s convictions and sentence of death on direct appeal, and
they became final in 1998 when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Id. at 442; Jimenez v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1123 (1998).
Since then, Jimenez has engaged in extensive litigation in both state and
federal court, none of which has resulted in relief from his convictions or sentence
of death. As relevant to the claims raised in these proceedings, in 2001, we upheld
the denial of Jimenez’s initial postconviction motion. Jimenez v. State, 810 So. 2d
511, 513 (Fla. 2001). Thereafter, we affirmed the denial of Jimenez’s first
successive postconviction motion, which Jimenez filed in April 2005. Jimenez v.
State, 997 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 2008). Additionally, Jimenez sought relief in federal
court pursuant to a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the district court denied
relief, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied Jimenez’s request for a
certificate of appealability. Jimenez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 481 F.3d 1337, 1340-
41 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1029 (2007).
-3-
Governor Scott signed Jimenez’s death warrant on July 18, 2018.1
Thereafter, Jimenez filed several requests for public records to numerous agencies,
including a request for additional public records pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.852(h)(3) to the City of North Miami Police Department
(NMPD), which was the agency that investigated the victim’s murder and, three
days later, arrested Jimenez. Collateral counsel had not “previously requested
public records” from NMPD (or any other agency), which is a prerequisite for a
request for additional records pursuant to rule 3.852(h)(3). See Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.852(h)(3); see also Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 511 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 441 (2017). NMPD had, however, more than 18 years before Jimenez’s
post-warrant records request, submitted records to the repository pursuant to the
provisions of rule 3.852(h) that apply to cases like Jimenez’s, in which the mandate
affirming the conviction and sentence of death was issued prior to rule 3.852’s
effective date of October 1, 1998. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(h)(1). Although
NMPD objected to and the postconviction court ultimately denied Jimenez’s public
records request to NMPD, NMPD sent its entire, unredacted file to the repository
as a courtesy before the postconviction court entered its denial order so that there
could be a comparison between it and NMPD’s prior submission. The repository
1. Jimenez’s execution was scheduled for 27 days later, on August 14, 2018,
but this Court subsequently stayed his execution.
-4-
received NMPD’s submission on July 25, 2018, and on July 30, 2018, Jimenez
obtained an order from the postconviction court allowing him to access those
records, even though they had not been redacted, subject to a prohibition against
releasing any confidential or exempt records without permission from the
postconviction court. The records repository began emailing Jimenez’s counsel the
records that same day and also sent Jimenez’s counsel a CD containing the records
(over 1,000 pages), which was received the next day, July 31, 2018.
During the same time period that Jimenez was reviewing NMPD’s post-
warrant records submission, he was also litigating in the postconviction court his
fifth successive postconviction motion and a motion to correct illegal sentence,
both of which Jimenez filed after the Governor signed his death warrant. After
holding a Huff2 hearing, the postconviction court summarily denied Jimenez’s fifth
successive postconviction motion and denied his motion to correct illegal sentence
on July 31, 2018. Jimenez appealed the denials to this Court on August 1, 2018.
On the same day, August 1, 2018, during their review of NMPD’s post-
warrant records submission, Jimenez’s counsel and his investigator saw
handwritten documents that they did not recognize. The investigator then traveled
to the repository to compare the 2018 submission against NMPD’s prior
submission, and Jimenez’s counsel ultimately confirmed that 81 pages of
2. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
-5-
handwritten records had not previously been disclosed. Jimenez’s counsel further
confirmed that there was no indication in NMPD’s prior submission that records
had been withheld or public records exemptions claimed.
On August 6, 2018, without first seeking leave from this Court’s post-
warrant scheduling order—which required all proceedings in the postconviction
court to be completed by July 31, 2018—Jimenez filed in the postconviction court
his sixth successive postconviction motion raising one claim with several
subclaims in which he argued that NMPD’s post-warrant records submission
includes newly discovered evidence that demonstrates Brady,3 Giglio,4 due
process, and discovery violations that singularly and cumulatively entitle him to
relief from his convictions and death sentence or, at minimum, an evidentiary
hearing. After the postconviction court held a Huff hearing, Jimenez sought to
amend his sixth successive postconviction motion to add a new subclaim as well as
additional allegations regarding other of his subclaims. On August 9, 2018, the
postconviction court denied Jimenez’s motion to amend and summarily denied his
sixth successive postconviction motion, stating in both denial orders that it would
not entertain rehearing.
3. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
-6-
On August 10, 2018, Jimenez appealed to this Court the summary denial of
his sixth successive postconviction motion and the denial of his motion to amend.
Thereafter, we stayed Jimenez’s execution and amended nunc pro tunc the July 31,
2018, deadline for completing proceedings before the postconviction court to the
date that they had actually been completed, August 10, 2018. In so doing, we
prohibited additional filings in the postconviction court by either party without
prior leave of this Court.
Presently pending before this Court are (1) Jimenez’s first post-warrant
appeal, in which Jimenez challenges the summary denial of his fifth successive
postconviction motion and the denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence; and
(2) Jimenez’s second post-warrant appeal, in which Jimenez challenges the
summary denial of his sixth successive postconviction motion and the denial of his
motion to amend. We address them in turn.
ANALYSIS
I. First Post-Warrant Appeal
A. Fifth Successive Postconviction Motion
In appealing the summary denial of his fifth successive postconviction
motion, Jimenez raises four claims: (1) that he was denied access to public records
necessary and relevant to framing and prosecuting his postconviction claims; (2)
that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that Florida’s use of
-7-
etomidate as the first of three drugs in its lethal injection procedure places him at
substantial risk of serious harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment and article I,
section 17 of the Florida Constitution; (3) that Florida’s continued use of a three-
drug protocol instead of a one-drug protocol constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in light of evolving standards of decency; and (4) that executing him
after he has spent more than 23 years on death row constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in light of evolving standards of decency. None of these claims
warrants relief.
(1) Public Records
Jimenez first challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his requests for
certain public records pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852(h)(3)
and (i),5 which he claims are necessary and relevant to framing and prosecuting his
5. “[R]ecords requests under Rule 3.852(h) are limited to persons and
agencies who were the recipients of a public records request at the time the
defendant began his or her postconviction odyssey; whereas, records requests
under Rule 3.852(i) must show how the requested records relate to a colorable
claim for postconviction relief and good cause as to why the public records request
was not made until after the death warrant was signed.” Hannon, 228 So. 3d at
511 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.852(i)(2)(C) (listing as one condition of the trial court’s ordering the production
of additional public records that “the additional public records sought are either
relevant to the subject matter of a proceeding under rule 3.851 or appear
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”); Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.852(k)(1) (limiting the scope of production “under any part of this rule,”
in pertinent part, to public records that are “either relevant to the subject matter of
the proceeding under rule 3.851 or are reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence”).
-8-
postconviction claims. “We review rulings on public records requests pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852 for abuse of discretion,” Hannon, 228
So. 3d at 511, and find none here.
Jimenez first argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his rule
3.852(h)(3) request to the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) on the ground
that “the records are overbroad, burdensome, and not related to a colorable claim.” 6
Jimenez relies on this Court’s decision in Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 201
(Fla. 2013), for the proposition that it is an abuse of discretion to deny an inmate
“his own inmate and medical records.” However, unlike Muhammad’s counsel,
who “had made previous requests for these records from the DOC, and [following
the signing of Muhammad’s death warrant] sought an update of his inmate and
medical files,” id., Jimenez’s collateral counsel had not previously requested public
records from DOC as required by the plain language of rule 3.852(h)(3).
6. Jimenez’s request to DOC states, in pertinent part, that
[t]he public records requested are for any files, records, reports,
letters, memoranda, notes, drafts and/or electronic mail in the
possession or control of [DOC] pertaining to Mr. Jimenez that were
received or produced by [DOC] since Mr. Jimenez’s previous request;
and or any documents that were, for any reason, not produced
previously.
-9-
Collateral counsel does not deny the absence of a prior records request to
DOC. Rather, he argues that rule 3.852 relieved him of that obligation because it
established the records repository. However, this argument is contrary to the plain
language of rule 3.852(h)(3), which limits the request for production of additional
public records under that subdivision to “a person or agency from which collateral
counsel has previously requested public records.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(h)(3); see
also Rolling v. State, 944 So. 2d 176, 181 (Fla. 2006) (“Because there is no
evidence in the record that Rolling has ever requested records from the Medical
Examiner’s Office or the Department of Corrections before his [post-warrant
request], we find that the trial court was correct in denying his claim without an
evidentiary hearing.”); Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66, 70 (Fla. 2000) (“The use [in
rule 3.852(h)(3)] of the past tense and such words and phrases as ‘requested,’
‘previously,’ ‘received,’ ‘produced,’ ‘previous request,’ and ‘produced previously’
are not happenstance.”).
Moreover, unlike the public records request at issue in Muhammad,
Jimenez’s request to DOC did not specifically identify the records requested, or
provide any context as to how those records were relevant to a potential, colorable
claim. Cf. Muhammad, 132 So. 3d at 201 (affirming the denial of “overly broad”
requests under rule 3.852(h)(3) that “did not clearly demonstrate how the records
were relevant to a colorable claim”). The record nevertheless shows that DOC
- 10 -
produced, as a courtesy, Jimenez’s medical and psychological records, which had
previously been produced to different counsel in 2015 in connection with
Jimenez’s clemency proceedings. While Jimenez argues that his inmate file might
reveal a basis to challenge his competency to be executed, even though Jimenez
acknowledged receipt of his medical and psychological records in the fifth
successive postconviction motion at issue, he did not allege that claim. Nor has he
explained how his inmate file would be relevant to the claims he did raise in his
motion, or the claims he subsequently raised in his sixth successive postconviction
motion discussed below. Cf. Sims, 753 So. 2d at 69 (explaining that rule 3.852 “is
a discovery rule for public records production ancillary to proceedings pursuant to
rules 3.850 and 3.851”).
On these facts, holding that the postconviction court abused its discretion in
denying Jimenez’s eleventh-hour request would be antithetical to the purpose of
rule 3.852(h)(3). See id. at 70 (explaining that rule 3.852(h)(3) is “not intended to
be a procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for records unrelated to a colorable
claim for postconviction relief” but rather “provide[s] for the production of public
records from persons and agencies who were the recipients of a public records
request at the time the defendant began his or her postconviction odyssey”).
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Jimenez’s request to
DOC pursuant to rule 3.852(h)(3).
- 11 -
We also find no abuse of discretion in the postconviction court’s denial of
requests for additional records from DOC, the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement (FDLE), and the District Eight Medical Examiner pursuant to rule
3.852(i), which Jimenez requested in support of his challenges to Florida’s current
lethal injection protocol. Specifically, although the postconviction court ordered
DOC and FDLE to produce checklists, logs, and documents memorializing the
execution of Eric Branch, Jimenez claims that the postconviction court erred by
denying his requests for records related to the selection of drugs, creation of the
protocol, alternatives to the current protocol, reasons for the recent changes that
have been made, including to the positioning of inmates in the death chamber and
the mitten-like coverings that are placed on their hands, and the records of three
other executions besides Branch’s using the current protocol (Mark James Asay,
Cary Michael Lambrix, and Patrick Hannon).
Recently, in finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of a similar request,
we explained that “[t]he current injection protocol was fully considered and
approved of in Asay VI,”7 and “production of records relating to lethal injection are
‘unlikely to lead to a colorable claim for relief [when] the challenge to the
constitutionality of lethal injection as currently administered in Florida has been
fully considered and rejected by the Court.’ ” Hannon, 228 So. 3d at 511-12
7. Asay v. State (Asay VI), 224 So. 3d 695 (Fla. 2017).
- 12 -
(quoting Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 1014 (Fla. 2009)); see also Correll v.
State, 184 So. 3d 478, 492 (Fla. 2015) (holding public records request “for the
autopsy records of twenty-one inmates is not only unduly burdensome, but also
unlikely to lead to a colorable claim because the records would not establish when
the inmates became unconscious, or whether they experienced pain during their
executions”); Muhammad, 132 So. 3d at 203 (“[R]equests related to actions of
lethal injection personnel in past executions do not relate to a colorable claim
concerning future executions because there is a presumption that members of the
executive branch will perform their duties properly.”). We likewise find no abuse
of discretion here.
(2) Use of Etomidate
Jimenez next argues that the postconviction court erred in summarily
denying his claim that Florida’s use of etomidate as the first of three drugs in its
lethal injection procedure places him at substantial risk of serious harm in violation
of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17
of the Florida Constitution. We disagree.
Claims raised under rule 3.851 “ ‘may be summarily denied when they are
legally insufficient . . . or are positively refuted by the record.’ Because a
postconviction court’s decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule
3.851 motion is ultimately based on written materials before the court, its ruling is
- 13 -
tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo review.” Marek v. State,
8 So. 3d 1123, 1127 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Connor v. State, 979 So. 2d 852, 868
(Fla. 2007)). Further, “[c]onclusory and speculative allegations are insufficient to
warrant an [e]videntiary [h]earing.” Knight v. State, 923 So. 2d 387, 399 (Fla.
2005) (quoting order denying amended motion for postconviction relief).
In Asay VI, we fully considered and approved of the current lethal injection
procedure, which replaced midazolam with etomidate as the first drug in the three-
drug protocol. In so doing, we held that competent, substantial evidence supported
the postconviction court’s finding after an evidentiary hearing that Asay had failed
to make the showing required to prevail on a method of execution challenge under
the Eighth Amendment pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2737 (2015). Asay VI, 224 So. 3d at 701 (“In
Glossip, the Supreme Court provided that a condemned prisoner must: (1) establish
that the method of execution presents a substantial and imminent risk that is sure or
very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering and (2) identify a known
and available alternative method of execution that entails a significantly less severe
risk of pain.”).
Jimenez argues that events that transpired during Eric Branch’s February
2018 execution constitute new evidence requiring reconsideration of the
- 14 -
constitutionality of lethal injection as currently administered in Florida.8
Specifically, Jimenez argues that screaming and body movements during Branch’s
execution show that Jimenez will experience severe pain on injection of the first
drug in the protocol—etomidate—and that etomidate may not render Jimenez fully
unconscious for the entire period of the execution, thereby placing him at
substantial risk of serious harm.
However, it is impossible to know whether Branch’s actions were in protest
of his execution or a reaction to etomidate, such as the “transient venous pain on
injection and transient skeletal movements, including myoclonus” recognized
among the “most frequent adverse reactions” in Asay VI, 224 So. 3d at 701.
Moreover, the record indicates that the required consciousness check was
performed before the subsequent administration of the second and third drugs.
8. In its order summarily denying relief on this claim, the postconviction
court explained the relevant facts from Branch’s execution:
Shortly before the execution process began, Branch gave a statement
calling Governor Rick Scott and Attorney General Bondi “cowards”
for failing to execute him in person. As the administration of the
etomidate commenced, Branch released a guttural yell or scream. He
then yelled out “murderers” three times. Branch’s legs were moving,
his head moved, and his body was shaking. He calmed down within a
minute. The appropriate consciousness check was performed before
the subsequent administration of the second and third drugs.
- 15 -
In sum, Jimenez’s speculative and conclusory allegations regarding Branch’s
execution are insufficient to require revisiting our holding in Asay VI approving the
constitutionality of lethal injection as currently administered in Florida over the
challenge that the use of etomidate as the first drug in the lethal injection protocol
presents a substantial risk of serious harm.9 Cf. Hannon, 228 So. 3d at 508-09
(affirming postconviction court’s summary denial of challenge to constitutionality
of the current lethal injection protocol approved in Asay VI where “Hannon
presented no new evidence that would require us to reconsider our recent approval
of the three-drug protocol”).
(3) Three-Drug Protocol
Jimenez next argues that Florida’s continued use of a three-drug protocol
instead of a one-drug protocol constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in light of
evolving standards of decency. However, “we have consistently rejected [the]
9. Jimenez could not prevail on his challenge to the current protocol in any
event because he has also failed to meet his burden under Glossip to “identify a
known and available alternative method of execution that entails a significantly
less severe risk of pain.” Asay VI, 224 So. 3d at 701 (citing Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at
2737). His proposed alternative—replacing the three-drug protocol with one drug,
pentobarbital or compounded pentobarbital—relies on a drug that is not readily
available and has been previously rejected by this Court as speculative. See id. at
702. To the extent Jimenez suggests switching back to midazolam, this Court
rejected the argument that the substitution of etomidate for midazolam violates the
Eighth Amendment in Asay VI. Finally, although Jimenez proposes switching
from lethal injection to nitrogen gas, his fifth successive postconviction motion
states that he “has not had adequate time to research and consult with an expert
about this method.”
- 16 -
challenge that the DOC should substitute the current three-drug protocol with a
one-drug protocol.” Hannon, 228 So. 3d at 509 (citing Asay VI, 224 So. 3d at 702;
Muhammad, 132 So. 3d at 196-97); see also Muhammad, 132 So. 3d at 197
(“Florida is not obligated to adopt an alternative method of execution without a
determination that Florida’s current three-drug protocol is unconstitutional.”).
Accordingly, the postconviction court properly denied this claim.
(4) Length of Time on Death Row
In his final claim in the appeal of the denial of his fifth successive
postconviction motion, Jimenez argues that, because he has spent over 23 years on
death row, adding his execution to that punishment constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in light of evolving standards of decency. We have consistently
rejected this argument and decline to recede from our long-standing precedent in
Jimenez’s case. See, e.g., Lambrix v. State, 217 So. 3d 977, 988 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 312 (2017) (denying relief on claim “that the totality of the
punishment the State has imposed on [the capital defendant], which now includes
not just execution, but also more than three decades of being on death row, violates
the Eighth Amendment” and citing numerous cases demonstrating that “[t]his
Court has consistently rejected this claim”). Accordingly, we affirm the
postconviction court’s denial of relief on this claim.
- 17 -
B. Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
Jimenez also appeals the postconviction court’s denial of his rule 3.800(a)
motion to correct illegal sentence.10 Jimenez argues that his life sentence for
burglary with an assault and battery in an occupied dwelling is illegal in light of
this Court’s decision in Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000), in which this
Court receded from the interpretation of the burglary statute that it had used to
affirm Jimenez’s burglary conviction on direct appeal. We previously denied
Jimenez relief pursuant to Delgado in affirming the denial of his initial
postconviction motion, see Jimenez, 810 So. 2d at 512-13, and we reject his
attempt to misuse rule 3.800(a) to revive arguments that are procedurally barred.
See also Jimenez, 481 F.3d at 1340, 1340, 1342-43 (denying Jimenez’s application
for a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s denial of his federal
habeas claim that this Court’s “refusal on collateral review to apply a subsequent
construction of the burglary statute to the conduct for which Jimenez was
convicted violated due process and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against the
arbitrary and capricious imposition of a death sentence” because the claim was
10. The standard of review is de novo. See Williams v. State, 235 So. 3d
962, 963 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (“The error to be corrected in a rule 3.800(a) motion
must be apparent from the face of the record. Johnson v. State, 60 So. 3d 1045,
1049 (Fla. 2011). Accordingly, such a motion cannot require an evidentiary
hearing. Id. As no evidentiary hearing is required or permitted, this Court is
presented with pure issues of law on appeal, and applies the de novo standard of
review.”).
- 18 -
procedurally barred and because, even without the procedural bar, “Jimenez did
not make a substantial showing that [this Court’s] refusal to apply retroactively an
interpretation of the burglary statute violated his constitutional rights”).
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief.
II. Second Post-Warrant Appeal
Jimenez’s second post-warrant appeal challenges the postconviction court’s
summary denial of his sixth successive postconviction motion, in which Jimenez
raised claims of Brady, Giglio, discovery, and due process violations arising from
alleged newly discovered evidence contained within 81 pages of investigatory and
trial preparation materials recently disclosed by NMPD. In addition, Jimenez
appeals the postconviction court’s denial of his motion to amend his sixth
successive postconviction motion to add a new subclaim and additional argument
regarding other of his subclaims. We address the motion to amend first, followed
by the sixth successive postconviction motion.
A. Motion to Amend
“[E]ven accepting for the sake of argument that the circuit court erred in
denying the motion [to amend], any such error would clearly be harmless.”
Zakrzewski v. State, No. SC11-1896, 115 So. 3d 1004 (Fla. Nov. 9, 2012) (table).
Jimenez’s claims are based upon written materials contained in NMPD’s post-
warrant records submission that “this Court is just as capable as the trial court of
- 19 -
assessing.” Johnson v. State, 44 So. 3d 51, 72 n.18 (Fla. 2010). As explained
below, even giving Jimenez the benefit of his proposed amendments, none of his
claims warrants relief. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Jimenez’s motion to
amend and find no error in the postconviction court’s refusal to allow rehearing for
claims that are conclusively refuted by the record and, thus, due to be summarily
denied.
B. Sixth Successive Postconviction Motion
Jimenez next appeals the postconviction court’s summary denial of his sixth
successive postconviction motion. Giving Jimenez the benefit of the additional
subclaim and arguments presented in his motion to amend, Jimenez raises the
following seven subclaims, which he alleges arise from records that were
previously undisclosed by NMPD: (1) handwritten detective notes of an interview
with Jimenez’s and the victim’s neighbor that occurred before the neighbor gave
her sworn, recorded statement evince a Brady violation; (2) handwritten detective
notes from an interview with Jimenez’s former girlfriend regarding her daughter’s
relationship with the victim evince a Brady violation; (3) handwritten notes by
NMPD Detectives Diecidue and Ojeda taken during their interview with Jimenez
on the day of his arrest evince Brady, Giglio, discovery, and due process
violations; (4) handwritten detective notes regarding, and correspondence from,
jailhouse informant Jeffrey Allen evince a Brady violation; (5) a fax coversheet
- 20 -
showing communication between NMPD and private investigator Steve Sessler on
October 16, 1992, evince a Brady violation; (6) handwritten detective notes
showing contact information for cab driver Anwar Ali and the content of a
September 1993 interview with Ali evince a Brady violation; and (7) handwritten
notes that appear to be trial preparation materials for Detective Ojeda evince a
Brady violation. Jimenez contends that, singularly and cumulatively, these alleged
violations entitle him to relief from his convictions and sentence of death, or at the
very least require an evidentiary hearing.
Before analyzing each of Jimenez’s subclaims, we address the standards that
govern our review.
Timeliness
Before this Court may reach the merits of any subclaim within Jimenez’s
sixth successive postconviction, he must first establish that it is timely. A rule
3.851 motion for postconviction relief must generally be filed within one year after
the judgment and sentence are finalized. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). A
motion filed after the expiration of this time period is procedurally barred unless
one of the following circumstances exists:
(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to
the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, or
(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not
established within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and
has been held to apply retroactively, or
- 21 -
(C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file the
motion.
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2).
Jimenez filed the sixth successive rule 3.851 motion at issue on August 6,
2018, well beyond the one-year time period limitation after his judgment and
sentence became final on May 18, 1998, when the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari. However, Jimenez argues that his motion is timely under rule
3.851 because the 81 pages of investigatory and trial preparation materials that
NMPD disclosed in response to Jimenez’s post-warrant public records request
constitute newly discovered evidence. “To be considered timely filed as newly
discovered evidence, the rule 3.851 motion was required to have been filed within
one year of the date upon which the claim became discoverable through due
diligence.” Jimenez, 997 So. 2d at 1064 (citing Mills v. State, 684 So. 2d 801, 804-
05 (Fla. 1996)).
If Jimenez is correct that the claims in his sixth successive postconviction
motion do, in fact, arise from newly discovered evidence (which, as addressed
below, they do not) and are, therefore, timely (which, as addressed below, they are
not), several standards nevertheless stand between Jimenez and the relief he seeks.
Brady
The first standard at issue in this appeal applies to Jimenez’s claims that
information contained in NMPD’s 2018 post-warrant disclosure shows violations
- 22 -
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), as well as the State’s discovery
obligations under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Brady requires the
State “to disclose material information within its possession or control that is
favorable to the defense.” Taylor v. State, 62 So. 3d 1101, 1114 (Fla. 2011). To
establish a Brady claim,
the defendant must demonstrate that (1) favorable evidence, either
exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently
suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material,
the defendant was prejudiced. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-
82 (1999); Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000). To meet the
materiality prong, the defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Way, 760 So. 2d
at 913 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. [667,] 682
[(1985))]. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine this Court’s confidence in the outcome. Id.; see also
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290. However, in making this determination, a
court cannot “simply discount[] the inculpatory evidence in light of
the undisclosed evidence and determin[e] if the remaining evidence is
sufficient.” Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 102 (Fla. 2011). “It is the
net effect of the evidence that must be assessed.” Jones v. State, 709
So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).
Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1258-59 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Mungin v.
State, 79 So. 3d 726, 734 (Fla. 2011)).
Furthermore, to assess materiality where more than one Brady violation is
alleged, pursuant to Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995),
[i]n making the materiality determination, a court must first
“evaluate the tendency and force of the undisclosed evidence item by
item” before separately “evaluat[ing] its cumulative effect.” See
[Kyles, 514 U.S.] at 436 n.10 (“We evaluate the tendency and force of
- 23 -
the undisclosed evidence item by item; there is no other way. We
evaluate its cumulative effect for purposes of materiality separately
and at the end of the discussion . . . .”). “Considering the undisclosed
evidence cumulatively means adding up the force of it all and
weighing it against the totality of the evidence that was introduced at
the trial.” Smith [v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.], 572 F.3d [1327,] 1334
[(11th Cir. 2009)]. “A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result
exists when the government’s evidentiary suppressions, viewed
cumulatively, undermine confidence in the guilty verdict.” Id. (citing
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 436 & n.10, 437).
Smith v. State, 235 So. 3d 265, 269 (Fla. 2017).
Jimenez also makes the related argument that the Brady violations he claims
are reflected in NMPD’s post-warrant disclosure show that the State failed to
comply with its discovery obligations. As this Court has explained, “when
discovery violations are proven in motions for postconviction relief[,] . . . [t]he test
for measuring the effect of the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, regardless
of whether such failure constitutes a discovery violation, is [the same that applies
to a Brady violation, namely] whether there is a reasonable probability that ‘had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.’ ” Duest v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1990) (quoting
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). Moreover, the defendant’s
“personal knowledge” of the evidence claimed to represent a Brady violation
“would in and of itself defeat his Brady claim, since by definition such evidence
would not have been unlawfully ‘suppressed’ by the State.” Gorham v. State, 494
So. 2d 211, 212 n.* (Fla. 1986).
- 24 -
Giglio
The next standard at issue applies to Jimenez’s claim that the State violated
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). “By contrast to an allegation of
suppression of evidence under Brady, a Giglio claim is based on the prosecutor’s
knowing presentation at trial of false testimony against the defendant.” Guzman v.
State, 868 So. 2d 498, 506 (Fla. 2003). To establish a Giglio violation,
“[A] defendant must show that: (1) the prosecutor presented or failed
to correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was
false; and (3) the false evidence was material.” Rhodes v. State, 986
So. 2d 501, 508-09 (Fla. 2008). As to the knowledge prong, in
Guzman . . . , [this Court has] clarified that Giglio is satisfied where
the lead detective testifies falsely at trial because the “knowledge of
the detective . . . is imputed to the prosecutor who tried the case.” Id.
at 505.
The materiality prong of Giglio is more defense-friendly than in
a Brady claim. See Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519, 532 (Fla. 2009)
(“[T]he standard applied under the third prong of the Giglio test is
more defense friendly than the test . . . applied to a violation under
Brady.”). While under Brady, evidence is material if a defendant can
show “a reasonable probability that . . . the result . . . would have been
different,” Way, 760 So. 2d at 913 (emphasis added), under Giglio, the
evidence is considered material simply “if there is any reasonable
possibility that it could have affected the jury’s verdict.” Rhodes, 986
So. 2d at 509 (emphasis added).
Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1259 (quoting Mungin, 79 So. 3d at 738).
Further, the cumulative analysis used to evaluate materiality under the Brady
standard also applies to Giglio claims. See Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d
1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Considering the undisclosed evidence cumulatively
means adding up the force of it all and weighing it against the totality of the
- 25 -
evidence that was introduced at the trial. That is the way a court decides if its
confidence in the guilty verdict is undermined where a suppressed-evidence type of
Brady claim is involved, or if the suppression was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt where a Giglio type of Brady claim is involved.”).
And, similar to the way in which a defendant’s personal knowledge of
information allegedly “suppressed” is fatal to a Brady claim, see Gorham, 494 So.
2d at 212 n.*, a Giglio claim “based on information that the defendant and defense
counsel had at the time of trial” is barred. Moore v. State, 132 So. 3d 718, 724
(Fla. 2013).
Due Process
Jimenez argues that the same new evidence within NMPD’s post-warrant
disclosure that he contends supports his Brady and Giglio claims also shows that
the State violated his right to due process by misleading both his defense counsel
and his jury. See Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1957) (holding that it
violates due process for a prosecutor to intentionally mislead the defense and jury
in a material way). In support of this argument, Jimenez relies primarily on Garcia
v. State, 622 So. 2d 1325, 1331 (Fla. 1993), in which this Court explained that,
“while the State is free to argue to the jury any theory of the crime that is
reasonably supported by the evidence, it may not subvert the truth-seeking function
of the trial by obtaining a conviction or sentence based on deliberate obfuscation of
- 26 -
relevant facts.” See also generally Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) (“A
rule thus declaring ‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,’ is not tenable in a
system constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process. . . . Prosecutors’
dishonest conduct or unwarranted concealment should attract no judicial
approbation.”); Johnson v. State, 44 So. 3d 51, 53 (Fla. 2010) (“[S]ociety’s search
for the truth is the polestar that guides all judicial inquiry, and when the State
knowingly presents false testimony or misleading argument to the court, the State
casts an impenetrable cloud over that polestar.”); Waterhouse v. State, 82 So. 3d
84, 104 n.11 (Fla. 2012) (“[A]ttorneys and judges should be able to rely upon the
veracity of a police report.”).
However, as with the other due-process-based claims (i.e., Brady and
Giglio), a defendant who knows that his jury is being misled cannot adopt an “I’ll
deal with it later” approach. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2); cf. also Ferrell v.
State, 29 So. 3d 959, 977 (Fla. 2010) (holding claim that “the State violated Giglio
when, during closing argument, the prosecutor misled the jury . . . actually presents
a substantive claim of improper closing argument, which should have been raised
on direct appeal, and is thus procedurally barred”).
Review of Summary Denial
Finally, Jimenez’s argument that the postconviction court should have
granted him an evidentiary hearing implicates the standard applicable to our review
- 27 -
of a summary denial. A postconviction motion may be summarily denied only
“[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is
entitled to no relief.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B), (h)(6); see also Parker v.
State, 904 So. 2d 370, 376 (Fla. 2005) (“As a general proposition, a defendant is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on any well-pled allegations in a motion for
postconviction relief unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a
particular claim is legally insufficient.”). “Because a postconviction court’s
decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is
ultimately based on written materials before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a
pure question of law, subject to de novo review.” Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d 1123,
1127 (Fla. 2009). In reviewing a trial court’s summary denial, “this Court must
accept the defendant’s allegations as true to the extent that they are not
conclusively refuted by the record.” Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081
(Fla. 2008). However, mere conclusory allegations do not warrant an evidentiary
hearing. Anderson v. State, 220 So. 3d 1133, 1142 (Fla. 2017); see also LeCroy v.
Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1998) (“[S]peculation and conjecture about
what . . . letters and notes and opinions and cryptic references may suggest is not
sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing, much less relief.”) (quoting trial
court’s order).
- 28 -
As explained below, application of these standards to Jimenez’s subclaims
makes clear that Jimenez is not entitled to relief on these claims.
(1) Virginia Taranco, the neighbor
In his first subclaim, Jimenez argues that the State committed a Brady
violation when it failed to disclose information with respect to the victim’s
neighbor, Virginia Taranco, who provided a taped, sworn statement following the
murder, was deposed prior to trial, and testified at trial. Jimenez claims that the
previously undisclosed notes reveal “a previously unknown interview of Ms.
Taranco before the taped statement began” during which Taranco exonerated
Jimenez by “saying that while she was at Ms. Minas’ door investigating the sounds
that she had heard, she observed Mr. Jimenez come down from the third floor . . .
while the assailant is still inside . . . [meaning that] Mr. Jimenez could not possibly
have been the assailant.” Contrary to Jimenez’s assertion, the fact that this
interview occurred was disclosed to Jimenez in discovery prior to trial, and the
notes reveal that Taranco recounted the relevant facts in the preliminary interview
exactly as she did in the taped interview, in her deposition, and at trial, which was
not exonerating.
The notes start with five lines that have an “X” marked over them and are
lined through. Those five lines, which form the basis for this subclaim, are plainly
legible despite the cross-through, and read:
- 29 -
Heard one bang, went to investigate
Heard second bang. While at door
observed [defendant] coming from Third Floor
was wearing no hat First observed on
ground Floor with baseball hat
The remainder of the detective’s notes reflect that the detective had Taranco restart
her account at the beginning, chronologically, from when she first observed
Jimenez on the ground floor, prior to the murder, and describe Taranco seeing
Jimenez coming down to the second floor (where the victim’s apartment was
located) from the third floor (where Jimenez’s apartment was located) when
Taranco was waiting for the police, not when she was at the victim’s door hearing
noises and seeing the victim’s door being pushed shut from the inside.
This subclaim is procedurally barred, as this evidence is not newly
discovered. The record establishes that Jimenez has known of the existence of
Taranco’s pre-interview since before trial because it was mentioned in her sworn
taped statement—a transcript of which was provided to trial counsel in discovery
and included in NMPD’s original submission to the records repository more than
18 years before the successive postconviction motion at issue was filed.11 Further
11. In the sworn taped statement of Taranco on October 7, 1992, Detective
Ojeda states that he and Detective Diecidue spoke with Taranco immediately prior
to beginning the taped interview. He said, “[W]e spoke to you natural before we
went on tape and interviewed you. And we spoke to you about the homicide and
what role you played in it on October 2nd.”
- 30 -
underscoring Jimenez’s knowledge that Taranco was interviewed before giving her
sworn taped statement, defense counsel expressly referenced the pre-interview at
trial during his cross-examination of Taranco. Although Jimenez claims that he
was not aware that the page of handwritten notes existed, he was already aware of
the information contained in the page of notes, as none of it is new or previously
unknown information inconsistent with Taranco’s sworn statement or her trial
testimony.
Even if this subclaim were not procedurally barred, it is without merit. The
first prong under Brady is not satisfied because this allegedly suppressed
information is neither exculpatory nor impeaching. The crossed-out lines describe
Taranco hearing two bangs, investigating the noises, standing at the victim’s door,
and two encounters with the defendant, without any mention of how much time
passed between these events. These lines of notes do not reveal any facts that are
inconsistent with the rest of the page of notes or with Taranco’s trial testimony,
which was that she saw Jimenez twice on the evening of the victim’s murder.
First, Taranco testified that she saw Jimenez in the parking lot at approximately
7:55 p.m. Second, Taranco testified that she saw Jimenez coming down the stairs
to the second floor from the third floor somewhere between 8:20 and 8:22 p.m.,
after she had already called the police, which Taranco testified was at least 10 to
15 minutes after she heard the noises coming from inside the victim’s apartment.
- 31 -
The crossed-out lines of the notes do not show that Jimenez was with Taranco at
the victim’s door while the attack was ongoing inside the victim’s apartment,
which would be exculpatory. Rather, these lines are almost identical to Taranco’s
trial testimony since hearing two bangs and observing Jimenez coming from the
third floor while Taranco stood at the victim’s door is consistent with the events
and timeline articulated at trial.12
Accordingly, because this subclaim is both procedurally barred and without
merit we affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial.
(2) Yvette Imhoff, Jimenez’s former girlfriend
Jimenez next argues that the State committed a Brady violation when it
failed to disclose information with respect to a phone interview of Jimenez’s
former live-in girlfriend, Yvette Imhoff. The State allegedly failed to provide a
page of handwritten notes from an October 7, 1992, telephonic interview between
Detective Ojeda and Imhoff. The page of notes contains a sentence that states,
“Phyllis became friends w/ daughter.” Imhoff did not testify at trial, but the
12. Besides Detective Ojeda, Taranco is the only other person implicated by
Jimenez’s claims who testified at trial. Jimenez’s frequent use of the phrase
“Giglio/Brady claims” in his briefs filed in this Court, coupled with his argument
that the notes from Taranco’s pre-interview may be true while her trial testimony
may not be, makes it unclear whether Jimenez is also arguing that the notes
demonstrate that the State knowingly presented false testimony by Taranco in
violation of Giglio. To the extent Jimenez is making this claim, because the notes
do not show that Taranco’s trial testimony was false, they do not evince a Giglio
violation. See Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1259.
- 32 -
written report by Detective Ojeda regarding his interview with Imhoff (which was
previously disclosed) states that, in response to his question as to whether Jimenez
or Imhoff ever knew the victim, Imhoff stated that she knew that her daughter had
become friends with a lady downstairs, but that her daughter never mentioned her
name. Jimenez claims that the sentence in the notes is newly discovered evidence
that the person whom Imhoff’s daughter became friends with was the victim and is
Brady material because it is exculpatory. He asserts that the fact that the victim
had a friendship with Jimenez’s former girlfriend’s daughter, and that Jimenez
knew about it, shows that Jimenez had a positive relationship with the victim and
that he had been inside her apartment on occasion—which explains his fingerprint
on the inside of the victim’s front door.
This subclaim is procedurally barred. Detective Ojeda’s previously
disclosed report expressly mentions the phone interview and the fact that Imhoff
stated that her daughter had made friends with a lady downstairs. Moreover,
Imhoff’s statement was not without context, as Detective Ojeda’s report plainly
states that Imhoff gave this answer in response to his question of whether either
she or Jimenez ever knew the victim. To the extent it is not clear from the context
that the report’s reference to a “lady downstairs” is in reference to the victim, with
due diligence, Jimenez could have followed up years ago and discovered this
information. In any event, if Jimenez had a good relationship with the victim and
- 33 -
had been inside the victim’s apartment on previous occasions, this would not be
newly discovered evidence because Jimenez would have known it all along. Cf.
Jimenez, 997 So. 2d at 1068 (concluding that “[t]he presence of Jimenez inside [the
victim’s] unit on other occasions is necessarily based on his own personal
knowledge of his actions,” which is not “newly discovered evidence”).
Even without the procedural bar, however, the subclaim is without merit.
The first prong under Brady is not satisfied because this allegedly suppressed
information is not exculpatory. The handwritten sentence relied upon by Jimenez
does not provide any information regarding whether Jimenez actually knew that his
former girlfriend’s daughter had befriended the victim. Nor does it show that
Jimenez had any relationship with the victim whatsoever, let alone a good
relationship. Moreover, the sentence does not relate in any way to the allegation
that Jimenez had been inside the victim’s apartment on other occasions, prior to the
victim’s murder. Nor does the sentence have any impeachment value. Imhoff did
not testify at trial. Moreover, Detective Ojeda did not testify regarding his
interview with Imhoff. Nor is Detective Ojeda’s report from Imhoff’s interview, in
which it was clear that he was asking Imhoff about any contact that she or Jimenez
had with the victim, viewed through the lens of his notes, which expressly
references the victim’s name, impeaching in the sense that it shows NMPD’s
- 34 -
investigation was not a search for the truth. Accordingly, there was not a Brady
violation.13 We affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial of this subclaim.
(3) Jimenez’s Statements to Detectives Diecidue and Ojeda
In his third subclaim, Jimenez argues that NMPD’s post-warrant disclosure
of notes taken by Detectives Diecidue and Ojeda during their interview of Jimenez
on the day of his arrest establish Brady, Giglio, discovery, and due process
violations that entitle him to relief from his convictions and sentence of death, or,
minimally, to an evidentiary hearing. This subclaim is procedurally barred and, in
any event, without merit.
The notes at issue indicate that they were taken during an interview of
Jimenez by Detective Diecidue at 2:50 p.m. on an unspecified date and during an
interview of Jimenez by Detective Ojeda at 3:55 p.m. on an unspecified date,
13. In this subclaim, Jimenez points out that the notes regarding Imhoff’s
interview also contain the phrase “wh/van unk span/male.” However, beyond
referencing this fact in a footnote in his motion below, Jimenez did not argue how
this note entitles him to relief, and it is still not clear whether or how he contends it
does. Nevertheless, that Jimenez knew of the existence of and, thus, had the ability
to follow up on the presence of a white van in connection with this case is clear
from a review of the trial transcript. A police officer (Officer Cardona) had been
assigned to investigate a white van seen in the parking complex of the apartment
near the victim’s balcony, and, although this officer did not testify at trial, she
wrote a report and gave a deposition about her investigation. Further, at trial,
testimony regarding a white van being parked under the victim’s balcony ranged
from witnesses who saw the van, witnesses who said they did not see it, and
witnesses who were alleged to have made inconsistent statements as to whether
they saw it or not. This is not newly discovered evidence.
- 35 -
which Jimenez argues was October 5, 1992, as his arrest occurred at approximately
3:55 p.m. on that date. The notes suggest that Jimenez told Detective Diecidue that
he knocked on the victim’s door at approximately 7:00 p.m. on the evening of the
murder to use her phone, but that she was using the phone, and that he later used a
phone to call a cab at approximately 8:00 p.m., went downstairs to meet the cab,
and saw the police. The notes also indicate that Jimenez talked to Detective Ojeda
about the various residents of the apartment complex, telling him which residents
lived in which apartments; disclosed that he had a “problem” with one of his
neighbors (not the victim) because of “music”; and told Detective Ojeda what he
was wearing on the day of the murder.14
Jimenez’s claim is procedurally barred. The fact that these statements were
made by Jimenez and the fact that the detectives took notes while Jimenez made
them is not newly discovered evidence because Jimenez necessarily had personal
knowledge of these facts and because the detectives generally disclosed the
substance of the conversations that occurred prior to Jimenez invoking his rights
14. Detective Ojeda’s notes also reference the time of 8:00 p.m., a cab, and
“Vig,” which Jimenez suggests is shorthand for “Virginia.” Testimony at trial
showed that Jimenez used his neighbor Virginia Taranco’s phone to call a taxi after
Taranco had called the police upon becoming concerned for the victim’s welfare.
- 36 -
under Miranda.15 See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2); cf. Jimenez, 997 So. 2d at
1068.
Moreover, even without the procedural bar, Jimenez would not be entitled to
relief on the merits. Although the record reveals that, despite being asked during
their pre-trial depositions, both detectives failed to disclose the full content of
Jimenez’s statements to them (and also failed to document the full substance of
those statements in their reports),16 Jimenez has failed to establish Brady’s third
prong of materiality. There is no reasonable probability that had the jury heard the
information contained in the detectives’ notes the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Jimenez’s cooperation or lack thereof was not a feature of the
State’s case, and the value of Jimenez’s statements concerning his interaction with
the victim is limited. They do not show a close relationship between Jimenez and
the victim or put Jimenez inside the victim’s apartment in a position to leave his
fingerprint on the inside of the victim’s front door at any time other than during the
murder when witnesses testified that the door was pushed shut and locked from the
15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. The applicable discovery rule did not require the State to provide the
detectives’ notes to Jimenez. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(B). However,
because these notes show the substance of statements made orally by Jimenez, the
defendant, the State did have a discovery obligation to reveal their contents,
regardless of whether they constitute Brady material or evince a Giglio or other
due-process violation. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(C).
- 37 -
inside around the same time as another witness identified Jimenez dropping down
from a balcony beside the victim’s balcony. Adding up the force of the
information concerning Jimenez’s alleged cooperation with law enforcement and
his statements concerning innocent contact with the victim or her apartment and
weighing it against the totality of the evidence that was introduced at the trial, there
is no reasonable probability of a different outcome. Our confidence in the outcome
is not undermined. See Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1258-59.
Nor has Jimenez proven a Giglio or due process violation. In his initial
brief, Jimenez contends that “the lies and misrepresentations by Detectives Ojeda
and Diecidue in their pretrial deposition testimony and in their police reports
violated due process and amounted to a Giglio violation” and demonstrate that the
State obscured relevant facts in order to obtain his convictions and sentence. We
disagree.
Jimenez’s allegations of false testimony and misleading argument by the
State implicate Giglio’s prohibition against the State’s knowing presentation of
false testimony, to the extent that false testimony was actually presented at trial.
See Jimenez, 997 So. 2d at 1070 (explaining that “supposed false testimony” that is
“not presented during the trial . . . cannot form the basis for a Giglio claim”). To
the extent Jimenez’s allegation that the State obscured the relevant facts to obtain
his convictions and sentence are based on the State’s arguments during his trial,
- 38 -
they implicate the due-process protection against the State’s misleading the jury (or
the court). See Ferrell, 29 So. 3d at 977 (concluding that the claim that “the State
violated Giglio when, during closing argument, the prosecutor misled the jury . . .
actually presents a substantive claim of improper closing argument”); see also
Evans v. State, 177 So. 3d 1219, 1234 (Fla. 2015) (explaining that a preserved
challenge to the prosecutor’s improper closing arguments is reviewed for harmless
error); Garcia, 622 So. 2d at 1331 (“[W]hile the State is free to argue to the jury
any theory of the crime that is reasonably supported by the evidence, it may not
subvert the truth-seeking function of the trial by obtaining a conviction or sentence
based on deliberate obfuscation of relevant facts.”). Regardless of how the claim is
classified, however, assuming, as we do here, that there is no preservation issue or
other procedural bar, entitlement to relief is measured by whether the knowing
presentation of false testimony or misleading argument was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Guzman, 941 So. 2d at 1050 (explaining that “the test of
materiality under Giglio. . . . is the same as the harmless error test,” which
“requires the State to prove that there is no reasonable possibility that the error
contributed to the conviction”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mosley,
209 So. 3d at 1259 (“[U]nder Giglio, the evidence is considered material simply if
there is any reasonable possibility that it could have affected the jury’s verdict.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
- 39 -
Here, while the detectives only revealed that they received “basic
information” from Jimenez in their reports and depositions, meaning that the State
necessarily failed to disclose the full substance of Jimenez’s oral statements, it is
clear that no false testimony was presented at trial. Only Detective Ojeda testified
at trial, and he did not testify about Jimenez’s cooperation or lack thereof with
police during his interview. In fact, Detective Ojeda did not testify to any
statements Jimenez made during his interview based on the State’s agreement in
connection with Jimenez’s motion to suppress any statements made during that
interview. Thus, because no testimony was presented at trial on these subjects,
there is no Giglio violation. See Jimenez, 997 So. 2d at 1070 (explaining that
“supposed false testimony” that is “not presented during the trial . . . cannot form
the basis for a Giglio claim”).
Assuming, arguendo, that any argument by the prosecutor at trial was
misleading in light of Jimenez’s statements to detectives that might evince his
cooperation with law enforcement or innocent contact with the victim or her
apartment, Jimenez would still not be entitled to relief.
Considering the cumulative effect of what Jimenez contends was misleading
argument in light of the totality of the evidence introduced at trial, there is no
reasonable possibility that the force of any misleading argument by the State
concerning Jimenez’s alleged cooperation with law enforcement—which was not a
- 40 -
feature at trial—added to the force of any misleading argument by the State
concerning Jimenez’s innocent contact with the victim or her apartment—where
there was no evidence that Jimenez, even by his own statement, ever actually used
the victim’s phone or was otherwise ever in the position to innocently leave his
fingerprint on the inside of the victim’s front door—could have affected the jury’s
verdict. See Smith, 572 F.3d at 1334.
Thus, even if Jimenez’s subclaim regarding the recently disclosed detective
notes of his interview by NMPD detectives were not procedurally barred, he would
not be entitled to relief on the merits. Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction
court’s summary denial of this subclaim.
(4) Inmate Jeffrey Allen
Jimenez next argues that NMPD’s 2018 records submission shows that the
State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose information with respect
to Jeffrey Allen. Allen is an inmate who was housed with and who informed upon
Jimenez but who did not testify against Jimenez at trial. See Jimenez, 997 So. 2d at
1071. The State allegedly failed to provide handwritten notes from a March 15,
1993, interview between Detective Diecidue and Allen; a February 8, 1993, phone
message from Allen for “Pearce”; a note from Detective Ojeda dated February 9 of
an unspecified year indicating that he “spoke with” Allen; and multiple pages of
handwritten letters from Allen. Jimenez alleges that these documents indicate that
- 41 -
Allen was acting as a state agent when incarcerated with Jimenez in violation of
the Sixth Amendment, before the March 15, 1993, date that Detective Diecidue
stated in a 1995 deposition was his first and only contact with Allen. Jimenez
claims that these notes and letters constitute Brady material because they could
have been used to impeach Detective Diecidue. Jimenez also argues that the
documents can be used as impeachment evidence to show that the investigation
was not a search for truth.
This subclaim is procedurally barred. The State previously disclosed a
report by Detective Diecidue reflecting that, prior to his March 15, 1993,
interview, “Allen had called several times and advised that he had information
relating to this investigation.” Further, Jimenez’s former counsel deposed Allen on
March 11, 1998, at which time Allen stated that he had written notes and several
letters about his knowledge of the murder and given them to Detectives Ojeda and
Diecidue. At this deposition, Allen stated that he met with the detectives more
than once and also referenced phone calls with them. Collateral counsel could
have made a specific public records request to NMPD to obtain Allen’s letters and
notes but did not do so, and in any event, the police reports in this case describe the
information that Allen provided to the detectives. There is thus no new evidence
that was unavailable to Jimenez by the exercise of due diligence.
- 42 -
Even without the procedural bar, this subclaim is without merit. The first
prong under Brady is not satisfied because this information is not impeaching.
Defense counsel could not have used these documents at trial for impeachment as
evidence of prior inconsistent statements, because neither Allen nor Detective
Diecidue testified at trial, and Detective Ojeda did not mention Allen in his trial
testimony. Nor could the documents have been used at trial to impeach Detective
Ojeda for bias or to impeach the caliber of the police investigation, because they do
not contain information that shows partiality on the part of the police department.
Nor is the information exculpatory, as Allen’s status as a jailhouse informant for
the State and unilateral communication attempting to benefit from that status have
no bearing on the guilt or innocence of Jimenez, and Allen did not testify at trial.
Accordingly, there was not a Brady violation. We affirm the postconviction
court’s summary denial of this subclaim.
(5) Steve Sessler, the private investigator
Jimenez’s next subclaim concerns a fax coversheet contained in NMPD’s
post-warrant records disclosure that shows contact between law enforcement and a
private investigator named Steve Sessler on October 16, 1992 (14 days after the
victim’s murder). Jimenez raised a related claim in 2005, in his first successive
postconviction motion, concerning NMPD’s collaboration with Sessler. Prior to
the 1992 Minas murder at issue here, Sessler had investigated Jimenez in
- 43 -
connection with the October 1990 death of Marie Debas. Sessler had been hired
by Debas’s boyfriend, Manuel Calderon, whom Jimenez alleged was a member of
a drug cartel and had a vendetta against him because Jimenez previously had an
affair with Debas.17 In Jimenez’s 2005 motion, he alleged that the State had
committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose that Sessler provided NMPD
with information he had gathered in connection with the Debas case, which
Jimenez alleged caused NMPD to unfairly target him for the Minas murder.
This Court affirmed the denial of Jimenez’s 2005 claim, concluding that it
was procedurally barred because it was not based on newly discovered evidence:
[I]t had long been common knowledge that the North Miami Police
Department was given information that originated from the
investigation orchestrated by Calderon. . . . [W]hen Jimenez’s trial
counsel deposed Detective Diecidue on December 13, 1995, he
confirmed that Sessler had provided him with information concerning
Jimenez’s possible involvement in the death of Debas while the
investigation for the murder of Minas was ongoing.
Jimenez, 997 So. 2d at 1069. Additionally, this Court concluded that, even if the
claim were not procedurally barred, it would be without merit because Jimenez
could not establish the materiality prong of a Brady claim:
If evidence of Calderon’s influence had been presented during the
trial, this would have opened the door to potentially damaging
evidence concerning Jimenez’s involvement in the death of Debas.
17. After Jimenez’s convictions and sentence in this case, Jimenez pled
guilty to the second-degree murder of Debas, whose death had been ruled an
accidental drug overdose before Sessler’s involvement.
- 44 -
Thus, there is not a reasonable probability that if this information with
regard to the influence of Calderon had been disclosed to Jimenez, the
jury would have reached an alternative verdict.
Id. at 1070 (concluding, further, that Jimenez’s Giglio claim relating to Calderon’s
influence was “without merit” because the “supposed false testimony was not
presented during the trial, so it cannot form the basis for a Giglio claim”).
Jimenez’s present claim adds only that he has discovered within NMPD’s
2018 records submission a fax coversheet showing that Sessler communicated with
NMPD on October 16, 1992, two weeks into the investigation of the Minas
murder. Jimenez asserts that this communication shows the influence of Sessler
and Calderon on the investigation very early in the case. This is not new evidence.
Accordingly, this claim is procedurally barred. It also fails on the merits for the
reason that this Court previously articulated in affirming the denial of the Brady
and Giglio claims related to Sessler that Jimenez raised in his first successive
postconviction motion filed in 2005. See id. at 1069-70. Accordingly, we affirm
the postconviction court’s summary denial of this subclaim.
(6) Anwar Ali, the cab driver
Jimenez also claims that NMPD’s post-warrant disclosure contains new
Brady material related to Anwar Ali, the cab driver who responded to Jimenez’s
call for a taxi on the night of the victim’s murder but who never picked up Jimenez
and, instead, picked up a man with a bleeding face several minutes and blocks
- 45 -
away from the apartment complex where the victim was murdered. The
postconviction court properly summarily denied this claim, which is procedurally
barred and without merit.
In affirming the denial of Jimenez’s first successive postconviction motion,
this Court found procedurally barred, and alternatively meritless, Jimenez’s claim
that the State had committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose that it had
repeatedly attempted to get Ali to identify Jimenez as the man with the bleeding
face, even though Ali said the man was not Jimenez, essentially harassing him, and
that these efforts had resulted in Ali’s refusal to involve himself in this case
further. Jimenez, 997 So. 2d at 1064-65.
In the claim at issue here, Jimenez does not suggest that NMPD’s disclosure
goes to the substance of the testimony that Ali would have had to offer had he
testified at trial, namely “that he picked up a person, who stated that he had been
mugged and was bleeding from the face, approximately sixteen blocks from the
crime scene and approximately thirty minutes after the murder.” Id. at 1065.
Rather, Jimenez claims that NMPD’s failure to provide him, before trial, with Ali’s
address and phone number—which NMPD’s recent disclosure indicates it had—at
a time when Jimenez was trying to secure Ali’s trial testimony is new evidence that
amounts to a Brady violation. Jimenez further argues that law enforcement’s
- 46 -
deceit with respect to the handling of Ali is new evidence of valuable impeachment
because it shows the investigation was not a search for the truth.
Jimenez’s arguments are procedurally barred. That NMPD had Ali’s contact
information is not new evidence. Although Jimenez was unsuccessful in his
attempt to subpoena Ali to testify at trial, there is plentiful evidence establishing
that, with the exercise of due diligence, the defense could have contacted Ali. For
example, defense counsel knew that the State had been able to contact Ali, as
defense counsel extensively questioned both Detectives Ojeda and Diecidue about
Ali during their respective pre-trial depositions. Further, during Detective Ojeda’s
deposition, defense counsel informed Detective Ojeda about statements regarding
picking up a man with a bleeding face that Ali had allegedly made to an
investigator for the defense (who also clearly had contact with Ali), and Detective
Ojeda stated that he was going to follow up. With the exercise of due diligence,
defense counsel could have, too.
The fact that Detective Diecidue wrote down Ali’s name and phone number
is also not new evidence since Jimenez knew that the detective had been in contact
with Ali. While Jimenez claims that this notation reflects that Detective Diecidue
interviewed Ali but chose not to take notes because the information Ali provided
was favorable to Jimenez, the notes do not indicate that they are from an interview
with Ali. But, even accepting for the sake of argument that Jimenez is correct, this
- 47 -
is also not new evidence. If it actually occurred, whatever impeachment value
Detective Diecidue’s decision to document only a name and number may have had
is part and parcel of the impeachment value inherent in Detective Diecidue’s “lost”
report of Ali’s interview discussed by both Detectives Diecidue and Ojeda in their
pre-trial depositions, which is not new because Jimenez has known about the “lost”
report since 1993.
Similarly, although Jimenez argues that Detective Ojeda never disclosed that
he had an interview with Ali, the recently disclosed notes suggest that Detective
Ojeda followed up with Ali after his July 1993 deposition, just as he told defense
counsel at the deposition he was going to do.18 The notes are consistent with the
information the State previously disclosed to Jimenez and with other information
that it is clear from Detective Ojeda’s deposition Jimenez already had and, in fact,
alerted the State to (i.e., Ali’s description of encountering the man with the
bleeding face). Thus, these notes are not new evidence.
Finally, even without the procedural bar, Ali’s testimony would not have
been exculpatory or impeaching as required to establish the first prong of Brady for
18. Although Detective Ojeda’s notes do not include the year, they identify
the month as September. Because the victim was murdered in October of 1992, an
interview in September in connection with the murder investigation would
necessarily have had to have occurred at least a year after the victim’s murder, in
September 1993, which also necessarily would have been after Detective Ojeda’s
July 1993 deposition.
- 48 -
the reasons we previously expressed. See Jimenez, 997 So. 2d at 1065 (explaining
that Ali’s account of picking up the man with the bleeding face blocks away from
the crime scene and thirty minutes after the victim’s murder “would not have
logically connected the person that he picked up in his cab to the murder” or
“impeach[ed] any of the evidence presented by the State during the trial”).
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial of this
subclaim.
(7) Detective Ojeda’s trial preparatory materials
Finally, Jimenez argues that an 11-page document that he claims was written
by the prosecutor to prepare for Detective Ojeda’s trial testimony, and which the
postconviction court denied Jimenez leave to address in his successive
postconviction motion, is new evidence of a Brady violation. Had his motion to
amend been granted, Jimenez would have argued that this document—which he
acknowledges is consistent with Detective Ojeda’s trial testimony—is undisclosed
impeachment evidence. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the
postconviction court should have granted Jimenez’s motion to amend, this claim is
both procedurally barred and conclusively refuted by the record. See Zakrzewski,
115 So. 3d 1004.
“[P]rosecutors are permitted to discuss testimony with witnesses . . . .”
Hartley v. State, 990 So. 2d 1008, 1015 (Fla. 2008). Although trial preparatory
- 49 -
materials that are exculpatory or impeaching because, for example, they “reveal[]
coaching by the prosecutor[, contain] conflicting accounts of the witness’s
testimony,” or “indicate any testimony contrary to that presented at trial” can give
rise to Brady claims, Tompkins v. State, 872 So. 2d 230, 239 (Fla. 2003), the
document at issue in this case is neither exculpatory nor impeaching. Rather, it
contains answers to questions that are consistent with Detective Ojeda’s reports
and deposition testimony, which were available to Jimenez before trial. Therefore,
it contains nothing new. Cf. Mills v. State, 507 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 1987) (“Our
examination does not show that the State put words in this witness’[s] mouth.
Even though some of the questions [the State provided to its witness] contained
answers to those questions, there is no evidence that these answers emanated from
any source other than the witness.”).
Furthermore, the record conclusively refutes Jimenez’s speculation of
nefarious intent on behalf of the State in terms of the prosecutor somehow working
with Detective Ojeda to keep information about a white van from the jury because
the word “out” was written in the margin next to questions regarding the van.
Before Detective Ojeda testified at trial, the prosecutor asked another NMPD
officer, Officer Sidd, a question concerning whether Officer Cardona’s
investigation of the white van led her to conclude that the individuals in the van
were not involved in the murder that is virtually identical to the question denoted
- 50 -
with the word “out” in the document at issue, and the trial court sustained defense
counsel’s objection. In other words, it was not the prosecutor but the trial court
that (properly) kept this (hearsay) testimony “out,” although the jury was permitted
to hear testimony from at least four witnesses, three of whom were law
enforcement officers, relating to the white van.
Accordingly, even if the recently disclosed document presents anything new,
on the merits, because the document is neither exculpatory nor impeaching, it fails
under the first prong of Brady.
In conclusion, all seven of the subclaims that Jimenez raised or sought to
raise in his sixth successive postconviction motion are procedurally barred and, in
any event, without merit. Although Jimenez argues that the postconviction court
did not properly consider the force of all of the Brady and Giglio violations
evinced in the new evidence when it assessed materiality, there is no newly
discovered evidence in NMPD’s post-warrant submission. Accordingly, all of
Jimenez’s claims are procedurally barred and due to be summarily denied on that
basis alone. To the extent our alternative merits analysis reached materiality for
the Brady violations alleged in Jimenez’s third and fifth subclaims, adding up the
force of Jimenez’s own statements—that do not place him in the position to
innocently leave his fingerprint on the inside of the victim’s front door or put him
cooperating with law enforcement in any way that mattered to the evidence
- 51 -
actually presented at trial—plus the force of a fax coversheet showing a
Sessler/Calderon connection to NMPD’s investigation of the victim’s murder—
that if introduced would open the door to damaging evidence concerning Jimenez’s
involvement in another person’s death—and weighing it against the totality of the
evidence introduced at trial, this evidence could not “reasonably be taken to put the
whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”
Smith, 235 So. 3d at 268-69 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435). Further, although
we alternatively reached materiality for the Giglio/due process argument Jimenez
raised in his third subclaim with respect to the State’s arguments concerning
Jimenez’s innocent contact with the victim or her apartment and his cooperation
with detectives during his interview, there are no additional instances of false
testimony or misleading argument to consider cumulatively with the materiality
analysis we already conducted for that subclaim. Jimenez is not entitled to relief,
singularly or cumulatively, on his allegations that NMPD’s post-warrant records
disclosure evinces Brady, Giglio, due process, and discovery violations.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, we affirm the postconviction court’s orders
summarily denying Jimenez’s fifth and sixth successive postconviction motions
pursuant to rule 3.851, the postconviction court’s order denying Jimenez’s motion
to correct illegal sentence pursuant to rule 3.800(a), and the postconviction court’s
- 52 -
order denying Jimenez’s motion to amend his sixth successive postconviction
motion. We further lift the stay of execution entered on August 10, 2018. No
rehearing will be entertained by this Court, and the mandate shall issue
immediately.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
QUINCE, J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that Jimenez is not entitled to relief on his second post-warrant
appeal regarding newly discovered evidence (No. SC18-1321). See majority op. at
19-52.19 However, I dissent from affirming the postconviction court’s denial of
Jimenez’s first post-warrant appeal regarding Florida’s lethal injection protocol
(No. SC18-1247). See majority op. at 7-17. For the reasons explained below, I
would reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on these claims.
19. As to the majority’s discussion of this issue, I reiterate the importance of
“express[ing] the prejudice prong of Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),] in
terms of a probability sufficient ‘to undermine confidence in the verdict’ and not a
reasonable probability of a different result.” Pittman v. State, 90 So. 3d 794, 822
(Fla. 2011) (Pariente, J., concurring in result) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 290 (1999)).
- 53 -
Florida’s Lethal Injection Protocol
For the fifth time since this Court’s decision in Asay VI,20 Florida will
execute a death-sentenced defendant using a lethal injection protocol that the
defendant argues is in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See majority op. at 13. Indeed, the majority relies on Asay VI to
deny Jimenez relief on these claims. See majority op. at 14-15. However, Jimenez
challenges Florida’s lethal injection protocol in light of new and troubling
information, specifically regarding Florida’s most recent execution, which, at the
very least, should be fully developed at an evidentiary hearing. I disagree with the
majority that Jimenez’s claims “are insufficient to require revisiting our holding in
Asay VI.” Majority op. at 16.
In my dissenting opinion in Asay VI, I explained that Asay was
unconstitutionally denied access to documents that may have supported his claim
that Florida’s new lethal injection protocol—which replaced midazolam with
etomidate as the first drug in the protocol, intended to induce unconsciousness—
violates the Eighth Amendment’s bar against cruel and unusual punishment. 224
So. 3d at 705-08 (Pariente, J., dissenting). Although Asay VI is now final, Jimenez
presents new, additional evidence from the executions Florida has performed since
that decision—Mark Asay on August 24, 2017, Michael Lambrix on October 6,
20. Asay v. State (Asay VI), 224 So. 3d 695 (Fla. 2017).
- 54 -
2017, Patrick Hannon on November 8, 2017, and Eric Branch on February 22,
2018—regarding the possibility that the lethal injection protocol subjects the
defendant to cruel and unusual punishment.
As to the administration of the first drug in the lethal injection protocol,
etomidate, the postconviction court wrote in its order denying Jimenez’s motion:
“As the administration of the etomidate commenced, Branch released a guttural
yell or scream. . . . Branch’s legs were moving, his head moved, and his body was
shaking.” Order, at 4.21 His body “continued to shake and his chest was heaving
for another four minutes.” Initial Br., at 38. The postconviction court noted and
the majority accepts that all of this took place “before the consciousness check was
performed before the subsequent administration of the second and third drugs.”
Order, at 4; majority op. at 15. Dr. Lubarsky, “an experienced anesthesiologist,”
Initial Br., at 29, opined that this was “indicative of insufficient anesthetic depth
prior to the administration of the second and third drugs.” Id. at 38.
As to the second and third drugs, Jimenez alleges that—according to Dr.
Lubarsky’s review of Florida’s lethal injection protocol and records from Branch’s
execution—Branch had only “1/10th of the clinical dose of etomidate . . . in his
bloodstream” by the end of the execution process, an amount that is “insufficient to
21. The postconviction court’s Order Denying Successive Motion to Vacate
Judgments of Conviction & Sentence is cited herein as “Order.”
- 55 -
ensure that” he did “not feel the excruciating pain of the second and third
drugs.” Id. at 31. In Dr. Lubarsky’s opinion, Branch’s scream was “objective
evidence” of his “experiencing significant pain during [the] execution,” id. at 35—
not “in protest of his execution or a reaction to etomidate.” Majority op. at 15. Of
course, this information was unknown when this Court rejected Asay’s challenge
to the new lethal injection protocol.
In my view, this new information makes it impossible to allow another
execution to proceed without thoroughly reviewing whether Florida’s lethal
injection protocol subjects defendants to a substantial risk of pain, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Thus, I would reverse and remand for an evidentiary
hearing.
Further, I reiterate my long-standing concern that a one-drug protocol has a
greater likelihood of reducing any substantial risk of pain. Specifically, Florida’s
continued use of a paralytic agent, such as rocuronium bromide, could lead to a
situation where defendants like Jimenez are entirely aware of the execution,
including the attendant extreme pain and suffering, but unable to inform anyone of
or indicate such awareness. See Initial Br., at 49. I again urge the executive
branch to adopt a one-drug protocol to avoid this unconstitutional risk. See Asay
- 56 -
VI, 224 So. 3d at 705 (Pariente, J., dissenting) (quoting Schwab v. State, 973 So. 2d
427, 429 (Fla. 2007) (Pariente, J., concurring)).22
Short Warrant Period
Finally, I note the seriously constricted warrant period in this case. As the
majority explains, Governor Scott signed Jimenez’s death warrant on July 18,
2018, scheduling his execution for 27 days later—August 14, 2018. Majority op.
at 4 & n.1. The original scheduling order determined July 31, 2018, as the
“deadline for completing proceedings before the postconviction court.” Majority
op. at 7.
This extremely short warrant period created a fire drill approach to the
review of Jimenez’s claims. It was not until after the postconviction court denied
Jimenez’s sixth successive postconviction motion (filed on August 6, 2018) that
this Court entered a stay of execution. See majority op. at 6. The postconviction
court and Jimenez’s attorneys were forced to race against the clock in reviewing
and presenting all of Jimenez’s claims, respectively. But for this Court entering a
22. Indeed, it appears that many other states that still impose the death
penalty have adopted one-drug protocols. Eight states—Arizona, Georgia, Idaho,
Missouri, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington—have used a single-drug
method for executions. Six other states—Arkansas, California, Kentucky,
Louisiana, North Carolina, and Tennessee—have announced plans to use a one-
drug protocol. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., State by State Lethal Injection,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection (last visited Aug. 6, 2018).
- 57 -
stay of execution as a result of Jimenez’s second post-warrant appeal, this Court
would have also had inadequate time to thoroughly review his claims.
While I realize that all proceedings should be completed by the time the
Governor signs a death warrant, some claims, such as those challenging the
execution method, cannot be raised or evaluated until the signing of the death
warrant. At the least, defendants must have adequate time to investigate and raise
and courts must have adequate time to properly review these warrant-based claims.
Since executions resumed in Florida after Hurst, the judicial system—the
circuit courts, this Court, and the United States Supreme Court—has been faced
with increasingly short warrant periods, the shortest being the one in this case—a
mere 27 days.23 However, the Legislature—tasked with providing “the method,
the means, and the instrumentalities for executing death sentences imposed by the
courts pursuant to the law,” Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529, 543 (Fla. 2014)
(quoting Blitch v. Buchanan, 131 So. 151, 155 (Fla. 1930))—has determined that a
warrant period of 180 days is reasonable. See § 922.052(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018);
Abdool, 141 So. 3d at 544. Thus, I urge the Executive branch, in setting warrant
23. The warrant period for Asay’s execution was 52 days. Asay VI, 224 So.
3d at 699. The warrant period for Lambrix’s execution was 34 days. Lambrix v.
State, 227 So. 3d 112, 112 (Fla. 2017). The warrant period for Hannon’s execution
was 33 days. Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 508 (Fla. 2017). The warrant
period for Eric Branch’s execution was 34 days. Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981,
983-84 (Fla. 2018).
- 58 -
periods, to consider the judicial proceedings that must be completed before the date
of execution.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, while I agree that Jimenez is not entitled to relief on his
newly discovered evidence claims, I would reverse and remand for an evidentiary
hearing on his claims challenging Florida’s lethal injection protocol.
QUINCE, J., concurs.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County,
Richard L. Hersch, Judge - Case No. 131992CF0341560001XX
Martin J. McClain and Linda McDermott of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton
Manors, Florida,
for Appellant
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Lisa-Marie Lerner,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, and Melissa Roca Shaw,
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida,
for Appellee
- 59 -