J-A28041-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
VENDOR RESOURCES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MANAGEMENT,(VRM) DULY : PENNSYLVANIA
AUTHORIZED AGENT FOR THE :
SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 1704 EDA 2016
ANNETTE OAKLEY :
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order April 26, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): December Term, 2014 No. 1412-01394
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED OCTOBER 04, 2018
Appellant, Annette Oakley, Esq., appeals pro se from the Order
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denying her
Motion to Set Aside Consent Judgment in the Trial Worksheet1 and granting
the Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement filed by Appellee, Vendor
Resources Management, the duly authorized Agent of the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs. After careful review, we affirm.
We set forth the following factual and procedural history gleaned from
the certified record, the parties’ briefs, and the trial court’s Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) Opinion. On December 9, 2014, Appellee filed a Complaint against
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1 The Trial Worksheet memorialized the terms of the settlement agreement.
J-A28041-17
Appellant and any and all tenant occupants seeking their ejectment from
residential property located at 2015 S. 11th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19148
(the “Property”).2 Appellant filed preliminary objections, which the court
denied after Appellant filed an Answer with New Matter and a Counterclaim
to Appellee’s Complaint on March 9, 2015. Following many more months of
litigation of preliminary objections, and preliminary objections to preliminary
objections, the matter proceeded to a case management conference in April
2015. In October 2015, the court listed the case for a pre-trial conference.
Appellant failed to file a settlement memorandum as ordered and the court
imposed a monetary sanction. On February 1, 2016, the court scheduled
the matter for trial on February 16, 2016.
On February 16, 2016, pro se Appellant and counsel for Appellee had
discussions regarding settlement of the ejectment action. Appellant offered
the possibility of a relative purchasing the property; Appellee counter-
offered; and the parties reached an agreement. The parties informed the
court that they had reached a settlement, which the court directed
Appellee’s counsel to state on the record. The Agreement provided that
Appellant would vacate the property in 45 days, i.e., by April 1, 2016, and
that Appellee would pay $2,000 in relocation costs to Appellant upon
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2 The property was the subject of a 2010 mortgage foreclosure action in
which Appellant was the mortgagor. Appellee acquired the property in
January 2014 at a sheriff’s sale. The mortgage foreclosure is not part of this
Appeal.
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satisfactory final inspection of the property. Appellant also agreed to “an
immediate consent judgment for possession that cannot be executed until
after that 45-day period lapses if she remains in the property.” N.T.,
2/16/16, at 4-5. The parties also agreed to the mutual release for all past,
present and future claims. After Appellee relayed the terms of the
Settlement Agreement to the court on the record, the court confirmed with
Appellant that she agreed to the terms. Id. at 5. The court entered the
Trial Worksheet memorializing the agreement immediately after the hearing
and provided notice pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 236 that same day.
Appellant subsequently obtained counsel, and on March 24, 2016, she
filed a Motion to Set Aside the Trial Worksheet Entering a Consent
Judgment, alleging that Appellee made false representations upon which she
relied to her detriment.3 On April 15, 2016, Appellee filed an Answer to the
Motion to Set Aside and a Counter-Motion to enforce the Settlement
Agreement. On April 26, 2016, the trial court granted Appellee’s Motion to
Enforce the Settlement Agreement and denied Appellant’s Motion to Set
Aside the Settlement Agreement. Appellee filed a Praecipe for a Writ of
Possession, which the court clerk entered on May 19, 2016.
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3 Appellant alleged that she relied to her detriment during settlement
discussions prior to trial on the following: (1) Appellee had falsely
represented that Appellant’s Counterclaim had been stricken; and (2)
Appellee rejected her offer of a family member to purchase the property
based on a misrepresentation.
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On May 25, 2016, the day the Sheriff served Appellant with the Writ of
Possession, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
granting the Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. The next day, on
May 26, 2016, she filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court denied the Motion
for Reconsideration on June 7, 2016.4
Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in considering [Appellee’s]
Counter Motion to Enforce Settlement in response to
Appellant’s Motion to Set Aside the February 16, 2016
Trial Worksheet Entering Consent Judgment when
[Appellee’s] Counter Motion was filed two days after the
Response date without demonstrating good cause or
justice requires?
2. Whether the trial court erred in issuing its April 26,
2016 Order granting [Appellee’s] Counter Motion to
Enforce Settlement before the response period lapsed in
which Appellant could oppose?
3. Whether the trial court erred in ruling on disputed issues
of facts raised in [Appellee’s] Counter Motion to Enforce
Settlement without affording the Appellant the opportunity
to be heard?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
In her first two issues, Appellant does not raise substantive issues.
Rather, she asserts that the court should not have acted in light of
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4 On June 16, 2016, Appellant filed a Motion to Stay Writ of Execution. On
July 12, 2016, the trial court granted the Motion pending the issuance of a
decision by this Court in Appellant’s appeal.
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procedural defects. The applicability of our rules of civil procedure raises a
question of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of
review is plenary. Oswald v. WB Pub. Square Assocs., LLC, 80 A.3d 790,
793 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Pa.R.C.P. No. 126 provides:
The rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding to which they are applicable. The court at
every stage of any such action or proceeding may
disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not
affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Pa.R.C.P. 126.
“Under the doctrine of substantial compliance, the trial court may
‘overlook any procedural defect that does not prejudice a party's rights.’”
Green Acres Rehab. & Nursing Ctr. v. Sullivan, 113 A.3d 1261, 1272–73
(Pa. Super. 2015), quoting Womer v. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269, 276 (Pa.
2006) “[P]rocedural rules are not ends in themselves, and ... rigid
application of [the Rules] does not always serve the interest of fairness and
justice.” Id.
In her third issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not
affording her an opportunity to be heard prior to granting Appellee’s
Countermotion to Enforce Settlement before the expiration of the twenty-
day response period provided by Pa.R.C.P. No. 208.3(b) and the Philadephia
County Local Rule 208.3(b).
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Appellant cites no case, rule, or statute requiring that a court hold a
hearing prior to granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Our
research indicates that there is no mandate that a court hold an evidentiary
hearing on a motion to enforce settlement where, as here, there is no
dispute that an offer to settle was tendered, it was accepted, counsel had
the authority to act, and the record contains the terms of the settlement and
the parties’ acquiescence. See Christian v. Allstate Ins. Co., 502 A.2d
192, 194 (Pa. Super. 1985) (noting the need for an evidentiary hearing
where an insufficient record exists for appellate review of a settlement
agreement).
In her Rule 1925(a) Opinion, the Hon. Abbe F. Fletman concisely
addresses and analyzes each of Appellant’s issues with citation to the
certified record and application of relevant and dispositive case law. Our
review of the record, including the notes of testimony from the settlement
hearing, supports her well-reasoned analysis. Accordingly, we adopt the
trial court’s analysis as our own and affirm. See Tr. Ct. Op., dated Dec. 16,
2016, at 3-8 (finding: (1) Appellee’s response to Appellant’s Motion to Set
Aside Consent Judgment filed two days after the end of the response period
substantially complied with Pa.R.C.P. No. 208.3, and Appellant suffered no
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prejudice,5 id., at 3; (2) the court’s action in granting the Motion to Enforce
the Agreement prior to the passage of the twenty-day response period,
provided in Pa.R.C.P. No. 208.3(b) and Local Rule 208.3, did not prejudice
Appellant “in any way” as she “had an opportunity to make all her
arguments in her motion for reconsideration, which the court reviewed and
rejected,” id., at 4; (3) the court was not required to hold a hearing where
there was no factual dispute as to the existence of the Settlement
Agreement, and a court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on a
motion to enforce, id., at 5; (4) Appellant’s allegations of fraud were
insufficient to set aside the Settlement Agreement, and the alleged
misrepresentation was immaterial to the Settlement Agreement, id., at 5-6;
(5) the record reflects that Appellant, “a barred lawyer [who] is not an
unsophisticated party,” accepted the settlement agreement “freely and on
the record” and she does not dispute its existence, id., at 6; and (6)
Appellant’s “experience of anxiety and stress does not constitute duress
necessary to invalidate the [S]ettlement [A]greement as a matter of law”
and “[t]herefore, th[e] court did not err in deciding the motions without a
hearing, id. at 7.).
The parties are instructed to annex a copy of the trial court’s
December 16, 2016 Opinion to any future filings.
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5The court also noted that Appellant had filed her Motion to Set Aside the
Consent Judgment 17 days late.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/4/18
-8-
Circulated 08/27/2018 12:18 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRIAL DIVISION - CIVIL
VENDOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, et al.
DECEMBER TERM, 2014
c.•
NO. 01394
v.
1704 EDA 2016
OAKLEY, et al.
OPINION
This appeal arises from an order this Court entered on April 26, 2016, denying appellant
Annette Oakley's motion to set aside a settlement agreement and granting the motion toenforce
a settlement agreement of appellee Vendor Resource Management ("VRM"), an authorized agent
of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. This Court committed no error in entering the April 26,
2016 order, and the Superior Court should affirm its decision for the following reasons.
FACTS
On December 9, 2014, VRM filed the underlying civil complaint against appellant
Annette Oakley for ejectment from a property at 2015 S. 11th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19148 (the
"Property"). VRM obtained ownership of the Property through a sheriffs sale. The Sheriff's
Deed was delivered and recorded on August 6, 2016. (Ex. A to Complaint) The complaint named
Ms. Oakley as one of several possible occupants who lived in the Property without any legal
right to remain.
Ms. Oakley answered the complaint prose on April 9, 2016, and asserted a counterclaim
against VRM. Immediately before the matter was scheduled to proceed to trial on February 16,
2016, the parties informed the trial court that they had reached a settlement. The Court entered a
"Trial Work Sheet," reflecting that "Annette Oakley agrees to vacate the property by April 1st
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