NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 9 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RUBEN DARIO GARCIA, Jr., No. 17-55600
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00875-LAB-BGS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
R. BLAHNIK; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 4, 2018 2018**
Before: TROTT, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges
Ruben Dario Garcia, Jr., a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
retaliation related to his filing of grievances. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Cir. 2013). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Gordon v.
Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
Summary judgment was proper as to Garcia’s claims of retaliation based on
the Form 128-B General Chronos filed by Estes, Blahnik, and Canada because
Garcia failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the General
Chronos constituted an adverse action. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,
567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (defining elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim
in the prison context); see also Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221,
1231–32 (9th Cir. 2006) (retaliation plaintiff must prove that defendant took action
that “would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First
Amendment activities” (quoting Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cty., 192
F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir.1999))).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Garcia’s claims of
retaliation based on the filing of rules violation reports by Blahnik and Flores
because Garcia failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
filing of the reports failed to advance a legitimate correctional goal. See Brodheim
v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To prevail on a retaliation claim, a
prisoner must show that the alleged action ‘did not reasonably advance a legitimate
correctional goal.’” (quoting Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment as to Garcia’s claim
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of retaliation based on his removal from the Men’s Advisory Council because
Garcia failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his removal
failed to advance a legitimate correctional goal. See Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271.
Summary judgment was proper as to Garcia’s claims of retaliation against
various supervisors for their role in processing, approving, and screening of rules
violation reports, because Garcia failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether any of the supervisors’ actions were because of Garcia’s protected
conduct. See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
plaintiff must allege a causal connection between the adverse action and the
protected conduct.”). We reject as unsupported by the record Garcia’s contentions
against Seibel. Additionally, the district court properly granted summary judgment
as to Garcia’s claims of supervisory liability because Garcia failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether any supervisors were personally
involved in any alleged retaliation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th
Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability).
The district court correctly granted summary judgment as to Garcia’s
retaliation claim against Cariman for restraining and temporarily placing him in a
holding cell. Taking all inferences in Garcia’s favor, there is no genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Cariman acted without an appropriate purpose. Garcia
had previously interrupted the orderly process of the medication line and accused
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the nurse of endangering inmates’ health and safety. When he raised the same
objections on July 24, 2013, he created a similar disruption, causing Cariman to
remove him from the line. Cariman’s response to Garcia’s behavior was fitting
under the circumstances. As the district court noted, “Cariman’s ‘day-to-day’
decision to remove Garcia from the pill line is the type of call Sandin [v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)] says courts need to avoid second guessing. Instead, the
court should ‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to
manage a volatile environment.’” Garcia v. Blahnik, No. 14CV875-LAB (BGS),
2017 WL 1161225, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2017) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at
482). A medication line in a prison is undoubtedly a “volatile environment” which
cannot tolerate prisoner interference.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Garcia’s motion for
a third extension of time to file his opposition to defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. See Swoger v. Rare Coin Wholesalers, 803 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir.
2015) (setting forth standard of review).
We do not consider matters “not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in [the] opening brief.” See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20
v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.1985)).
AFFIRMED.
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