In the Matter of: Aa.P., T.B., Aj.B., K.B., At.P., and Az.B., Children Alleged to be in Need of Services S.B. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services, and Child Advocates, Inc. (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Oct 12 2018, 7:53 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court

the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Anna Onaitis Holden Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of: October 12, 2018

Aa.P., T.B., Aj.B., K.B., At.P., Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-JC-1168
and Az.B., Children Alleged to
be in Need of Services; Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
S.B. (Mother),
The Honorable Gary Chavers,
Appellant-Respondent, Judge Pro Tempore

v. The Honorable Marcia J. Ferree,
Magistrate

Indiana Department of Child Trial Court Cause Nos.
49D09-1712-JC-4012
Services, 49D09-1712-JC-4013
Appellee-Petitioner, 49D09-1712-JC-4014
49D09-1712-JC-4015
and 49D09-1712-JC-4016
49D09-1712-JC-4017

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JC-1168 | October 12, 2018 Page 1 of 7
 Child Advocates, Inc.,

Co-Appellee.

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case
[1] S.B. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s adjudication of her minor children,

Aa.P., T.B., Aj.B., K.B., At.P., and Az.B. (collectively “the Children”), as

children in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother raises one issue for our review,

namely, whether the trial court erred when it adjudicated the Children to be

CHINS.1

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[3] Mother has six children: Aa.P., born October 28, 2006; T.B., born October 19,

2009; Aj.B., born September 5, 2011; K.B., born July 8, 2015; At.P, born

February 25, 2016; and Az.B., born April 2, 2017. D.C. is the biological father

1
D.C. and T.W., the fathers of Az.B. and T.B., respectively, were respondents below but do not participate
in this appeal. A.P. is the father of the other four children and does not participate in this appeal.

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 of Az.B. On November 27, 2017, Officer Dominique Clark with the

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department “responded to a domestic call

along with a shots fired run” at Mother’s house in Indianapolis. Appellant’s

App. Vol. II at 194. When Officer Clark arrived, D.C. was not home, but

Mother told Officer Clark that “there had been an altercation about [D.C.]’s

cell phone” where D.C. “got out a gun, chased [Aa.P.] up the stairs and said he

would shoot out the televisions and blow out the windows.” Id. Mother then

told Officer Clark that D.C. “went outside and fired the gun.” Id. Mother also

stated that D.C. “choked her until she couldn’t breathe and she struggled and

fought to get him off of her.” Id. A few hours later, when D.C. returned to

Mother’s home, Mother called the police, and Officer Clark returned and

arrested D.C.

[4] On December 5, Jourdan Taylor, a Family Case Manager (“FCM”) with the

Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”), went to Mother’s house to

investigate the safety and well-being of the Children given the incident on

November 27 that led to D.C.’s arrest. Mother told Taylor that Mother and

D.C. had only gotten into “a small disagreement” on that date, “that there was

not a gun involved, and that none of the children were present at the time of the

altercation.” Id. at 195. Mother told Taylor that Mother would not get an

order of protection against D.C. “because there was not an altercation and that

she would not be pursuing any legal action” against D.C. Id. Mother admitted

to Taylor that Mother had previously been the victim of domestic violence

committed by A.P.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JC-1168 | October 12, 2018 Page 3 of 7
[5] On December 7, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were CHINS

because of the incident on November 27, and the trial court granted wardship of

the Children to DCS. Following a factfinding hearing on March 22, 2018, the

trial court concluded that the Children were CHINS. In particular, the court

found that each of the Children’s physical or mental condition was seriously

impaired or endangered as a result of Mother’s inability, refusal, and neglect to

provide the Children with a safe and stable home environment free from

domestic violence. The court found further that (1) the Children need a safe

and stable home environment that is free from domestic violence, which they

are unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the Court; and (2)

the Children need therapy which they are unlikely to receive without the

coercive intervention of the court. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision
[6] Mother contends that the trial court erred when it adjudicated the Children to

be CHINS. Our Supreme Court recently set out our standard of review:

When reviewing a trial court’s CHINS determination, we do not
reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. In re S.D., 2
N.E.3d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2014). “Instead, we consider only the
evidence that supports the trial court’s decision and [the]
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. at 1287 (citation,
brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). When a trial
court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and
conclusions law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We
consider, first, “whether the evidence supports the findings” and,
second, “whether the findings support the judgment.” Id.
(citation omitted). We will reverse a CHINS determination only

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 if it was clearly erroneous. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253
(Ind. 2012). A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do
not support the findings or “if it applies the wrong legal standard
to properly found facts.” Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262
(Ind. 1997) (citation omitted).

Gr. J. v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs. (In re D.J.), 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017)

(alterations in original).

[7] Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred when it

concluded that the Children need therapy which they are unlikely to receive

without the coercive intervention of the court. In particular, Mother asserts that

two of the trial court’s findings in support of that conclusion are erroneous, and

she asserts, generally, that the evidence does not support that conclusion. But

Mother ignores the trial court’s conclusion that the Children were also CHINS

because they need a safe and stable home environment that is free from

domestic violence, which they are unlikely to receive without the coercive

intervention of the court. Thus, Mother has waived this issue for our review.

[8] DCS alleged that the Children were CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section

31-34-1-1 (2018), which provides that a child is a child in need of services if,

before the child becomes eighteen years of age: (1) the child’s physical or

mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the

inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to

supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education,

or supervision; and (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted

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 without the coercive intervention of the court. Our Supreme Court has

interpreted this provision to require “three basic elements: that the parent’s

actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child’s needs

are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met

without State coercion.” J.B. v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child. Serv. (In re S.D.), 2 N.E.3d

1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014).

[9] Again, the trial court made conclusions under both prongs of Indiana Code

Section 31-34-1-1, including two independent conclusions under the second

prong. On appeal, Mother only challenges one of the court’s two conclusions

relevant to the second prong of the statute. Mother does not dispute that the

evidence supports the trial court’s conclusions both that (1) the physical or

mental condition of each of the Children was seriously impaired or endangered

as a result of Mother’s inability, refusal, and neglect to provide the Children

with a safe and stable home environment free from domestic violence; and (2)

that the Children need a safe and stable home environment that is free from

domestic violence, which they are unlikely to receive without the coercive

intervention of the court. Indeed, the undisputed evidence shows that, after she

initially reported the November 27, 2017, incident to Officer Clark, Mother

then recanted and failed to show up for D.C.’s trial, which led to the State’s

dismissal of all charges. Mother did not seek an order of protection and

continued to regularly see D.C. throughout the CHINS proceedings.

[10] It is well settled that a child’s exposure to domestic violence can support a

CHINS adjudication under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1. See N.L. v. Ind.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JC-1168 | October 12, 2018 Page 6 of 7
 Dep’t. of Child. Serv. (In re N.E.), 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010); see also M.P.

v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child. Serv. (In re D.P.), 72 N.E.3d 976, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)

(“[A] single incident of domestic violence in a child’s presence may support a

CHINS finding, and [the violence] need not necessarily be repetitive.”). Here,

DCS presented testimony regarding Mother’s “history of choosing partners that

are physically aggressive to herself and the [C]hildren,” as well as the trauma

that domestic violence can cause in children, which “could affect them as they

grow[.]” Tr. at 55-56. In light of the evidence most favorable to the judgment,

we cannot say that the trial court’s adjudication of the Children as CHINS is

clearly erroneous. As such, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[11] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

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