In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.K.M., Minor Child, and K.M., Mother v. Indiana Department of Child Services, and Child Advocates, Inc. (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Oct 12 2018, 6:20 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of and Tax Court

establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE DCS
Lisa M. Johnson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Brownsburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Kyle Hunter
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination of October 12, 2018
the Parent-Child Relationship of Court of Appeals Case No.
K.K.M., Minor Child, and K.M., 18A-JT-760
Mother, Appeal from the Marion Superior
Appellant-Respondent, Court
The Honorable Gary Chavers, Judge
v. Pro Tem
Indiana Department of Child Services, The Honorable Larry Bradley,
Magistrate
Appellee-Petitioner
Trial Court Cause No.
and 49D09-1705-JT-466

Child Advocates, Inc.,
Co-Appellee.

Brown, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-760 | October 12, 2018 Page 1 of 19
[1] K.M. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights

with respect to K.K.M. Mother raises two issues which we restate as whether

the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 8, 2016, K.K.M. was born, and Mother and baby tested positive for

cocaine. Mother, who was born on January 19, 1984, used cocaine “like once

every few months” from the time she was twenty-two years-old until K.K.M.’s

birth and, approximately a month before his birth, she “did it like maybe once a

week for a month.” Transcript Volume II at 8-9. On May 11, 2016, the

Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging K.K.M.

was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) and stating that Mother had

previously given birth to a drug-exposed infant, had a history with DCS and

was previously offered services through a CHINS action, and “continues to

demonstrate an inability to provide the child with a safe, drug-free home,”

despite prior services having been offered. Petitioner’s Exhibit 19. On May 12,

2016, the court held an initial hearing and issued its Order Regarding Children

in Need of Services Initial/Detention Hearing which indicates that Mother had

no objections to DCS’s recommendations because “she and grandmother have

a good relationship” and that DCS noted K.K.M. remained in relative care

with his maternal grandmother1 and requested continued placement and for

1
In her brief, Mother indicates that K.K.M. went home with his maternal grandmother when he left the
hospital on May 10, 2016.

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 authorization for foster care. Petitioner’s Exhibit 18A. The order, which

indicates that the family case manager states “this is Mother’s second

substance-positive infant and they would like to see a length of time of negative

screens before they recommend relative care supervision,” authorized Mother

to have supervised parenting time “contingent upon continued submission of

clean screens.” Id.

[3] On August 15, 2016, the court held a hearing on the CHINS petition, which

Mother did not attend, continued K.K.M.’s placement and adjudicated him to

be a CHINS, and found: Mother had three random drug screens and tested

positive for cocaine, alcohol, and hydrocodone on May 10, 2016, and for

alcohol on May 12, 2016, and May 25, 2016; Mother’s attorney withdrew due

to not having contact with her; and Mother had not had any parenting time

with K.K.M. On the same day, the court issued both a dispositional order and

a participation order. The latter required Mother to engage in home-based

therapy and case management and follow all recommendations, to complete a

substance abuse assessment and all treatment recommendations, and to submit

to random drug and alcohol screens.

[4] On May 1, 2017, the court held a permanency plan hearing, which Mother did

not attend, and found that she “has not participated in services and has been

discharged a couple of times” and that the family case manager met last week

with Mother who “acknowledged that she has not been engaged in services.”

Petitioner’s Exhibit 1.

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[5] On May 22, 2017, DCS filed its verified petition for involuntary termination of

Mother’s parental rights. On October 23, 2017, the court held a hearing, in

which Mother indicated that she continued using cocaine, marijuana, and

alcohol after K.K.M.’s birth “every day” until September of 2017; that she spent

“twenty bucks,” or “not much at all,” per week on drugs and alcohol; that she

was living at her brother’s home; that she was not currently working; that she

had a ten year-old child and a five year-old child who were in their father’s care;

and that she was in a car wreck “maybe six months ago” in which she was

driving her brother’s car and was under the influence of alcohol, cocaine, and

marijuana. Mother also stated that she had a criminal history related to her

drug use that included possession of marijuana and operating while intoxicated

that “was like six months ago”, and that she did not successfully complete the

services ordered by the court in the CHINS matter. Transcript Volume II at 11,

13-14. When counsel for the guardian ad litem asked if Mother’s child, Ca.,

was born drug positive, Mother answered affirmatively and indicated she had

been using cocaine, and the following exchange regarding Ca. and Mother’s

other child, Co., occurred:

Q: And at the time that the CHINS was filed for [Ca.], in two
thousand eleven, was your other child made a child in need of
services at the same time?

A: My oldest son?

Q: Mhmm.

A: No.

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 Q: If I have paper work showing an order to file on both
children, would you disagree with that, or does that help refresh
your memory?

A: I really don’t understand – I don’t – I don’t understand, I am
saying like I have the thing with [Ca.], so I don’t think [Co.], I
didn’t have any problem with my oldest son.

Q: During that child in need of services case, did you complete
any services to address your drug use?

A: No, actually, my kid’s father took custody of my son.

Q: So that case closed eventually with the children going to their
dad’s?

A: Mhmm.

*****

Q: Okay. Would it have been April twenty ninth twenty thirteen
when the case closed? You don’t remember?

A: If it says it, I guess that is it.

*****

Q: Did you have an opportunity through that prior CHINS case
to do drug treatment services?

A: Um, yes, I think so. I would think they would give thos [sic]
– I kind of don’t remember, but I would think they –

Q: You weren’t able to complete them during that case?

A: I mean because with the – with my kids’ father – just with the
whole situation – he just adopted [Ca.], so – I don’t think, I know
– I don’t remember.

Id. at 17-18.

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[6] Mother agreed that all of the services ordered as part of the CHINS case for

K.K.M. were appropriate and she needed them, that she missed “a lot of drug

screens,” and that some of them would have been positive if she had taken

them. Id. at 20. When asked if she felt that she needed treatment before she

could provide K.K.M. with a safe home, she stated, “I would think I need some

– I need some structure in this – with this drug thing. I am clean, but I am

battling it, I am struggling. I think maybe I can get some tools or something.”

Id. at 22-23. She indicated that she felt she needed treatment “with the tools

and stuff,” and stated “when I went to Valle Vista, I think I can wipe this out,”

that she needed “a little more time,” and that “[s]ix days aint going to do it for

me.” Id. at 23.

[7] DCS family case manager Bradley Riddle testified that he assessed K.K.M. in

May 2016, made the decision to remove K.K.M. from Mother based on the

previous DCS history involving her two other children and the positive drug

screens at the hospital, and that DCS ended up substantiating Mother for the

neglect of K.K.M. The court heard testimony from case manager Sharon

Sanders who began visitations with Mother in January 2017 and later

conducted home-based case management in March of 2017 and who stated that

Mother’s visits “started to trail off due with [sic] [Mother] cancelling [and] there

were times where she was late.” Id. at 40. When asked when she noticed the

change in Mother’s attendance, case manager Sanders answered “about three

months in . . . is when she started to give excuses why she could not come to

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-760 | October 12, 2018 Page 6 of 19
 visits” and indicated that Mother missed about half of her visits with K.K.M.

Id.

[8] Case manager Sanders also testified that Mother’s initial goals included

admission into rehab, employment, and housing. She answered in the negative

when asked whether Mother felt like she could manage her addiction without

treatment and indicated Mother received referrals to the Terra Treatment

Center and Volunteers of America, needed to go to the detox center before she

could be admitted to Terra, and attended Valle Vista for detox during the first

week of September 2017.2 She indicated Mother was fired from Caito Food

Service because she did not complete her application correctly, and testified

“[b]etween mom and her brother” when asked where Mother was living at the

time of her client assessment and “[s]ame, between mom and brother” when

asked where Mother was living now. Id. at 43. When asked to identify

Mother’s greatest barriers to achieving her goals, case manager Sanders

answered “communication with me” and “waiting to be admitted to a bed,”

and indicated later that Mother did not communicate with her when she was

under the influence and that communication was a problem “because we were

unable to complete any goals or objectives.” Id. at 45, 52.

2
Respondent’s Exhibit VV indicates that Mother was admitted on August 29, 2017, to Valle Vista Health
System, and was discharged on September 6, 2017. On the “Reason for Hospitalization” line, the “detox”
box is marked. Respondent’s Exhibit VV at 3.

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[9] Case manager Sanders testified that she had seen Mother intoxicated at an

August 8, 2017 court hearing,3 and that Mother had told her she had been

drinking. After indicating that Mother attended Fairbanks “for about seven

days, six days” before attending Valle Vista, she agreed with counsel for DCS

that Mother used after that period of time and indicated that it was because

Mother “verbally has stated that she has used.” Id. at 77. She testified that she

did not believe that Mother was currently able to care for a child because “she

has not had the treatment that she needs.” Id. at 47. She also indicated that the

house of Mother’s mother was inappropriate for a child “due to the traffic in the

home.” Id. at 69.

[10] Guardian ad litem Jennifer Ankney (“GAL Ankney”) testified that Mother

attended one child and family team meeting and was not in attendance at the

other ones, that she did not recommend placement of K.K.M. back with

Mother because she did not believe Mother had “demonstrated her ability to

address her sobriety or maintain her sobriety,” and that she recommended

continuing with the plan of adoption with foster parents, who “have provided .

. . a very safe, loving home” for K.K.M. for nearly a year and with whom he

had bonded. Id. at 84. She indicated it was in K.K.M.’s best interests that

Mother’s rights be terminated because she did not believe Mother had

addressed her ability to provide a safe and stable home for him and

3
The record contains a copy of the chronological case summary for the CHINS case involving K.K.M. and
Mother which indicates that a placement review hearing was completed on August 7, 2017.

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 characterized Mother’s participation in the CHINS case as “[n]on-existent,

really.” Id. at 85.

[11] On January 10, 2018, the court continued the hearing and Mother’s mother

testified that she never left K.K.M. alone with Mother “[f]or his protection.”

Id. at 218. Nia Williams, K.K.M.’s family case manager since September 2016

(“FCM Williams”), testified that when she was assigned to the case, Mother

was not engaging in services and that her whereabouts were unknown, that she

talked with Mother about engaging in services in November 2016, and that she

made a new referral for drug screens as well as referrals for home-based care

management with supervised visitation, a substance abuse assessment, and

home-based therapy. She indicated that Mother had not completed any court-

ordered services and that the next time she spoke with Mother was mid-to-late

April 2017, when she made Mother aware of the May 1, 2017 permanency

hearing. FCM Williams stated she had met with Mother prior to an August 7,

2017 hearing and that Mother was “under the influence that day” and behaving

very erratic, kissed her, and “tripped over like nothing that was there.” Id. at

104-105. She testified that K.K.M. has not been returned to Mother’s care since

he was removed and Mother had not remedied the conditions for DCS’s initial

involvement and for K.K.M.’s continued placement, and that Mother “was

completing treatment, and then she relapsed. She chose not to engage when

referrals were made for her previously.” Id. at 107.

[12] FCM Williams agreed when asked if continuation of the parent-child

relationship between Mother and K.K.M. would pose a threat to his well-being

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 and explained that Mother’s “situation right now isn’t stable. Again, she

doesn’t have a stable home.” Id. at 108. She agreed that termination of the

parent-child relationship was in K.K.M.’s best interests because “she is not able

right now to meet [K.K.M.’s] needs. She is not able to parent appropriately

until she regains and maintains her sobriety.” Id. at 109. During cross-

examination, counsel for the guardian ad litem asked FCM Williams if the drug

treatment that Mother was currently engaged in was the only drug treatment

she had received during K.K.M.’s life, and FCM Williams answered negatively

and stated that Mother had “went through Fairbanks prior to this” and

“completed a substance abuse assessment, I believe through Families First

before this.” Id. at 111.

[13] The court heard additional testimony from Mother in which she testified that

her current residence was at Volunteers of America (“VOA”), a recovery

treatment center, that she had been there since October 2017 and finished the

acute program at one point, that when she “was on the second phase, a screen

came back positive for marijuana” and she had to “drop back down,” and that

she was still on the twenty-one day acute phase.4 Id. at 226. When asked if she

thought she could return to her employment at Taco Bell that she had started

on her second phase, she stated “I can. I still have employment there.” Id. at

4
The VOA Fresh Start Recovery Center Monthly Report from December 2017 indicates that Mother was
“due to complete the Step-Down Phase of and discharge from the Fresh Start Recovery Center” on January
17, 2018 and that Mother restarted the Acute Phase on December 29, 2017, when she tested positive for
THC. Respondent’s Exhibit TT.

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 227. She answered negatively when asked by her counsel if she used drugs

before December 17, 2017, and stated “[n]o ma’am I didn’t” when asked “[y]ou

had a positive screen on December seventeenth, did you use?” Id. at 229. She

indicated that she did not have any explanation for the positive screen. (Id.)

She testified that she had not seen K.K.M. since April 2017 and, in explaining

what happened when she stopped visiting, stated:

[DCS] stopped my visits because I wasn’t – I honestly wasn’t –
would have visits. Sometimes I would cancel visits. I was still
using and um when I would have my visits some days, I would
call and let them know because I had become under the
influence, so I would have my visits – I wasn’t consistent
honestly with my visits.

Id. at 232. She answered negatively when asked if she believed she still had

visits and stated “[t]hey told me I couldn’t receive my visits until I got into

treatment.” Id. at 232-233.

[14] On March 13, 2018, the court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental

rights, which provided in part:

10. [Mother] was to undergo a substance abuse assessment and
follow recommendations due to [Mother] having a long history
of cocaine, marijuana and alcohol abuse. She was involved in a
CHINS case approximately six years ago when another child was
born cocaine positive. That case ended with her child being
placed with the father due to [Mother] being unsuccessful at
services.

11. [Mother] has had periods of sobriety but has not maintained
it for the past eleven years.

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 12. After a lapse in time, [Mother] did go to Fairbanks Hospital
to address substance abuse. She later relapsed.

13. [Mother] went through a seven-day program with Fairbanks
but relapsed thereafter.

14. In September of 2017, [Mother] went through a
detoxification program through Valle Vista.

15. As of the first day of trial in this matter, [Mother] was
awaiting a bed in a drug program through Tara. [Mother] felt
she needs treatment and struggles with her sobriety.

16. [Mother] did not go to Tara, but in late October of 2017,
commenced a program through [VOA].

*****

20. As of the time of trial in this matter, [Mother] had not
successfully completed any of the Court ordered services.

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 16-18. The order concluded that there was

a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in K.K.M.’s removal

and continued placement outside the home would not be remedied by Mother

“who has failed to successfully complete a service, maintain[] employment and

housing, and has not demonstrated she is able to maintain sobriety,” and that

termination of the parent-child relationship was in K.K.M.’s best interests. Id.

at 18.

Discussion

[15] The issue is whether the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s parental

rights. In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS is required to

allege and prove, among other things:
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 (B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). If the court finds that the allegations in a petition

described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-

child relationship. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[16] The State’s burden of proof for establishing the allegations in termination cases

“is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-

1261 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2), reh’g denied. This is “a

‘heightened burden of proof’ reflecting termination’s ‘serious social

consequences.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re G.Y.,

904 N.E.2d at 1260-1261, 1260 n.1). “But weighing the evidence under that

heightened standard is the trial court’s prerogative—in contrast to our well-

settled, highly deferential standard of review.” Id. We do not reweigh the

evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the

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 evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn

from the evidence. Id. We confine our review to two steps: whether the

evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the

findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id.

[17] Reviewing whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings,

or the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, is not a license to

reweigh the evidence. Id. “[W]e do not independently determine whether that

heightened standard is met, as we would under the ‘constitutional harmless

error standard,’ which requires the reviewing court itself to ‘be sufficiently

confident to declare the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.

(quoting Harden v. State, 576 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Ind. 1991) (citing Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967))). “Our review must ‘give “due

regard” to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses

firsthand,’ and ‘not set aside [its] findings or judgment unless clearly

erroneous.’” Id. (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., Dearborn Cty. Office,

989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A))). “Because a

case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in

person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court

when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640.

[18] We note that the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive

and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-

2-4(b)(2)(B). Because we find it to be dispositive under the facts of this case, we

limit our review to whether DCS established that there was a reasonable

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 probability that the conditions resulting in the removal or reasons for placement

of K.K.M. outside the home will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B)(i).

[19] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in K.K.M.’s removal will

not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at

642-643. First, we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we

determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will

not be remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a

parent’s fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into

consideration evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent’s recent

improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there

is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that

delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior

history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id.

Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not

preclude them from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of

future behavior. Id.

[20] “The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child’s removal for

purposes of determining whether a parent’s rights should be terminated, but

also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home.” In re

N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). A court may consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal

history, history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing

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 and employment, and the services offered by DCS and the parent’s response to

those services, and, where there are only temporary improvements and the

pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court might reasonably find

that under the circumstances the problematic situation will not improve. Id. A

trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient

lifestyle such that his or her physical, mental, and social growth are

permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. In re

Z.C., 13 N.E.3d 464, 469 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[21] Mother challenges several of the court’s findings, contends that K.K.M. was

“removed from Mother solely because he and Mother tested positive for

cocaine” at the time of his birth, and argues that there is no clear and

convincing evidence that this condition will not be remedied. Appellant’s Brief

at 12. She asserts, in part, that the court’s findings that Mother failed to

complete any services and failed to demonstrate an ability to maintain sobriety

are not supported by the evidence given she successfully completed a substance

abuse assessment and a detoxification program, submitted to many random

drug screens, is actively engaged in and receiving intensive therapy at a

residential treatment program at VOA, and is fully engaged in home-based case

management. Mother admits that the court’s finding that she has not had

parenting time with K.K.M. since April 2017 is factually accurate, but argues

that it does not support the conclusion that the removal conditions are unlikely

to be remedied.

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[22] DCS contends Mother’s refusal to engage in court-ordered services and failure

to provide a drug-free home contributed to the continued removal of K.K.M.

and argues that the trial court’s conclusion that Mother will not remedy the

conditions is not clearly erroneous and is supported by the facts that she did not

participate in substance abuse services until after the petition for termination

had been filed, failed to complete court-ordered services, and did not have any

visitation with K.K.M for approximately six months by the first day of the

termination hearing. DCS argues that “[u]ltimately, it was Mother[’s] long

history of drug use, her consistent refusal to participate in services over multiple

years and multiple CHINS cases, and her history of relapses that lead [sic] the

trial court to determine that there was a reasonable probability that Mother

would not remedy the reasons that Child was removed from her care.”

Appellee’s Brief at 25.

[23] The record reveals that Mother had used cocaine, prior to K.K.M.’s birth, since

she was twenty-two years-old and, approximately a month prior to his birth on

May 8, 2016, Mother used it “like maybe once a week for a month.” Transcript

Volume II at 8-9. K.K.M. was Mother’s second child who was born drug

positive while she was using cocaine. After K.K.M.’s birth, Mother had three

random drug screens in which she tested positive for cocaine, alcohol, and

hydrocodone on May 10, 2016, and for alcohol on May 12, 2016, and May 25,

2016; and she admitted, at the October 23, 2017 hearing that she continued

using cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol after K.K.M.’s birth “every day” until

September of 2017, spent “twenty bucks” per week on drugs and alcohol, and

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was in a car wreck “maybe six months” prior in which she was driving her

brother’s car and was under the influence of alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana.

Id. at 11, 13. Mother also agreed at the hearing that she had an opportunity

through her prior CHINS case to complete drug treatment services, that all of

the services ordered as part of K.K.M.’s CHINS case were appropriate, and that

she missed “a lot of drug screens,” some of which would have been positive if

she had taken them. Id. at 17-18, 20. While we observe Mother’s completion

of the acute program at VOA at one point, we note that the trial court is given

discretion in balancing her very recent efforts at improvement against the

habitual patterns of her conduct, in determining that the evidence of Mother’s

prior history is the best predictor of her future behavior, and in finding that

Mother “has had periods of sobriety but has not maintained it for the past

eleven years.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 16. Considering Mother’s

unresolved substance abuse issues, together with the trial court’s other findings,

we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the court’s

determination that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions leading

to K.K.M.’s removal will not be remedied. See In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that there was a reasonable probability that the

conditions that led to the children’s removal, including substance abuse, would

not be remedied and noting that “while [the mother] remedied two of the

conditions that led to the children’s removal, there was no evidence that she

would remedy her substance abuse,” and “[e]ven though [father] attended a

month of treatment at Aspire, he failed to attend the last eight weeks of his

program, which caused Aspire to discharge him for non-attendance”).
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[24] While Mother does not argue that termination of her parental rights was not in

K.K.M.’s best interests, we observe that case manager Sanders answered in the

negative when asked whether Mother felt like she could manage her addiction

without treatment and that Mother indicated she needed more treatment and “a

little more time.” Id. at 23. We also observe that GAL Ankney testified in

support of the request for termination and indicated it was in K.K.M.’s best

interests because she did not believe Mother had addressed her ability to

provide a safe and stable home for him; and that FCM Williams agreed that

termination was in K.K.M.’s best interests because Mother “is not able right

now to meet [K.K.M.’s] needs. She is not able to parent appropriately until she

regains and maintains her sobriety.” Transcript Volume II at 109. Our review

of the evidence as set forth above and in the record reveals that the evidence

supports the trial court’s best interests determination.

Conclusion

[25] We conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental

rights.

[26] Affirmed.

Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-760 | October 12, 2018 Page 19 of 19