[Cite as Weber v. GEICO Cas. Co., 2018-Ohio-4158.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY
Thomas Weber Court of Appeals No. WD-18-003
Appellant Trial Court No. 2017CV0053
v.
GEICO Casualty Company DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellee Decided: October 12, 2018
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Martin J. McManus, for appellant.
Daniel P. Whitehead and Michael R. Kroner, for appellee.
*****
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an accelerated appeal from a January 3, 2018 summary judgment
ruling of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, denying insurance coverage to
appellant and granting summary judgment to appellee/insurer GEICO in connection to a
November 21, 2014 motor vehicle accident occurring in Michigan. For the reasons set
forth below, this court reverses the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 2} Appellant, Thomas Weber, sets forth the following two assignments of error:
A. The trial court erred in holding that appellant[’s] automobile
policy did not provide no-fault personal injury protection coverage for his
Michigan accident.
B. The trial court erred in holding that GEICO Casualty Company
was not negligent in placing appellant in one of its subsidiaries not certified
in Michigan.
{¶ 3} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. Appellant is an
Ohio resident who purchased automobile insurance coverage from GEICO Casualty
Company (“appellee”). During the relevant timeframe, appellant was employed by a
courier service, lived in relatively close proximity to Michigan, and performed a
significant percentage of his work-related automobile travel duties in Michigan.
{¶ 4} On November 21, 2014, while driving his motor vehicle on I-75 in Wayne
County, Michigan, appellant was struck by an intoxicated driver. The collision forced
appellant’s vehicle into the freeway median barrier wall, causing damages and injuries.
{¶ 5} Automobile accidents occurring within the state of Michigan are governed
by Michigan’s no-fault insurance laws. The automobile insurance policy appellant
purchased from appellee contained an out-of-state insurance provision. Specifically, the
provision establishes that, “[W]hen the policy applies to the operation of a motor vehicle
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outside of your state, we agreed to increase your coverage to the extent required of out-
of-state motorists by local law.” The state of Michigan no-fault insurance laws require
that personal injury protection coverage be furnished to comply with Michigan’s no-fault
statutory scheme.
{¶ 6} Subsequent to the accident, appellant filed a claim for benefits with appellee
arising from the above-described November 21, 2014 collision in which appellant was
struck by an intoxicated driver on a Michigan freeway.
{¶ 7} Appellee denied the claim and filed for summary judgment. In support,
appellee denied that it was liable to provide appellant with Michigan personal injury
protection no-fault insurance benefits as appellant’s policy was connected to an affiliate
company not licensed in the state of Michigan.
{¶ 8} In response, appellant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment against
appellee. In support, appellant asserted that the plain language of appellant’s policy
contractually mandated appellee to provide appellant with the coverage required by the
local laws of another state for collisions occurring in that state.
{¶ 9} In addition, appellant contended negligence by appellee in failing to advise
appellant in the course of the purchase of the policy that the policy may not provide
coverage for collisions in Michigan or that the company was comprised of affiliates not
licensed in Michigan.
{¶ 10} On January 3, 2018, the trial court granted summary judgment to appellee,
and denied summary judgment to appellant. In the single page ruling, the trial court
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summarily concludes, “The plaintiff asks this court to declare that he is eligible for no-
fault benefits arising out of his injury accident in Michigan. The plaintiff argues that his
Ohio policy includes language that would conform his coverage to include no-fault
benefits. The plaintiff’s arguments are not well-taken.”
{¶ 11} Given that the trial court’s summary judgment entry lacks any citations to
statutory authority or to legal precedent, it cannot be ascertained what relevant authority
the court relied upon in reaching the above-quoted legal conclusion.
{¶ 12} Both of appellant’s assignments of error stand for the proposition that the
subject trial court summary judgment ruling was incorrect. The assignments of error will
be considered simultaneously.
{¶ 13} It is well-established that an appellate court reviews a trial court’s granting
of summary judgment on a de novo basis, applying the same standard as that used by the
trial court. Lorain Nat’l Bark v. Saratoga Apts., 61 Ohio App.3d 127, 572 N.E.2d 198
(9th Dist.1989).
{¶ 14} Summary judgment will be granted when there remains no genuine issue of
material fact and, when construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving
party, reasonable minds can only conclude that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶ 15} The essence of appellant’s appeal lies in the proposition that the trial court
erred in determining that appellant’s GEICO automobile insurance policy did not provide
personal injury protection coverage to appellant for appellant’s November 21, 2014
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collision in Michigan pursuant to Michigan’s no-fault insurance statutory scheme. We
concur.
{¶ 16} In conjunction with the above, according to Ohio law, insurance policies
are contracts. Their language must be vested with the plain meaning of the words used.
Thus, we conduct our review of the relevant insurance policy language pursuant to the
plain meaning standard. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Owners Ins. Co., 6th Dist. Lucas. No.
L-11-1180, 2012-Ohio-3112, ¶ 13.
{¶ 17} Lastly, consistent with the foregoing applicable legal standards, Kurent v.
Farmers Ins. of Columbus, 62 Ohio St.3d 242, 1991 Ohio LEXIS 2891, 581 N.E.2d 533,
specifically established that when an Ohio resident is injured in an out-of-state
automobile accident occurring in a no-fault insurance state, caused by a resident of that
state who is insured by the state’s no-fault statutory scheme, the Ohio resident’s legal
right to recover from the tortfeasor is governed by the statutory scheme of the no-fault
state where the accident occurred.
{¶ 18} The determinative policy provision of appellant’s GEICO policy
establishes that, “[W]hen the policy applies to the operation of a motor vehicle outside of
your state, we agree to increase your coverage to the extent required of out of state
motorists by local law.”
{¶ 19} The record does not reflect, and therefore a question of material fact
remains, whether appellant operated his motor vehicle in Michigan for, “[A]n aggregate
amount of more than 30 days in any calendar year,” so as to trigger the local Michigan
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statutory requirement for out-of-state drivers such as appellant to maintain PIP coverage
when driving in Michigan. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 500.3102(1).
{¶ 20} Based upon the foregoing, we find that reasonable minds can only conclude
that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellee and thereby finding
appellant ineligible for the increased coverage. Given the facts of this case, appellant
may qualify for the increased coverage and thus the matter must be remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings to enable that determination to be made.
{¶ 21} Lastly, we note that appellee’s assertion that it cannot be liable as appellant
was placed with an affiliate not certified as an insurance provider in Michigan is without
merit as even if the law mandating coverage to an out-of-state motorist is ultimately
determined to be applicable in this case, the law is merely requiring an increase in the
existing coverage of appellant’s Ohio policy to match minimum Michigan requirements,
it is not rendering the Ohio policy a Michigan policy, as implied by appellee’s assertion.
{¶ 22} Wherefore, the January 3, 2018 summary judgment ruling of the Wood
County Court of Common Pleas in this matter is hereby reversed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Appellee
is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment reversed.
6.
Weber v. GEICO Cas. Co.
C.A. No. WD-18-003
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
_______________________________
Christine E. Mayle, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
_______________________________
JUDGE
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