NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 15 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HAYWARD JACKSON, No. 17-56831
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:17-cv-00143-FMO-JPR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
EQUIFAX WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS,
DBA Labor Ready Southwest; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 11, 2018**
Before: TROTT, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Hayward Jackson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his employment action alleging federal and state-law claims. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has filed an amicus brief on
Jackson’s behalf. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Eclectic
Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2014), and
we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jackson’s discrimination claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 because Jackson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his
termination was based on racial animus. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341–
42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a
plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for
relief); Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1989) (in a section 1981
action, “plaintiffs must show intentional discrimination on account of race.”).
Contrary to Jackson’s contentions, the district court did not err by requiring
Jackson to allege factual content demonstrating the plausibility of his claim. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009) (complaint must contain factual
allegations “sufficient to plausibly suggest [a] discriminatory state of mind”).
The district court properly dismissed Jackson’s claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) and § 1986 because Jackson’s second amended complaint contained
only conclusory allegations and failed to attribute specific wrongful conduct to any
individual defendant. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S.
263, 267–68 (1993); Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985)
(“[A] cause of action is not provided under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 absent a valid claim
2 17-56831
for relief under section 1985.”).
AFFIRMED.
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