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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-11250
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-21199-KMW
RYAN LEE ZATER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, FCI MIAMI LOW,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(October 17, 2018)
Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Ryan Zater, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his
28 U.S.C. § 2241 application for habeas corpus relief. The district court concluded
that because Zater failed to satisfy § 2255(e)’s saving-clause requirements, he was
not entitled to relief under § 2241, and dismissed his application for lack of
jurisdiction. On appeal, Zater makes two arguments. First, he asserts that his 18
U.S.C. § 924 convictions are invalid, and that he should be able to seek habeas
relief under § 2255(e)’s saving clause on the ground that he is “actually innocent”
and § 2255 was inadequate and ineffective to challenge his conviction because his
earlier efforts to do so were barred by precedent and the bar on second or
successive § 2255 motions.1 Second, and separately, Zater contends that the
district court erred in not exercising its discretion to transfer his § 2241 application
to the District of South Carolina―the district of his conviction―for resolution.
After careful review, we affirm.
In a federal habeas proceeding under § 2241, the applicability of § 2255(e)’s
saving clause is “a threshold jurisdictional issue,” and the saving clause “imposes a
subject-matter jurisdictional limit” on § 2241 applications. Samak v. Warden, FCC
Coleman-Medium, 766 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). We review
the applicability of § 2255(e)’s saving clause de novo. McCarthan v. Dir. of
1
A federal prisoner who wishes to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence is required to move the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district
court to consider such a motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), cross-referencing 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
Without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive
petition. United States v. Holt, 417 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005).
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Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (2017), cert. denied sub
nom., 138 S. Ct. 502, 199 (2017). Although district courts shall liberally construe
pro se filings, pro se litigants must still comply with the court’s procedural rules,
Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
Ordinarily, a federal prisoner may attack the validity of his conviction or
sentence by filing a motion to vacate under § 2255. Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d
1363, 1365 (11th Cir. 2003). Under § 2255(e)’s saving clause, a prisoner may seek
relief through a § 2241 habeas application only if “the remedy by [§ 2255] motion
is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,” which is the
petitioner’s burden to establish. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); McCarthan, 851 F.3d at
1081. In McCarthan, we concluded that the saving clause permits a federal
prisoner to proceed under § 2241 only when: (1) he is “challeng[ing] the execution
of his sentence, such as the deprivation of good-time credits or parole
determinations”; (2) “the sentencing court [was] unavailable,” such as when the
sentencing court itself has been dissolved; or (3) “practical considerations (such as
multiple sentencing courts) might prevent a petitioner from filing a motion to
vacate.” 851 F.3d at 1092–93.
The saving clause, however, does not allow access to § 2241 simply because
a claim is barred by the rule against second or successive § 2255 motions. Id. at
1092. Consequently, a petitioner who has filed a previous § 2255 motion that has
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been denied may not circumvent the restriction on successive § 2255 motions by
filing an application under § 2241. Id. at 1091–92.
Even liberally construing Zater’s claims, as we must, his argument that he is
“actually innocent” of his § 924 convictions―the same argument that he attempted
to make in his successive § 2255 motions―attacks the substance of his convictions
and accompanying sentences, and thus falls outside the scope of § 2255(e)’s saving
clause as interpreted in McCarthan. Accordingly, we conclude that the district
court properly dismissed his application for lack of jurisdiction.
Additionally, unlike § 2255 motions, § 2241 applications must be brought in
the district court for the district in which the inmate is incarcerated. Fernandez v.
United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991). Any other district court lacks
jurisdiction over a § 2241 application. Id. Here, Zater brought his application in
the Southern District of Florida―the district in which he is incarcerated.
Therefore, the district court did not err by declining to transfer Zater’s application
to the District of South Carolina―the district of his conviction.
For these reasons, the district court properly dismissed Zater’s § 2241
habeas application for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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