J-S48042-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
WILLIAM R. HOSKINS :
:
Appellant : No. 3078 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 24, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-1127531-1975
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 18, 2018
Appellant, William R. Hoskins, (also known as Muhammad Waliyud-Din),
appeals pro se from the order entered January 24, 2017, dismissing his fourth
petition, filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546, as untimely with no exception to the statutory time-bar
pleaded and proven. We affirm.
On April 4, 1985, a jury convicted Appellant of murder of the first degree
and criminal conspiracy.1 Appellant acknowledges that at the time of the
murder he was twenty-three years of age. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 9;
Statement of Errors, 10/16/17, at 3; see also PCRA Court Opinion, 11/14/17,
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1 The PCRA Court also relates that Appellant endeavored to kill an eyewitness
to the murder. (See PCRA Ct. Op., 11/14/17, at 4 n.3)
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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at 5). The trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for his murder
conviction, and to a term of not less than five nor more than ten years of
imprisonment, concurrent, for his conspiracy conviction. This Court affirmed
Appellant’s judgment of sentence on January 19, 1988. He did not seek
allowance of appeal. Accordingly, his sentence became final on February 18,
1988.
Appellant filed multiple unsuccessful post-conviction petitions. He filed
the instant fourth petition under the PCRA, on August 29, 2012. Appointed
counsel filed a Turner/Finley “no merit” letter.2 Appellant filed an objection.
The PCRA court, after independent review of the record, dismissed Appellant’s
petition and permitted counsel to withdraw. This appeal followed.3
Appellant presents one question for our review, which we reproduce
verbatim:
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2 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
3 We note at the outset that Appellant readily concedes his notice of appeal
was late, but maintains that he did not receive notice of the January 24, 2017
dismissal order until September 5, 2017. (See Notice to File Late Appeal,
9/29/17). He blames a “mix-up” in delivery at the federal correctional
institution in New Jersey where he was incarcerated, and where the notice
was sent. (Id.). He provides copies of documentation suggesting that the
notice was immediately (and inexplicably) “returned to sender.” (Id.). While
the explanation is not entirely definitive, and does not totally exclude other
causes, for which he might be more culpable, we conclude Appellant has made
a reasonable, good faith effort to explain the delay. Accordingly, we give
Appellant the benefit of the doubt, and deem his notice of appeal timely filed
nunc pro tunc.
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Is Petitioner/Appellant entitled to post-conviction review
since (P.C.R.A.) counsel acted as a Friend of the Court instead of
acting as a (sic) active advocate on behalf of
petitioner/appellant[?]
(Appellant’s Brief, at 4).
Our standard and scope of review for the denial of a PCRA petition is
well-settled.
[A]n appellate court reviews the PCRA court’s findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by the record, and reviews
its conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from
legal error. The scope of review is limited to the findings of the
PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
We must begin by addressing the timeliness of Appellant’s petition, as
the PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or
disregarded in order to address the merits of his claims. See
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the
PCRA, any petition for relief, including second and subsequent petitions, must
be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment of sentence
becomes final. See id. To avoid the PCRA time-bar, Appellant has the burden
to plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence one of the three
statutory exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by
the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). Furthermore, any petition attempting to
invoke these exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim
could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2); see
Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000).
Here, Appellant claims the benefit of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012), which held, in pertinent part, that mandatory life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles under the age of eighteen violate the Eighth
Amendment. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 8); see also Miller, supra at 470,
479).4 However, Appellant candidly concedes that he was twenty-three years
of age when he committed the murder. Accordingly, he has failed to plead
and prove an applicable exception to the PCRA time-bar. The PCRA court
properly dismissed his petition as untimely.
Moreover, Appellant’s related arguments do not constitute an exception
to the PCRA time-bar and in any event would not merit relief. Appellant raises
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4In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016), as revised (Jan.
27, 2016), the United States Supreme Court decided that Miller announced a
substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral review.
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several overlapping issues for review. He claims PCRA counsel was not “an
active advocate”. (Appellant’s Brief, at 4). Specifically, Appellant asserts
counsel should have argued for an expansive interpretation of Miller,
extending its application to him as a twenty-three year old at the time of the
murder. (See id. at 9-10). We construe this claim liberally as a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Notably, a claim of ineffective assistance
must still establish one of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.
As a prefatory matter, although this Court is willing to construe
liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally
confers no special benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro
se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the
Pennsylvania Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss
an appeal if an appellant fails to conform with the requirements
set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 252 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal
denied, 879 A.2d 782 (Pa. 2005) (case citation omitted).
Here, Appellant’s issue fails to present a cognizable claim for PCRA relief.
It is not enough to claim generally that counsel acted as a friend of the court
and should have been a more zealous advocate. Appellant had the burden to
prove “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the
particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9543(a)(2)(ii).
Our standard of review in ineffectiveness cases is well-
settled. Counsel is presumed effective, and the appellant has the
burden of proving otherwise. Appellant establishes
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ineffectiveness of counsel with a demonstration that: (1) the
underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or
inaction was not grounded on any reasonable basis designed to
effectuate Appellant’s interest; and (3) there is a reasonable
probability that the act or omission prejudiced Appellant in such a
way that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. If the issue underlying the charge of ineffectiveness is
not of arguable merit, counsel will not be deemed ineffective for
failing to pursue a meritless issue. Also, if the prejudice prong of
the ineffectiveness standard is not met, the claim may be
dismissed on that basis alone and [there is no] need [to]
determine whether the [arguable merit] and [client’s interests]
prongs have been met.
Commonwealth v. D'Collanfield, 805 A.2d 1244, 1246–47 (Pa. Super.
2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Appellant’s underlying claim, that he was eligible for the special
treatment afforded to juveniles by Miller, supra, is unsupported by
controlling authority and lacks arguable merit.5 This Court cannot deem
counsel ineffective for failing to assert a meritless claim. See
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 947 A.2d 795, 798 (Pa. Super. 2008).
“Counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once this Court
determines that the defendant has not established any one of the prongs of
the ineffectiveness test.” Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398, 406 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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5 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) for a discussion of why
the age of eighteen is “is the point where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood.”
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Appellant’s petition is untimely, and he has not satisfied a timeliness
exception to the requirements of the PCRA. The PCRA court was without
jurisdiction to review the merits of Appellant’s claim, and properly dismissed
his petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/18/18
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